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Abstract 
I investigate how culture affects decision making under risk and uncertainty 
through three main strands - social networks, cultural norms and identity, and 
peer effects. 
Firstly, I investigate whether students from collectivist cultures form larger 
networks at university than students from individualist cultures and to what extent 
these networks are relied on for risk-sharing. Using an online survey, I find that 
students from collectivist cultures such as China form larger financial risk-sharing 
networks at university than students from individualist cultures such as Britain. In 
the financial context, having a larger network increases the willingness to take 
risks for collectivists but not individualists. On the other hand, students from 
collectivist cultures are less willing to take risks with their interpersonal 
relationships than those from individualist cultures. One likely reason for this is 
that as networks are relied on more for risk-sharing in collectivist cultures, the 
value of maintaining relationships is increased. 
Secondly, I run experiments with a stag hunt and bargaining coordination game 
to see whether cultural norms or identity play a part in coordination decisions. 
Using a between-subjects design, I vary the identity of the opponent between 
someone of the same culture or a different culture. I compare the responses of 
British and Asian students and show the cultural identity of the opponent by 
physical appearance. The players appear to use cultural stereotypes to predict 
behaviour, especially in the bargaining game which may require more strategic 
thought than the stag hunt game.  
Finally, I investigate cultural differences in conformity in the context of risk 
attitudes. I expect that people from cultures that value conformity, such as 
collectivist East Asian cultures, will be more likely to conform to others than 
   
 3 
 
people from cultures that value individuality, such as the United Kingdom. My 
experiment consists of lottery choice tasks, where some students are given 
information on the choices from a previous session. Again, comparing Asian and 
British students, I find no difference in the distribution of Asian choices between 
treatments. However, the British students are inclined to choose against the 
majority of their peers. This behaviour is consistent with an individualist culture 
that places value on uniqueness. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
 In this thesis I explore how culture affects decision making under risk and 
uncertainty. As a growing area of research in economics, studying cultural 
differences helps us to understand whether some phenomena are unique to 
certain groups or generalizable to the human population (Henrich et al, 2010). 
When a cultural difference exists we can dig deeper to find out why people from 
certain cultures behave the way they do. We can then provide recommendations 
for Governments, firms, and individuals who interact with people from different 
cultures. The question of cultural differences is especially important in the current 
times of increasing migration and lowering of trade barriers. As interactions with 
people from different cultures rise, there is an increasing need to understand each 
other’s preferences. This research aims to meet that need. 
1.2 Summary of Chapters 
In Chapter Two, I begin the thesis with a literature review of cultural 
differences in economics. I also use this chapter to explain what we mean by 
culture in an economics context and how the concept can be used meaningfully. 
I then go on to discuss the previous evidence on cultural differences under the 
two main headings of individual choice and games. Finally, I end the chapter with 
a discussion of the proposed explanations for cultural differences and highlight 
some of the key challenges that arise when trying to compare the behaviour of 
people from different cultural groups. 
In Chapter Three of this thesis, I investigate whether students from 
collectivist cultures form larger networks at university than students from 
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individualist cultures and to what extent these networks are relied on for risk 
sharing. The idea is that people from collectivist cultures are more likely to have 
access to informal risk sharing networks than people from individualist cultures, 
which should affect their risk attitudes (Hsee and Weber, 1999). I also test the 
hypothesis that students from collectivist cultures are more risk averse for social 
risks than students from individualist cultures. If people from collectivist societies 
have greater scope to receive financial support from their social network, they 
may have a stronger incentive to maintain relationships with those they can 
receive support from. 
 Moving on from individual choice, Chapter Four looks at how people make 
decisions when interacting with others from a different culture. In particular, I run 
a stag hunt and bargaining coordination game where players interact with either 
players from their own culture or a different culture. The premise is that people 
from the same culture will share similar social norms and find it easier to predict 
each other's behaviour, thus improving coordination. On the other hand, when 
faced with an opponent from a different culture people are less familiar with each 
other's norms and may rely more on stereotypes to predict behaviour. The results 
from this project will be relevant for international bargaining where the parties do 
not know each other’s strategies. 
Finally, in Chapter Five I investigate how an individual’s decisions are 
shaped by the attitudes of his or her peers. The idea is that people from cultures 
who value conformity should be more susceptible to peer effects in attitudes 
towards risk and uncertainty. I test this prediction by running lottery choice 
experiments where some players are told the percentage of people choosing 
each option from a previous session. 
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I believe these chapters flow well from each other. I begin by looking at 
how culture drives individual decision making, then move on to study interactive 
scenarios, and end by studying how group norms are projected back onto the 
individual. In Chapter Six I finish the thesis with some concluding remarks and 
touch on future research directions for this topic. 
1.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
While cross-cultural studies in economics have been done before, much 
of the previous literature focuses on social preferences in ultimatum and public 
goods games. By focusing on social networks, coordination games, and peer 
effects, this thesis will fill a gap in literature. The area of cultural differences is 
relatively new in economics, and as such there is still scope for improvement. 
The social networks chapter is unique in that it studies a likely cause of 
cultural differences in risk attitudes. A lot of previous literature about social 
networks exists in economics, as well as some literature on cultural differences 
in risk attitudes. However, previous literature has not covered the link between 
the two areas in a great level of detail. While we know that cultural differences 
exist, the challenge now is to explore the causality and pin-point the exact 
mechanisms through which culture affects risk attitudes. 
I deal with the causality issue by looking at how students choose to form 
networks when they come to study at university, while controlling for external 
factors. When studying networks at home we are unable to tell why the networks 
exist. Were people born into their networks or did they acquire them for the 
purposes of risk sharing? We want to find out to what extent networks are driven 
by culture compared to economic conditions. If students from collectivist cultures 
still form larger networks at university after controlling for financial situation and 
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other demographics, this indicates that culture may be a key driver of network 
formation. 
Studying differences in coordination games also fills a gap in the cross-
cultural literature. Some previous literature suggests that group identity (Chen 
and Chen, 2011) and social norms (Singh, 2009) are important for coordination 
game outcomes, but few studies have focused on culture. As culture is one 
aspect of identity, those from similar cultures should find it easier to coordinate 
on payoff dominant outcomes. Similarly, if the players share some social norm, 
such as trust, they should find it easier to coordinate. Much of the previous 
literature on cultural differences in games looks at social preferences, rather than 
focusing on norms and identity in particular. This chapter aims to fill that gap. 
Finally, peer effects have proven to have a very strong influence on 
behaviour. Usually people prefer to conform to what others in their peer group 
are doing. This is because people gain utility from belonging to a group and want 
to act in a way that reinforces their group identity (Geisinger, 2004). However, 
some cultures value conformity more than others (Bond and Smith, 1996). 
Collectivist cultures are very group focused and value consistency and harmony 
in relationships. However, individualist cultures are more concerned with 
individual freedom and expression. There is a desire to stand out from the crowd 
in individualist societies. Peer effects in risk attitudes is a relatively new area in 
economics and yet to be studied cross-culturally. This chapter will link up the 
evidence of peer effects in economics with the social psychology literature on 
cultural differences in peer effects. 
In general, cross-cultural research improves our understanding of when 
and where our results and theories can be applied. Many human behaviours are 
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context-specific and contexts often interact with demographic variables such as 
culture. The interpretation of any given situation will likely depend on the prior 
experiences of the decision maker, which can differ vastly by culture. Of course, 
this can make results difficult to interpret when running experiments as we cannot 
be sure that people from different cultures interpreted the task in the same way. 
Abstract experiments that are lacking in context are a particular problem as the 
participants are free to imagine their own context which will likely differ by culture. 
Field experiments with a more natural context may therefore be a better route to 
studying cultural differences. For example, studying insurance arrangements in 
different groups will give us insight into risk preferences in a real decision 
environment. 
Some of the key theories in behavioural economics, such as prospect 
theory, were developed based on results from experiments on Westernised 
college students. There is little reason to believe that people from different 
backgrounds are subject to the same decision biases. For example, Chinese and 
Koreans tend to be less loss averse than Americans because they have more 
scope to seek compensation for a loss from their social networks (Arkes et al, 
2010). Similarly, Chinese may be more subject to framing effects than Americans 
because they focus more on the background of a situation than the foreground 
(Morris and Peng, 1994). We now need to run more experiments in different 
countries to see whether the theories developed in behavioural economics can 
be applied across cultures. 
As well as improving our understanding, this research has wider 
implications for public policy and the private sector. Risk attitudes are important 
in many policy settings such as health and safety and tax compliance. When the 
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Government introduces a policy change it should consider how the change 
impacts different cultural groups. Using subtle “nudge” techniques (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008) may be effective for some cultures while having a negative effect 
on others. Firms will also have an interest in this research as they will better 
understand the risk attitudes of their customers, competitors, and trading 
partners. This is especially true when doing business abroad. As the world is 
rapidly becoming more globalised this research provides a timely response that 
will be useful now and in the future. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
2.1 Overview and Motivation 
There is little doubt that the environment one is raised in can affect 
behaviour in many economic settings. Culture shapes the social norms of a 
society and guides people’s behaviour and decision making. People from 
different cultural backgrounds will usually have different beliefs and values, which 
affect their choices in social interactions and economic decisions. However, the 
majority of economic experiments to date have been conducted on Western, 
particularly American, college students. In many cases, results from experiments 
using such samples are unlikely to generalise to the human population as a whole 
(Henrich et al, 2010). 
As the world becomes more globalised and interactions with people from 
other cultures rise, there is an increasing need to understand the preferences of 
people from all over the world. For example, firms doing business abroad will 
benefit from understanding their markets and trading partners. Similarly, 
Governments will find trade negotiations easier with a greater understanding of 
each other’s culture. Even individuals will benefit from understanding how culture 
affects the decision making of people they interact with regularly. 
 Culture has been shown to be an important factor in a wide variety of 
economic decisions. For example, Henrich et al (2001) find vast differences in 
ultimatum game responses across societies. People who live in societies with a 
high level of market integration1 tend to give close to the equal split, while any 
low offers are rejected. In contrast, those with a high level of economic 
                                                          
1 Market integration is a measure of how much people rely on market exchange in their daily lives 
(Henrich et al, 2001, p. 76). 
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independence tend to make very low offers which are almost always accepted. 
Similarly, Herrmann et al (2008) find differences in antisocial punishment2 in 
public goods games across cities. Those in Muscat (Oman) and Athens (Greece) 
engage in very high levels of antisocial punishment, while those in Boston (USA) 
and Melbourne (Australia) show the least. Herrmann et al (2008) explain their 
results in terms of differences in societal norms, such as a tendency to punish 
“do-gooders” in some societies, which leads to antisocial punishment. 
Risk attitudes have also been shown to differ by culture. For example, 
Hsee and Weber (1999) find that Chinese students are significantly more risk 
seeking than American students, when choosing between risky or safe lottery 
options. Hsee and Weber (1999) claim that this result is driven by the high level 
of collectivism3 in Chinese culture, which promotes risk-sharing behaviour within 
families. In addition, both American and Chinese participants in Hsee and 
Weber’s (1999) study expected the Americans to be the more risk seeking out of 
the two cultural groups, which suggests a reliance on cultural stereotypes to try 
and predict behaviour. Therefore, culture not only affects individual behaviour, 
but also how we perceive and form judgements of others in society. Finally, 
culture can also affect how we are influenced by other people, with those from 
collectivist cultures being more conformist than those from individualist cultures 
(Bond and Smith, 1996). 
 
                                                          
2 Antisocial punishment is where the person being punished contributed at least as much to the 
public good as the punisher. 
3 Collectivism is a societal structure which is organised in strong close-knit groups, where group 
members offer each other mutual protection and support (e.g. China, India). The opposite of 
collectivism is individualism, where people are expected to take responsibility for themselves and 
close family only (e.g. United States, United Kingdom). Collectivism and individualism can be 
seen as a scale, on which countries can be ranked, rather than absolute measures. 
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2.2 Meaning of Culture 
 As the word culture has several different meanings, I clarify here what 
culture refers to in this study. Richerson and Boyd (2005, p. 5) give the following 
definition of culture: 
Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they 
acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, 
and other forms of social transmission. 
Here, information includes a wide variety of aspects, such as ideas, experiences, 
skills, norms, and attitudes, to name just a few. Richerson and Boyd (2005) 
emphasise that such information need not be conscious. Some aspects of culture 
may be instinctively acquired without conscious thought, such as the habits and 
mannerisms of people within a society. Culture is acquired over time by absorbing 
information from one’s society. It is important to note that cultural information is 
capable of affecting behaviour, but will not affect behaviour with certainty. Modern 
psychology views culture as a dynamic process that can be primed in certain 
situations (Wong and Hong, 2005). 
Guiso et al (2006) try to identify a causal link between culture and 
economic outcomes, by narrowing down culture to beliefs and values. They 
define culture in the following way: 
Those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social 
groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation. 
Guiso et al (2006) give culture economic relevance by interpreting customary 
beliefs and values as expectations and preferences, respectively. Economic 
outcomes can then be linked back to beliefs and values, which are partly driven 
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by culture. Although the main way culture can influence decision making is likely 
to be through beliefs and values, other factors may also be important, such as 
societal norms and acquired habits. Therefore, I am more comfortable with 
Richerson and Boyd’s (2005) definition, which defines culture as information, 
including beliefs and values, as well as other aspects of culture. These other 
aspects of culture may have a less direct economic interpretation than beliefs and 
values, but should be included to give a complete definition of culture. 
One potential advantage of Guiso’s et al’s (2006) definition is that it 
suggests that causality runs in only one direction. This is because the definition 
specifies that culture is fairly unchanged from generation to generation, and is 
acquired from previous generations, rather than current situational differences 
between groups. Guiso et al (2006) argue that changes in culture due to the 
economic circumstances of a group are usually very slow, and happen over 
centuries rather than years. Thus cultural factors are usually quite stable over an 
individual’s lifetime. However, the gradual evolution of culture can also be applied 
to Richerson and Boyd’s (2005) definition. While it is possible for culture to 
change over a long period of time, any given individual is unlikely to experience 
substantial cultural change over their life-time. 
Although I am primarily concerned with national cultures, different cultures 
also exist within nations. Conventionally, cultures within nations are referred to 
as subcultures while differences between nations or groups of similar nations are 
known as cultural differences (Hofstede, 1980). I follow this convention. 
Examples of subcultures include cultures within workplaces or professions, which 
are interesting in their own right, and provide useful case studies of the impact of 
culture on decisions. 
   
 22 
 
Cultural theory is used to explain cultural differences at the individual or 
subculture level (Douglas, 1982; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). This theory 
characterises people into four groups: Hierarchists, Egalitarians, Fatalists, and 
Individualists. These categories have different implications for risk attitudes. 
Hierarchists care about risks that are likely to threaten the social order, 
Egalitarians are concerned with risks to equality, Fatalists feel unable to control 
risks, and Individualists care about risks to personal freedom (Langford et al, 
2000). Subcultures and national cultures can also be associated with these 
categories. Which cultural identity is important for behaviour (e.g. national or 
individual) will likely depend on which identity is salient at the time a decision is 
made (e.g. Wong and Hong, 2005; Shih et al, 1999). Thus, when someone is at 
work, their workplace culture may override individual or national culture. 
2.3 Previous Cross-Cultural Research 
2.3.1 Individual Choice 
Attitudes towards Gambling and Insurance 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find a reflection effect amongst many 
subjects, where risk aversion in the domain of gains switches to risk seeking in 
the domain of losses. One factor that contributes to this result is a bias for certain 
outcomes in the gain frame, but bias against certain outcomes in the loss domain. 
This is because the pain of a sure loss is overweighted relative to a probabilistic 
loss. 
However, due to the overweighting of small probabilities (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979), subjects often show an opposite reflection effect under very low 
probabilities. For example, many people find buying a lottery ticket or betting on 
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horse races an attractive activity, even though the probabilities of winning are 
often very low. People tend to become highly risk seeking when there is a small 
probability of winning a large prize, and the cost of participation in the lottery is 
not too high. When one gambles on a lottery ticket or horse race, the odds are 
not designed to be in one’s favour, which means that the expected value of the 
lottery is negative. Voluntary participation in an activity when one is expected to 
lose money shows risk seeking behaviour. Conversely, in the loss domain, many 
people prefer to purchase insurance against a low probability disaster, even 
though their expected wealth would be higher without insurance. Under very low 
probabilities, people tend to become more risk averse in the loss domain, which 
is the opposite of the reflection effect typically found under moderate and high 
probabilities. 
 Sowinski et al (2011) and Laban (2011) find an opposite reflection effect 
for different cultural groups when looking at behaviour under very low 
probabilities. Sowinski et al (2011) find that while most Americans prefer to take 
a gamble that pays $5,000 with 0.1% probability rather than have $5 with 
certainty, most Germans prefer the sure gain. However, when the same problem 
is framed as a loss, most Americans prefer to insure themselves against the 0.1% 
chance of a $5,000 loss by taking a $5 loss with certainty, while most Germans 
prefer to leave themselves open to the large loss. Similarly, using the same 
parameters as Sowinski et al (2011), Laban (2011) finds that British students 
prefer to take the gamble in the gain frame but the insurance in the loss frame, 
while Chinese students show the opposite. 
Of course, the dominant behaviour of all four cultures in these studies is 
inconsistent with expected utility theory, which assumes a constant utility function 
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over both positive and negative domains. The behaviour can be modelled using 
prospect theory, where subjects attach decision weights to probabilities. Decision 
weights reflect the impact of a prospect’s probability on the overall value of a 
prospect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 275). Americans and British 
apparently attach higher decision weights to the probability 0.001 than Germans 
and Chinese. However, it is worth noting that abstract lottery choices such as 
these may not accurately reflect true attitudes towards gambling and insurance4. 
Usually the exact probabilities are unknown when gambling or purchasing 
insurance, and need to be estimated by the consumer. Running a study with the 
same parameters as above but using field context or introducing uncertainty 
would go some way to generalising the lab results to the real world. 
 The overweighting of very low probabilities contributes to a four-fold 
pattern of risk aversion, which is often observed in experiments (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). Subjects tend to be risk averse for moderate and high 
probability gains, but risk seeking for very low probability gains. In the loss 
domain, subjects tend to be risk seeking for moderate and high probability losses, 
but risk averse for low probability losses. However, results from Sowinski et al 
(2011) and Laban (2011) suggest that the four-fold pattern of risk aversion might 
not generalise to all cultures, as Germans and Chinese do not seem to 
overweight small probabilities to the same extent as Americans and Britons. 
Attitudes towards Tax Evasion 
Evading tax is another kind of risky behaviour. Tax evaders risk getting 
caught and penalised by the Government in the hope of gaining the benefit of a 
                                                          
4 Harrison et al (2007) explain some of the difficulties in generalising risk attitudes elicited in the 
lab to real world behaviour. 
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reduced tax burden. Cultural differences in attitudes towards tax evasion have 
been well documented. The differences stem from either differences in tax 
administration across countries, or the attitudes of citizens towards governments 
(Cummings et al, 2004). Tsakumis et al (2007) characterise a country with high 
levels of tax evasion according to Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions of culture as a 
country with low individualism, high uncertainty avoidance, low masculinity, and 
high power distance5. Empirical evidence supports these hypotheses, with 
countries such as the United Kingdom and United States found to be more tax 
compliant compared to countries such as Italy and Spain (Cullis et al, 2012; Lewis 
et al, 2009; Alm and Torgler, 2005). 
Cullis et al (2012) show how cultural differences affect tax evasion through 
prospect theory. Using a hypothetical survey with student participants, they find 
that British taxpayers are more compliant than Italians. They attribute this result 
to differences in social norms between the two countries. People in the UK expect 
to pay tax and therefore have a lower reference point than the Italians, i.e. income 
net of any tax payments. As Italians believe tax evasion is more widespread in 
their society they are more likely to consider a reference point that is closer to 
gross income. This means that Italians see tax as more of a loss against their 
reference point than the British. According to prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979), people become more risk seeking when they are faced with a 
loss, and thus more likely to evade taxes. Figure 2.1 below shows the difference 
in reference points between UK and Italian taxpayers, where Ri is the reference 
point for Italians and Rb is the reference point for British. As can be seen in the 
                                                          
5 Uncertainty avoidance measures the extent to which people in a society try to minimise 
uncertainty. Masculinity measures the extent a society endorses masculine values such as 
competitiveness and assertiveness. Power distance shows how much the people with less power 
in a society view the distribution of power as unequal. 
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graph, a tax pushes the Italians into the loss domain, which encourages them to 
become risk seeking. 
Figure 2.1: Reference Points of UK and Italian Taxpayers 
 
 
In addition to reference points, Cullis et al (2012) also look at the slope of 
each group’s value function. British taxpayers are assumed to experience an 
intrinsic benefit to paying tax, which is described as a warm glow effect. The warm 
glow effect comes from the UK having higher tax morale than Italy. This means 
that British taxpayers see a tax payment as less of a loss and more of gain 
compared to the Italians, which makes the British value function flatter. The 
steeper value function for Italians implies they are more risk seeking for losses 
and more risk averse for gains. This is because they see a tax payment as more 
of a loss and a tax rebate as more of a gain. The British experience less of a gain 
from a tax rebate because they miss out on the warm glow effect of paying tax. 
Conversely, they see tax payments as less of a loss than Italians because they 
gain a warm glow effect from conforming to their peers. The difference between 
British and Italians is shown below in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: Value Function of UK and Italian Taxpayers 
 
Cullis et al (2012) show how cultural differences in tax compliance exist in 
theory and back this up with empirical results. Social norms are highlighted as 
one way that culture changes the implications of prospect theory, but there could 
be many more reasons for cultural differences (e.g. upbringing, social networks, 
group identity effects, and genetics). More research needs to be done to better 
understand the exact ways in which culture interacts with prospect theory and 
individual risk attitudes. 
2.3.2 Games 
 Strategic games are played under some level of uncertainty, in that you 
cannot be sure which strategies your opponent will choose. Players who are 
particularly averse to uncertainty will therefore look to play safe options when 
playing strategic games. Outcomes of interactive games depend to a large 
degree on social preferences (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). As social 
preferences are shaped by norms within a society, we have reason to expect that 
people from different cultures will behave differently when playing interactive 
games. Results from several games have been compared across cultures 
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directly, such as the ultimatum and public goods games. Other games, such as 
coordination games, lack empirical cross-cultural data, but some related literature 
suggests interesting effects. I will explain the key results for each of these games 
below. 
Ultimatum and Dictator Games 
 This section would not be complete without mentioning the ultimatum and 
dictator games run by Henrich et al (2001), which were among the first economic 
experiments conducted in small-scale societies6 such as tribes in the Amazonian 
rainforest. The ultimatum game involves a proposer and a recipient. The proposer 
chooses how to split an amount of money7 (“the pie”, typically $10) between 
themselves and the recipient. The recipient then decides whether to accept the 
proposal, in which case the split chosen by the proposer is implemented, or reject 
the proposal, in which case both players receive nothing. The dictator game is 
the same as the ultimatum game, except that the recipient does not get to make 
a decision and has to accept whatever is offered to them. Thus, the dictator game 
measures how much people are willing to give for altruistic motives alone. 
 The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for these games involves the 
proposer never offering anything (or offering the smallest possible amount in the 
case of the ultimatum game with discrete strategy choices) and the recipient 
never rejecting (they are better off with a small amount than nothing at all). 
However, when these games are played with real subjects, the proposers often 
send positive amounts and the recipients tend to reject low offers. This behaviour 
                                                          
6 A small-scale society contains a few dozen to several thousand individuals who live by foraging, 
herding animals, or horticulture. Such societies lack complicated economies or Governments and 
kinship relationships tend to be very important. 
7 Although most of Henrich et al’s (2001) experiments use money, a few use other valuable goods 
such as tobacco. 
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can be explained by social preferences, i.e. caring about the payoffs of other 
people, which are likely to be culture-dependent. 
 Henrich et al (2001) find vast differences when these games are played 
by different subject pools. For example, the Machiguenga tribe in Peru only offer 
around 25% of the pie on average, but hardly ever reject offers. This is in contrast 
to standard student samples, who tend to offer around 40% in the ultimatum 
game and reject lower offers. At the other extreme, the Lamelara tribe in 
Indonesia make very generous offers with a mean of 58%. Some societies even 
reject offers above the 50% mark. For example, the Au and Gnau of Papua New 
Guinea reject both very low and very high offers with nearly equal frequency. 
Henrich et al’s (2001) dictator game results also vary widely, with the Orma 
in Kenya showing a model offer of 50% while the Hadza of Tanzania’s mode is 
only 10%. Student samples tend to give around 25% in dictator games (Andreoni 
et al, 2007). These results suggest that how people play the ultimatum and 
dictator games is dependent on the society in which they live. Henrich et al’s 
(2001) results are consistent with the norms of the societies they studied. For 
example, societies with more interaction and a norm of sharing tend to give more 
than societies where families live independently of each other. 
 Dictator games have also been used to examine norm enforcement in 
Papua New Guinea (Bernhard et al, 2006). This study introduces uncertainty to 
the dictator game by including the option of punishment of the dictator by an 
independent third-party. The third-party observes the amount the dictator 
transfers to the recipient and can decide to punish the dictator. Punishment 
lowers the dictator’s payoff but is costly to the third-party. Therefore, the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium of this game involves no punishment. However, the 
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third-party may choose to inflict punishment on the dictator to enforce a social 
norm that the dictator may have violated. 
 Bernhard et al (2006) play the dictator game with third-party punishment 
with two tribes in Papua New Guinea. Their treatments vary by the tribal identity 
of each player. The tribes in Papua New Guinea hold very egalitarian values, and 
thus are likely to select the equal split as the social norm. Any deviation from the 
equal split is therefore likely to attract punishment by the third-party. The authors 
find that punishment occurs significantly more when the punisher and recipient 
belong to the same tribe, or when the dictator belongs to a different tribe than the 
punisher. This shows evidence of in-group altruism, as the punishers show more 
aversion to a member of their own group being treated unfairly, and dictators are 
forgiven more if they are from the punisher’s own tribe. 
 The above study shows that how players behave in a game depends on 
the norms of their society and the identity of their opponents. Differences in norms 
and identity have interesting implications for how strategic games are played 
cross-culturally. How will the cultural identity of the opponent matter when a 
player is selecting strategies, and how will the social norms of each player drive 
their behaviour? I address these questions in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 A few studies have looked at cross-cultural differences in prisoners’ 
dilemma game responses but the evidence is inconclusive. An example of a 
typical prisoners’ dilemma game is given below in Figure 2.3. The prisoners’ 
dilemma game has a payoff structure such that both players have a dominant 
strategy to defect, even though both players would do better if they both 
cooperate rather than defect. Cultures that place more emphasis on maximising 
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social welfare than individual gain may do a better job of coordinating on the 
cooperative outcome. 
Figure 2.3: Prisoners’ Dilemma 
  Player 2 
 Cooperate Defect 
Player 1 Cooperate 3, 3 0, 5 
Defect 5, 0 1, 1 
 
 Wong and Hong (2005) show that priming bicultural Hong-Kong Chinese 
participants with Chinese icons (e.g. a Chinese dragon) increases cooperation 
when playing a prisoners’ dilemma against a friend, compared to a control group 
(primed with geometric shapes) and those primed with American8 icons (i.e. the 
American flag). However, no differences are found when playing against a 
stranger. The results for friends are consistent with the Chinese notion of 
collectivism that places great importance on the well-being of the group as 
opposed to the individual. However, the identity of the group also matters, such 
as whether the group consists of friends or strangers. 
 Goerg and Walkowitz (2009) show a cultural difference in framing effects 
when playing the prisoners’ dilemma, with Chinese and Palestinians subject to a 
framing effect but Finns and Israelis showing no such effect. The prisoners’ 
dilemma game they use is framed with either positive or negative externalities, 
although both frames are logically and strategically identical. They find that 
Chinese and Palestinian participants cooperate more when the game is framed 
in terms of positive externalities compared to negative externalities. As noted by 
the authors, the difference could stem from higher collectivism among Chinese 
                                                          
8 The authors choose to use American primes as American influence is strong in Hong-Kong. 
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and Palestinians which makes them more likely to cooperate and perhaps makes 
the frame more salient. Israeli and Finnish societies are more individualistic and 
therefore more competitive and less likely to cooperate. 
 Chen et al (2010) investigate the effect of priming different identities when 
playing a prisoners’ dilemma game. Specifically, they prime either an ethnic 
identity (to capture fragmentation) or a school identity (to capture a common 
identity). They find that compared to Caucasians, Asians are more responsive to 
priming and show significantly more in-group favouritism and out-group 
discrimination when playing the prisoner’s dilemma. Again, this could be due to 
the high level of collectivism in Asian cultures, where a strong group identity is 
important. 
 Cross-cultural results for the prisoners’ dilemma game are not yet 
extensive enough to draw robust conclusions. However, the evidence above 
suggests that collectivist cultures are more group-focused and therefore more 
likely to cooperate in the prisoners’ dilemma game, but only when the opponent 
is from the same group and cultural identities are made salient. 
Public Goods 
 The public goods game involves players deciding how much to contribute 
to a public good (ci), according to the following payoffs, where 1/n < α < 1. This 
game is similar to the prisoners’ dilemma in that the individual incentives are to 
free-ride (i.e. contribute nothing), even though players would receive a higher 
payoff when everyone contributes the maximum amount. 
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑧 − 𝑐𝑖) +  𝛼 ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
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 Herrmann et al (2008) play the public goods game with punishment across 
a variety of cities. Here, players can punish (with some cost to themselves) other 
group members after observing their contributions. They find differences in 
contributions and punishment across the different subject pools, but the most 
striking difference is in the level of antisocial punishment. Antisocial punishment, 
which is where the punisher contributed the same or less to the public good as 
the person they are punishing, is particularly strong in Athens (Greece) and 
Muscat (Oman). On the other hand, players in Boston (USA) and Melbourne 
(Australia) punished very little antisocially, but punished free-riders extensively. 
Herrmann et al (2008) suggest that the difference is due to variations in norms 
within each society. Some societies have a tendency to punish people who out-
perform or “show-off”, while others will only punish those who free-ride. The 
highest contributions are sustained in Boston (USA) and Copenhagen 
(Denmark), both of which engage in high levels of free-riding punishment. 
 As is becoming a recurring theme, Herrmann et al (2008, p. 1366) mention 
individualism/collectivism as a possible explanation for their results. Those in 
collectivist societies may be more driven towards antisocial punishment if they 
see the other players as out-group members. This is because the other players 
are strangers rather than members of the collectivist players’ close-knit social 
networks. Herrmann et al’s (2008) results are indeed consistent with collectivist 
cultures engaging in higher levels of antisocial punishment than individualist 
cultures. Regressions show a highly significant correlation between antisocial 
punishment and a widely used measure of individualism/collectivism (Hofstede, 
1980). 
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 Public goods games also yield interesting results when played inter-
culturally, i.e. when the players are from different cultures. Cultural diversity tends 
to hinder the ability of players to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium 
(Banerjee et al, 2005). Reasons that have been put forward for this include in-
group altruism towards members of the same culture, that members of the same 
culture have more scope to punish defectors in the future, and that members of 
the same culture can use social norms to coordinate on outcomes (i.e. a strategy 
selection mechanism). Habyarimana et al (2007) investigate why ethnic diversity 
hinders the provision of public goods. They find the strategy selection reason to 
be the most important, with members of the same ethnic group tending to play 
cooperative equilibria while members of different ethnic groups do not. However, 
they also find evidence that the threat of punishment is important, as members of 
the same culture are more likely to be connected through social networks and 
thus have greater scope to punish each other. 
Coordination Games  
Cross-cultural differences in coordination games have not yet been widely 
studied. Singh (2009) gives some theoretical predictions of how a society with a 
norm of high trust will be more likely to coordinate on the payoff dominant 
outcome in games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. According to the World 
Values Survey (Wave 4: 1999-2004), Singh concludes that 64% of countries are 
characterised by low trust, and thus will converge to inefficient equilibria in 
coordination games. The Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and Sweden 
tend to have the highest levels of trust, whereas African countries such as 
Uganda and Tanzania have low levels of trust (Singh, 2009, p. 18). 
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Similarly, Chen and Chen (2011) show the importance of a common group 
identity in achieving coordination. They find that subjects are more likely to 
coordinate on a payoff dominant outcome when the players share a common 
group identity, but only when the identity is made salient. As Chen and Chen 
study minimal group identities9, their results are likely to be a lower bound on the 
effect of cultural identities. 
Hsee and Weber (1999) find that people tend to rely on stereotypes when 
forming expectations about the behaviour of people from both one’s own and 
another culture, but more so for another culture. In particular, Hsee and Weber 
(1999) find that both Chinese and Americans expected Americans to be the more 
risk seeking of the two cultures. In addition, the Chinese expected Americans to 
be even more risk seeking than the Americans predicted of each other. 
Hsee and Weber (1999) use the “risk stereotypes” hypothesis to explain 
this result: Americans are often portrayed as aggressive and risk seeking in 
popular media (such as movies), whereas Chinese are not usually portrayed in 
this way. Interestingly, this stereotype turns out to be misleading, as Chinese 
participants are more risk seeking than Americans in Hsee and Weber’s (1999) 
study. People from another culture tend to rely more heavily on stereotypes as 
there is less scope to base their prediction on people they know. This suggests 
that subjects will probably experience more ambiguity when their opponent is 
from another culture than their own culture, and may rely on cultural stereotypes 
to predict behaviour. 
 
                                                          
9 Minimal groups are where subjects are randomly allocated to groups and given an arbitrary label 
such as the “blue” or “yellow” group. 
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Trust Game 
Identity is also important when playing the trust game. The trust game 
(Berg et al, 1995), involves one player (A) deciding how much money out of an 
initial endowment to send to another player (B). Any money that is sent to player 
B gets multiplied by some positive constant > 1. Player B then decides how much 
money to send back to player A. Therefore, in order for Player A to send any 
money to Player B, Player A must trust Player B to send at least some money 
back. Player B would not send any money back in a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium, and realising this Player A would not send any money to begin with. 
However, often players do trust each other in experiments and players in the role 
of Player B do send money back. 
Some papers have documented cultural differences in the trust game. 
Walkowitz et al (2004) design an inter-cultural trust game, where participants from 
Argentina, China, and Germany play the game against each other. Subjects are 
told the surname and university of their opponent to signal their cultural 
background. Significant amounts of trust are observed even across borders. 
Argentinians show the highest level of trust, followed by Chinese, and Germans 
show the lowest. Germans show significantly less reciprocity than Chinese or 
Argentinians. Participants do not discriminate between countries in reciprocity, 
however Chinese tend to discriminate against Argentinians in trust. 
Bornhorst et al (2004) study differences in trust game responses between 
northern and southern Europeans. Examples of northern countries include 
Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom, whereas southern countries include 
Greece, Portugal, and France. An important feature of Bornhorst et al’s (2004) 
trust game, is that players are allowed to choose the receivers to which they make 
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transfers. They find that people from southern European countries are 
discriminated against in the number of transfers they receive, particularly from 
northerners. However, this discrimination can be explained by the behaviour of 
southerners in early rounds of the game as they transfer less money back than 
northerners. 
Bornhorst et al (2004) offer two explanations for their result. The first is an 
income effect: southern Europeans tend to be poorer and feel that reciprocity is 
a luxury good that they cannot afford. The other explanation is that because the 
family plays a stronger role in economic interactions in southern Europe, 
northerners have to rely more on trusting people outside the family to achieve 
economic success. Different family and social structures are one of the key 
explanations of cultural differences in economic behaviour, and are discussed in 
detail throughout this thesis. 
2.4 Proposed Explanations for Cultural Differences 
2.4.1 The Cushion Hypothesis 
Hsee and Weber (1999) introduce the “cushion hypothesis” to explain their 
result that Chinese are more risk seeking than Americans. The Chinese culture 
is more collectivist than the American culture (Hofstede, 1980). This means that 
Chinese tend to define themselves as members of a close-knit group of family 
and friends, whereas most Americans consider themselves as individuals. 
Individualistic societies promote freedom and responsibility for one’s own 
decisions, whereas collectivist societies are more likely to make decisions as part 
of a group and share the responsibility if something goes wrong. This means that 
Chinese people can generally seek financial support from their social networks 
more readily than Americans can, i.e. the Chinese are cushioned if they fall. Hsee 
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and Weber (1999) claim that the ability to seek compensation from a social 
network contributes to their result that Chinese are more willing to take financial 
risks than Americans. 
Hsee and Weber (1999) find support for the cushion hypothesis by running 
a second study, where they ask subjects how many people they can receive 
financial support from. Chinese subjects give significantly higher responses to 
this question than American subjects. When including social network factors as 
explanatory variables, Hsee and Weber (1999) find that differences in risk 
attitudes between the two cultures disappear. In a further test of the cushion 
hypothesis, Hsee and Weber (1999) ask subjects to choose between safe or risky 
options in medical (drug options) and academic (essay topics) contexts. In these 
contexts, a social network will be unable to rectify a problem, and can only offer 
moral support. Chinese and American subjects show no significant difference in 
risk aversion when making medical or academic decisions. In addition, subjects 
from the two cultures give similar responses when asked for the number of people 
they could seek support from for medical or academic problems. 
In a separate study, Weber et al (1998) consider an alternative explanation 
for their finding that Chinese are more risk seeking than Americans. China’s rapid 
growth over recent decades may have inspired riskier financial decisions by its 
citizens. At the time Hsee and Weber’s (1999) experiment was run, people living 
in China may have been more likely to benefit from taking financial risks than 
Americans, due to the prosperous environment in China. Weber et al (1998) 
compare Chinese, American, and German proverbs using a content analysis. 
They find that long-standing Chinese and German proverbs promote significantly 
more risk taking advice in financial situations than American proverbs. Examples 
   
 39 
 
of Chinese proverbs used in Weber et al’s (1998) analysis include “Failure is the 
mother of success” and “If someone has never left his home, he cannot be a great 
person”. American proverbs include “The highest branch is not the safest roost” 
and “He who plays with a cat must expect to get scratched”. As the proverbs have 
been around since long before China’s spell of rapid economic growth, Weber et 
al (1998) conclude that the cushion hypothesis is a valid explanation. 
The cushion hypothesis can help explain cultural differences in several 
risky choice behaviours. For example, Arkes et al (2010) find Chinese and 
Koreans to be less loss averse than Americans, which can be explained by the 
higher ability to seek compensation for a loss from one’s social network among 
the Chinese and Korean cultures. This means that people from collectivist 
cultures are less likely to need to purchase formal insurance than individualists. 
Studies by Sowinski et al (2011) and Laban (2011) provide empirical evidence 
for this, with Germans and Chinese more likely to leave themselves open to a 
small chance of a large loss than Americans or British, who mostly prefer a small 
sure loss (an insurance premium). 
Although the cushion hypothesis suggests greater financial risk taking 
behaviour among collectivist cultures, some studies find that people from 
individualist cultures tend to make riskier financial decisions when the 
probabilities of winning are very low. For example, Sowinski et al (2011) (and 
Laban, 2011) find that Americans (British) prefer to take a low probability gamble 
on a large prize, than accept a small sure gain. However, Germans (Chinese) 
prefer to take the small sure gain. 
These results may be partly driven by the motivation to stand out in 
individualist cultures. As the British and American cultures are more individualistic 
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than both the Chinese and German cultures (Hofstede, 1980), the desire to get 
ahead of others by winning a large sum of money may be stronger among the 
British and Americans. Another potential explanation is that stigma associated 
with gambling in some cultures may discourage people from taking risks when 
the odds of winning are very low. Lau and Ranyard (2005, p. 626) note that heavy 
gambling is stigmatised in Hong Kong and raise doubts over whether a social 
network would provide financial support to cushion a reckless gambling loss.  
 2.4.2 Social Norms 
 Although the cushion hypothesis can explain a variety of observed cultural 
differences, it is important to determine how norms such as network structures 
are formed in the first place. For example, if social networks are formed in 
response to economic conditions, there could be a simultaneous causality 
problem when studying the effects of culture on economic decisions. On the other 
hand, if social networks are formed due to long-standing cultural norms, 
economic circumstances are unlikely to drive the cushion hypothesis. How 
people form networks in society can be thought of as a social norm. Examining 
how social norms arise gives us insight into why some cultures form larger 
networks than others. Previous literature suggests several explanations of norm 
formation. Some theories describe norm formation as a result of rational choice 
(e.g. McAdams, 1997), whereas another theory claims that norms arise from the 
self-categorisation of individuals into groups, which largely happens sub-
consciously (Geisinger, 2004). 
 Rational Choice Theories of Norm Formation 
 McAdams (1997) suggests that norms result from individual preferences 
for esteem. People will tend to behave in a way consistent with the norms of the 
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group they seek approval from. This is because other members of the group may 
punish people who violate norms by withholding esteem. Norms can arise by this 
method, provided the group has reached agreement on which behaviours are 
honourable or dishonourable, and there is a known reasonable probability of the 
other group members observing the honourable or dishonourable behaviour. 
Another theory of norm formation (Posner, 2000) that is based on rational choice 
is that norms result from signalling behaviour. People behave according to norms 
in order to signal to other group members that they are a cooperative person, 
which may be beneficial in future interactions, such as in a prisoners’ dilemma 
scenario. 
 Group Identity Theory of Norm Formation 
 Geisinger (2004) introduces a group identity theory of norm formation, 
which suggests that norms are the result of individuals self-categorising 
themselves into groups. People identify themselves and each other as members 
of categories in order to simplify and make sense of the complex social world 
around them. The act of categorisation tends to exaggerate similarities among 
group members while exaggerating differences between groups. Therefore, the 
group stereotype becomes the norm, and group members tend to conform to the 
stereotype as they receive self-esteem from belonging to the group (Shih et al, 
1999). 
 This raises the question of whether cultural differences in behaviour are 
partly due to people behaving according to their cultural stereotype. Shih et al 
(1999) find a difference in behaviour in Asian women when they are primed10 with 
                                                          
10 The participants were primed by completing a questionnaire with either gender or ethnicity 
related questions. The control group answered questions about university telephone and cable 
TV services. 
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a gender stereotype compared to a cultural stereotype. The women performed 
significantly better than a control group on a mathematics test when primed with 
their Asian identity, and significantly worse when primed with their female identity. 
As well as affecting individual behaviour, stereotypes can affect how we perceive 
others. For example, participants in Hsee and Weber’s (1999) study apparently 
rely on cultural stereotypes to set their expectations about the behaviour of 
others, i.e. that Americans are risk seeking and Chinese are cautious. However, 
the participants in Hsee and Weber’s (1999) study behave in contrast to their 
stereotype, with Chinese taking greater financial risks than Americans. These 
studies suggest that stereotypes are important for shaping both individual 
behaviour and expectations, especially when made salient. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) formalise the notion of group identity by 
incorporating identity and self-image (Ij) into a utility function for individual j, which 
also includes the individual’s actions (aj) and the actions of others (a-j), as follows: 
 
 Identity depends on an individual’s assigned categories (cj), prescriptions 
of how people in those categories should behave (P), and how closely the 
individual’s actions match the prescriptions (εj). Violation of the prescriptions by 
either the individual or others is assumed to cause anxiety and loss of identity to 
the individual. The identity function is represented as below. The function Ij(.) also 
measures the social status of a category and thus captures the individual’s self-
image as well as identity. 
 
U j  U jaj,aj, Ij
Ij  Ijaj,aj;cj,εj,P
   
 43 
 
 Although the set of prescriptions is not indexed by j, the authors note that 
there may be no universal agreement about social categories and prescriptions 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, p. 720). They also note that in some cases, 
individuals may have limited choice in the categories they belong to. Some 
categories, such as race and psychical appearance, can be difficult or impossible 
for the individual to alter. 
 Persistence of Norms 
 Norms may persist for several reasons, such as threat of social 
disapproval, emotions of shame or guilt when departing from a norm that is 
considered morally right, or the norm’s ability to solve a coordination problem. 
For example, people may fear ostracism for cutting in line at a bank, or they may 
abstain from littering even if nobody is around simply because they feel a moral 
obligation. A norm that solves a coordination problem is also likely to persist 
because it is in everyone’s interest to follow the norm. For example, it is better for 
all if everyone drives on the same side of the road, and there are strong reasons 
against driving on a different side from the norm. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) 
investigate how the norm of cooperation may become evolutionary stable in a 
prisoners’ dilemma game. In particular, they find that the tit-for-tat strategy can 
become evolutionary stable in a population, if the probability of playing against a 
tit-for-tat type player in the future is sufficiently high. 
 2.4.3 Overconfidence Bias  
 Yates et al (1997) find that Asians are more overconfident in their general 
knowledge judgements than Americans. This may contribute to more risk seeking 
behaviour when the probabilities are unknown, or more optimistic decision 
weights (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) under known probabilities. However, Lau 
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and Ranyard (1999) find that Chinese speakers generate a lesser variety of 
probability related expressions than English speakers when responding to a View 
of Uncertainty Questionnaire. This questionnaire asks subjects either general 
knowledge questions or predictions about the future. Subjects can respond 
verbally however they wish (e.g. a straight yes or no, or probabilistic statement). 
The number of different probability related terms that subjects mention is taken 
as a measure of how probabilistically they think. Straight “yes” or “no” answers 
are taken to show a lack of probabilistic thinking. Lau and Ranyard’s (1999; 2005) 
results suggest that Chinese think less probabilistically than English. 
Therefore, apparent overconfidence among Chinese may be partly driven 
by thinking less probabilistically rather than confidence attitudes. An experiment 
that distinguishes overconfidence from probabilistic thinking would allow us to 
measure the respective strength of the two effects. Lau and Ranyard (2005, p. 
625) find differences in probabilistic thinking to explain a small but significant 
portion of the variance in gambling decisions among Chinese and English, which 
leads them to conclude that social and cultural influences are also likely to be 
important. 
Distinguishing both overconfidence and probabilistic thinking from the 
cushion hypothesis explanation of risky behaviour among Chinese, would allow 
us to assess the importance of the three separate factors in explaining cultural 
differences. Hsee and Weber (1999, p. 175) reject differences in probabilistic 
thinking or overconfidence bias as possible explanations for their result that 
Chinese are more risk seeking than Americans when making financial decisions. 
This is because they find differences in risk aversion only in financial contexts, 
not academic or medical contexts. If their results are driven by differences in 
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probabilistic thinking or overconfidence, the differences should persist in the 
academic and medical contexts. 
 2.4.4 Genetic Factors 
Zong et al (2009) investigate the heritability of risk attitudes by comparing 
the behaviour of identical twins (who share the same DNA) with non-identical 
twins (who have different DNA but a presumably similar upbringing). Using a 
Chinese population, they find that 57% of the variation in risk attitudes is 
accounted for by genetic factors. However, using Swedish twins, Cesarini et al 
(2009) find only around 20% of risk attitude is inherited. Therefore, culture 
appears to play a smaller role in the development of risk attitudes in China 
compared to Sweden. Along a similar line, research in neuroeconomics (Hsu et 
al, 2005; Tom et al, 2007) suggests that chemical or anatomical differences in 
the prefrontal cortex may play a role in determining risk attitudes. These 
physiological and biological factors should be considered as potential 
explanations for cultural differences in behaviour, as people from a particular 
cultural group are highly likely to share a similar gene distribution and similar 
physiological conditions. However, according to the twins studies, genes alone 
do not fully explain risk attitudes, and the environment one is raised in is likely to 
play an important role. 
 2.4.5 Confounding Effects 
 Interpretation Differences 
Although cultural differences in behaviour are likely to be at least partly 
driven by differences in attitudes, one potential confound is differences in 
interpretation of the experimental situation. For example, framing effects have 
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been shown to differ across cultures. Levinson and Peng (2007) find that Chinese 
are more susceptible to framing effects than Americans, which is because they 
concentrate on the background of a situation, whereas Americans focus more on 
the foreground. Goerg and Walkowitz (2010) also find cultural differences in 
framing effects, with Chinese and Palestinians sensitive to the framing of a 
prisoners’ dilemma game, but Finns and Israelis showing no such effects. Again, 
people from the more collectivist cultures seem to read into the background more 
than people from the individualistic cultures. 
In addition, Keysar et al (2012) find that people are less subject to biases 
such as framing effects when making decisions in a foreign language, as opposed 
to their native language. This is probably because people are less emotionally 
attached when thinking in a foreign language, and therefore make decisions more 
systematically and less intuitively. Therefore, cross-cultural experiments that use 
a single language may be biased if the language used is native for some subject 
pools but foreign for others. 
Numerous cultural differences in perception and interpretation of images 
have been documented (e.g. Brislin and Lonner, 1973, pp. 116-117, 126). 
Therefore, any experimental situation is open to systematic interpretation 
differences between cultures. Brislin and Lonner (1973) recommend careful pre-
testing of questionnaires used in cross-cultural research, to ensure that the same 
thing is being tested in each culture. For example, a random sample of 
respondents may be asked probing questions about their responses, such as 
“What do you mean?” to see how well the respondents understand the question 
(Schuman, 1966). Another technique used is to ask subjects for a clarity rating of 
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each question (Mitchell, 1966). Any questions rated as unclear should be re-
worded and pre-tested again before being used in the final questionnaire. 
 External Influences 
 Harrison et al (2009) note several concerns when comparing data 
collected from developing countries. In particular, Harrison et al (2009) visit 
drought-stricken areas in India and Ethiopia, and note that their subjects may 
behave pessimistically due to the droughts. They point to a large body of 
evidence (Harrison et al, 2007) that suggests that background risk (such as 
extreme weather conditions or corruption within a country), can influence 
subjects’ behaviour over foreground risk (the experimental task at hand). This 
makes it difficult to explain whether any apparent differences in risk attitudes are 
due to long-standing cultural values or the current political, economic, or 
environmental conditions within a country. Harrison et al (2007) find that adding 
background risk to an experiment decreases the reliability of abstract lottery 
choices over monetary outcomes. In the same study, Harrison et al (2007) also 
find that subjects make fewer errors when the lottery prizes are something natural 
and familiar to the subjects11 than when choosing over abstract monetary 
lotteries. 
 As mentioned above, Weber et al (1998) try to alleviate the problem of 
competing explanations for cultural differences by examining long-standing 
proverbs in different cultures to see what risk attitudes are promoted. Although 
not a perfect measure, a content analysis can give us insight into long-standing 
cultural values, and compare these to attitudes suggested by the current 
                                                          
11 Harrison et al (2004) conduct their field study as a coin collectors’ show, where the lottery prizes 
are graded coins. They introduce background risk by adding another treatment where the grade 
of the coins is uncertified.  
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conditions. Another way some researchers (e.g. Hennig-Schmidt and Yan, 2009; 
Hennig-Schmidt et al, 2008) have attempted to deal with the causality problem is 
to use video experiments, where subjects make group decisions involving 
discussion. This allows us to assess the reasons and arguments used in reaching 
a decision. However, video experiments are not without their problems, such as 
the potential for subjects behaving differently than they would normally, just 
because they are being filmed. 
 Henrich and Boyd (1998) give examples of empirical evidence that 
suggests that differences in environmental conditions (either physical, ecological, 
or economic) are not sufficient to explain behavioural differences between 
groups. This is due to the widespread emergence of different behavioural 
patterns between groups who share very similar environmental conditions. For 
example, the Machiguenga and Yora tribes of the Amazon live in almost identical 
regions, with the same climate and level of technology. However, the two tribes 
speak entirely different languages and have very different familial and social 
structures. If environmental conditions are the primary determinant of behaviour, 
we should see similar behavioural patterns in the Machiguenga and Yora. Rather, 
culture appears to evolve independently of external environmental factors, which 
reduces the risk of simultaneous causality in the influence of culture on economic 
variables. 
2.5 Conclusions 
 While we have observed cultural differences in several previous 
experiments, one of the key challenges we now face is to isolate how culture 
affects behaviour. As there are many competing explanations, we cannot 
immediately attribute an observed cultural difference to be due to cultural values. 
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Therefore, in this thesis I focus cultural values that are likely to affect behaviour 
under risk and uncertainly, while controlling for other factors that could also be 
driving behaviour, such as demographics. 
 In particular, I focus on the key areas of social networks, cultural norms 
and identity, and peer effects. Research by Hsee and Weber (1999) indicates 
that social networks are likely to be a key driver of cultural differences in risk 
attitudes. Similarly, Chen and Chen (2011) show that group identity is likely to 
come into play when making interactive decisions under uncertainty. I use 
coordination games to investigate how cultural norms and identity affect 
behaviour as coordination games seem under-represented in the cross-cultural 
literature. Finally, I study cultural differences in the way risk attitudes are 
transmitted within peer groups to see whether conformist values are more 
manifest in the tight-knit collectivist cultures. 
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Chapter Three: Culture and Risk-Sharing Networks 
3.1 Introduction 
 Social networks are an important source of financial risk-sharing, 
especially in developing countries where formal insurance markets may be 
underdeveloped. Collectivist societies tend to place more emphasis on informal 
risk-sharing than individualist societies. This may be because collectivists are 
concerned more with group prosperity than individual wealth. If a member of a 
collectivist group loses money through bad luck, the other group members are 
likely to bail them out. On the other hand, in an individualist society there is more 
emphasis on taking responsibility for one’s own losses. This is exactly how Hsee 
and Weber (1999) explain their result that Chinese students are more willing to 
take financial risks than American students. The Chinese students, who are part 
of a collectivist society (Hofstede, 1980), are more likely to receive financial help 
from their family members, and thus take more risks with money than the 
individualistic Americans. Hsee and Weber (1999) call this explanation the 
“cushion hypothesis”, as the social network can be thought of as a cushion to 
protect someone who falls (i.e. suffers a financial loss). 
The importance of social networks in collectivist countries suggests that 
social risks (i.e. risks to interpersonal relationships) may be of greater concern 
than financial risks. While people from collectivist societies may receive financial 
support from their social network, any support received is usually conditional on 
the benefactor being on good terms with their network members. Therefore, 
people from collectivist cultures have a greater incentive to maintain good 
relationships than those from individualist cultures, who do not tend to rely on 
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others for financial support. Indeed, Weber et al (1998) find more proverbs 
applicable to social risks in Chinese culture than American or German culture. 
 We run an online survey to elicit the social networks of students at the 
University of Exeter in the United Kingdom and the University of Canterbury in 
New Zealand. The survey is followed up with a laboratory experiment where we 
saliently elicit students’ risk attitudes and present them with a hypothetical social 
risks problem. Asian students are found to form significantly larger financial risk-
sharing networks, and also show a greater preference for taking financial risks 
compared to British and New Zealand Europeans. However, fewer Asians are 
prepared to take risks in social situations compared to people from the other 
cultures. These findings support Hsee and Weber’s (1999) cushion hypothesis. 
While a larger social network may decrease risk aversion over financial 
outcomes, people from collectivist cultures have a greater incentive to maintain 
good relationships and thus take fewer risks with their social life. 
3.2 Background Literature 
 3.2.1 The Cushion Hypothesis 
Using hypothetical choices between a certain outcome and a gamble, 
Hsee and Weber (1999) document a cultural difference in financial risk 
preferences, with Chinese taking more risks than Americans. In contrast to this 
result, the majority of subjects from both cultures expected Americans to be more 
risk seeking than Chinese. However, the result makes sense in terms of social 
networks, as the collectivist Chinese are more likely to receive financial support 
from their network, thus inspiring more risk taking behaviour. In the event of a 
loss, Chinese are “cushioned” by their social network. People from individualist 
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cultures are less likely to receive such support and are therefore more cautious 
with their money. 
As explained in Chapter Two (pp. 37-38), Hsee and Weber (1999) find 
support for their cushion hypothesis by asking subjects how many people they 
could receive financial support from. The Chinese participants give a significantly 
larger number of people they could ask for financial support compared to the 
Americans. However, there are no significant cultural differences when asking 
participants how many people they could approach for emotional or psychological 
support. In addition, Hsee and Weber (1999) find no significant differences in risk 
attitudes between Chinese and Americans in the academic or medical context. 
They claim this is because while the social network can provide immediate 
support for financial problems, the network can only provide limited support for 
academic or medical problems. 
 3.2.2 Context-Specific Risks 
 Dohmen et al (2011) find risk attitudes to be highly context-specific in a 
large representative sample. Their data consists of 22,000 individuals from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel Survey. Using an 11-point scale, subjects are 
asked to rate their willingness to take risks in general, and in several different 
contexts (car driving, financial matters, sports and leisure, career, and health). 
The measure of general risk aversion is verified by a field experiment on a 
representative sample of 450 individuals, where the coefficient of risk aversion is 
estimated for each subject using a salient lottery choice task for money. Data is 
also collected on behavioural outcomes for the 450 individuals, including traffic 
offenses, portfolio choice, smoking, occupational choice, participation in sports, 
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and migration. In each case, the behavioural outcome is best predicted by the 
corresponding context-specific risk measure. 
In a separate study that uses the same data as Dohmen et al (2011), 
Dohmen et al (2012) look at the transmission of risk attitudes from parents to 
children. Using the risk attitude questions from the German Socioeconomic 
Panel, they find a strong correlation between the attitudes of parents and their 
children. These correlations are context-specific, with the attitudes of parents and 
children being highly correlated within each context. In addition to risk attitudes, 
they also attempt to measure preferences, by presenting subjects with a 
hypothetical lottery choice task. Again, they find a strong correlation between the 
choices of parents and their children. The authors note that the study does not 
distinguish how attitudes are transmitted. There are several possibilities including 
genetics, imitation, or deliberate efforts by parents. If attitudes are transmitted 
from generation to generation, any cultural differences in risk attitudes could 
persist for many years. Attitudes may also be transmitted through networks, 
which means cultural differences in network structures could affect how risk 
attitudes are transmitted. 
3.2.3 Models of Network Formation 
 Models of network formation assume that individuals gain benefit from 
being connected to others, but that maintaining direct links is costly. Therefore, 
links are only formed when the benefits of membership outweigh the costs. 
Typically, networks are represented as a set of n agents, N = {1,…,n}, where Ni 
is agent i’s set of neighbours, or agents i is linked with. A link between agents i 
and j is represented as gij = 1, whereas if agents i and j are not linked we have gij 
= 0. The set of links that makes up a network can then be represented on a graph. 
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Some of the most common network structures studied in the literature are 
illustrated below in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Common Network Structures 
 
The image on the far left of Figure 3.1 represents a unilateral matching 
network, where every member of the population (indicated by the nodes) is 
connected to every other member (indicated by the lines between nodes). The 
second image shows a local interaction network, where agents only interact with 
their nearest neighbours. The third image shows two marriage networks, where 
each agent is only connected to one other agent. Finally, the image on the far 
right corresponds to a situation of autarky, where no agents interact. These are 
the network structures considered by Corbae and Duffy (2008). 
 There are several reasons why network membership may be more or less 
beneficial or costly in some cultures. For example, greater geographic distance 
between members may make network maintenance more costly, or poor financial 
institutions in some areas may mean there is more benefit in forming social 
networks to obtain credit. This raises the question of whether social networks are 
formed in response to external factors such as poor financial institutions, or 
whether they reflect cultural values such as sharing and cooperation. There is a 
possibility that causality runs in the other direction, with financial institutions being 
underdeveloped in collectivist societies because there is less need for them.  
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 3.2.4 Network Formation in the Lab 
 Kosfeld (2004) provides a survey of network experiments in the lab, 
focusing on cooperation, coordination, and network formation. Although 
cooperation can theoretically be sustained in networks through imitation of 
successful strategies, some experimental evidence is to the contrary. For 
example, Kirchkamp and Nagel (2001) find that cooperation rates decline in the 
prisoners’ dilemma when moving to more isolated network structures. Kosfeld 
(2004) suggests that subjects may not learn from their neighbours in the way 
assumed by theoretical models of imitation. Rather, learning may be driven by 
positive reinforcement of one’s own successful strategies. 
 Both cooperation and coordination rates are higher in networks if people 
are allowed to choose their own partners (Kosfeld, 2004). In addition, a lower 
group size leads to greater convergence on payoff dominant outcomes. As for 
network formation, Kosfeld (2004) notes that the cost of maintaining networks is 
important and that fairness mechanisms may be needed to keep networks in 
place. For example, rotation of inferior roles or compensation given to those in 
inferior roles may help sustain the network. 
 Lab experiments are useful when studying cultural differences in risk-
sharing networks because we can eliminate competing reasons for network 
formation that are present in real-life networks such as friendship and emotional 
support. If people from collectivist cultures form more extensive networks in real 
life, we can check the robustness of this result by looking at network formation in 
the lab. We can also see if there are any cultural differences in the ability to use 
networks to cooperate or coordinate. 
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Corbae and Duffy (2008) experimentally test the effect of endogenous 
network formation on behaviour in a multi-player stag hunt game. Players are 
also subject to a random shock which limits the actions available to them in the 
stag hunt game. The idea is to see how network structure affects the possibility 
of contagion, i.e. the spread of a random shock from an individual to the network. 
In order to give players something to base their network formation on, 
three different types of network structures are imposed in the first set of games: 
marriage, local interaction, and uniform matching. Marriage networks are where 
only two people interact, local interaction has every player interacting with their 
two nearest neighbours, and uniform matching is where every player interacts 
with all other players in a group. Players are organised in groups of four, within 
which these networks structures are imposed. Therefore, players play either a 
two, three, or four player stag hunt game.  
After playing five rounds under an initially imposed network structure, 
players are free to propose links to other players within their group of four. Any 
players who mutually propose links to each other are then linked and play the 
stag hunt together for another five rounds. The process is then repeated three 
more times.  
Corbae and Duffy (2008) find that the marriage (i.e. two player) network is 
the most stable structure, and that regardless of the initial network imposed, most 
players end up with only one link. While the marriage and uniform matching 
networks are robust to contagion, they find some evidence of contagion in local 
interaction networks. They also find a high rate of efficiency, with around 90% of 
strategies played being payoff dominant. 
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3.2.5 Network Formation in the Field 
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) study the formation of risk-sharing networks 
in the rural Philippines. Using survey data, they find that one of the main 
determinants of network formation is geographical proximity (which is possibly 
correlated with kinship), with a smaller geographic distance indicating higher 
likelihood of network links. The authors find this surprising, as subjects do not 
maximise the potential for risk-sharing by forming networks with those in different 
occupations or regions. Apparently the participants prefer to form networks with 
people they can easily monitor, or perhaps have some kinship altruism towards. 
 In contrast, Grimard (1997) finds that risk-sharing groups in Cote d’Ivorie 
can form across regions where households share the same ethnicity. 
Anthropological evidence from Cote d’Ivorie suggests that links with extended 
family members are particularly important economically and that these links 
persist across regions (Grimard, 1997, pp. 399 – 401). Using panel data, Grimard 
(1997) finds evidence of partial risk-sharing among ethnic groups in Cote d’Ivorie, 
but admits that the data is subject to measurement error and unobserved 
common factors. Nonetheless, evidence from both Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) 
and Grimard (1997) suggests that risk-sharing networks are incomplete and 
related to kinship ties rather than income or occupation differences. 
3.3 Methods 
 There are three main hypotheses we attempt to test with this research. We 
address the hypotheses with an online survey to elicit social networks among 
students, which is followed up by a lab experiment to replicate network formation 
and introduce a salient measure of risk attitude. The hypotheses and research 
methods are detailed below. 
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Hypothesis One: Students from collectivist cultures will form larger networks than 
students from individualist cultures when they come to study at university, when 
all other factors are accounted for. In addition, collectivist students will also 
attempt to form more network connections in a lab environment than individualist 
students. 
Hypothesis Two: Having a larger network will decrease aversion to financial risk, 
as students can rely on their network for support if they need to borrow money. 
Note that this effect may be stronger for collectivist cultures than individualist 
cultures, as collectivists are more likely to consider their network in decision 
making. 
Hypothesis Three: Students from collectivist cultures will be more risk averse for 
social risks. This could be because they have a greater incentive to maintain 
harmonious relationships, in order to receive support from their network when in 
need. We also expect there to be cultural differences in risk attitudes in other 
contexts, such as health and career, due to differences in values and beliefs. 
 3.3.1 Initial Online Survey 
 Using SurveyMonkey, we run an initial online survey to identify social 
network connections of students at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the University of Canterbury in New Zealand (NZ), before inviting 
respondents to the lab for experiments. We choose the UK and NZ because both 
are English-speaking individualistic countries but have high numbers of Asian 
students. The entire set of questions from the surveys can be found in Appendix 
One. 
   
 59 
 
The survey was run at the University of Exeter in the UK in February 2012 
and the University of Canterbury in NZ in June 2012. We received 465 responses 
from students at Exeter and 87 responses from students at Canterbury. The low 
response rate from Canterbury students may have been because the survey was 
run during the last week of winter holidays and first week of term. For both 
surveys, the main method of advertising was emailing students who were 
registered to take part in experiments and inviting them to complete the survey. 
The invitation specified that responses were strictly confidential and would only 
be seen by the researchers. The surveys included a prize draw in both countries 
in order to incentivise participation. In Exeter one respondent was randomly 
selected to receive £100 and in Canterbury five randomly selected respondents 
received NZ$20 each. We had more prizes in Canterbury because the registered 
students were usually all paid when they attended experiments and the 
department wanted to pay as many as possible. 
 One of the shortcomings of this survey was that the respondents’ earnings 
were not contingent on their decisions in the survey, and therefore they were not 
given an incentive to answer truthfully. Leider et al (2009, p. 8) use a clever 
method to saliently elicit network connections, by paying subjects for naming 
people who also name them. While such a method is ideal for truthfully eliciting 
network connections, we were unaware how many people would complete the 
online surveys and thus faced a budget limitation. 
 Students provide a good subject pool when studying the formation of social 
networks, as students must decide with whom to form links when they come to 
study at university. In the UK and NZ students do not usually know any of their 
classmates before arriving at university. Studying network formation in people’s 
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home towns is complicated by the fact that many people are born into networks, 
rather than choosing who to form links with. By studying how networks are formed 
at university we can see how networks are consciously formed. We can therefore 
tell whether networks are formed due to cultural values or external conditions. 
While controlling for external conditions, if students from collectivist backgrounds 
still choose to form larger networks, this provides an indication that cultural values 
such as risk-sharing are important in determining networks. 
 The online survey contains three questions where respondents are asked 
to name fellow students who they could turn to for various problems. The first 
question asks respondents to give the full names of any people who they could 
ask to borrow £100 (or $100 in NZ) from for an accommodation deposit that they 
need urgently. The second question asks them to name classmates they could 
ask to borrow lecture notes from, and the final question asks them to name people 
who they could ask for personal advice. The survey questions are designed to 
identify the size of people’s social networks at university and to identify network 
connections between people. The three different network contexts are used to 
ensure robustness and to see whether certain cultures have larger networks in 
some areas of their lives than others. 
For all three questions, respondents are told that they can only list people 
from the university and cannot receive help from their friends or family back 
home. They are also told they can list any number of people. To make the data 
collection simpler we provide ten boxes for the participants to list their friends in, 
and an eleventh box to type the names of any other friends. Therefore, there may 
have been some anchoring effects driving the participants to list around ten 
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people. However, many people listed less than five friends so anchoring effects 
appear to be minor. 
 As part of the online survey, we include Dohmen et al’s (2011) context-
specific risk questions, in order to look for cultural differences in context-specific 
risk attitudes. We also ask subjects to rate their willingness to take risks in 
general. The questions are framed as follows: 
Please estimate your willingness to take risks with regard to the following 
areas, with 0 being not at all willing to take risks, and 10 being very willing 
to take risks: 
Driving, Financial Investment, Leisure and Sport, Career, Health, Social 
Approval12 
We ask several behavioural questions to follow-up the context-specific risk 
questions. We ask these questions before the context-specific risk measures, 
with another question in-between. This is to prevent respondents from trying to 
be consistent with their self-reported risk measures when answering the 
behavioural questions. The behavioural questions are as follows: 
 Please answer the following questions: 
 Do you smoke? 
 Have you ever been charged with a traffic offence? 
 Do you plan to become self-employed? 
 Do you (or will you) invest in the stock market? 
                                                          
12 We add a question about social risks, i.e. risks to interpersonal relationships, which we describe 
as “social approval”. 
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 Do you play any active sports? 
 Do you plan to work in the public sector? 
Although Dohmen et al (2011) collect data on actual behaviour, we hope the 
above questions will provide some indication of how useful our context-specific 
risk measures are at predicting behaviour. We are interested in any cultural 
differences in context-specific risk attitudes and related behaviour. In particular, 
we expect students of Asian origin to be less risk averse for financial investment 
risks but more risk averse for social approval risks. This is because collectivist 
values promote the sharing of financial risks, while emphasising the importance 
of relationships. 
The survey also collects information on demographics, which allows us to 
know the cultural background of subjects before they turn up for experiments. 
This minimises experimenter demand effects13 as we do not need to ask 
participants for their cultural information during the experiment. Knowing the 
cultural background of respondents before inviting them to experiments also 
allowed us to invite higher numbers of people from the cultures of most interest 
(such as Chinese and British). 
 3.3.2 Network Formation Experiment 
 In May 2012 we run a follow-up experiment to the online survey in Exeter, 
and in July 2012 we run the same experiment in Canterbury. A total of 120 
students attended the experiment in Exeter, and 68 students attended the 
experiment in Canterbury, leading to a total of 188 participants. The experiment 
involves a stag hunt game with endogenous network formation, based on Corbae 
                                                          
13 Brislin and Lonner (1973, p. 70) note that experimenter demand effects, or “courtesy bias”, are 
particularly prevalent in Eastern cultures, where participants like to please the experimenter. 
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and Duffy (2008). The idea is to see whether people from collectivist cultures try 
to form more links when given the opportunity to do so. The experiments are run 
using pen and paper in purpose-built experimental laboratories: FEELE (Finance 
and Economics Experimental Laboratory) at the University of Exeter and NZEEL 
(New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory) at the University of 
Canterbury. The experiment consists of four parts, each explained in detail below. 
Full instructions are available in Appendix Two. 
 As part of the follow-up experiment we include a salient measure of risk 
aversion, where subjects choose between risky or safe lottery options (Holt and 
Laury, 2002) and are paid accordingly. We also include a social risks question, 
where participants need to decide whether or not to give advice to a roommate 
that will either enhance or hurt the relationship (based on Weber et al, 1998). 
Responses from these questions can be compared to the subjects’ self-reported 
measures of risk attitudes from the online survey. 
 To avoid inducing any cultural stereotypes, we do not prime the identity of 
participants. People from a variety of cultural backgrounds are invited to each 
session, and we do not mention anything about culture until the follow-up 
questionnaire. Hsee and Weber (1999) find cultural stereotypes of risk attitudes 
to be highly misleading. In their experiment, both Chinese and American 
participants expected Americans to be more risk seeking. The results were in fact 
the opposite, with Chinese being the more risk seeking. Previous literature shows 
that subjects have a tendency to behave according to stereotypes in experiments 
when primed with their identity (Shih et al, 1999). As we are interested in 
identifying norms rather than stereotypes, we do not prime the identity of 
participants before they take part in the experiment. 
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 Part One – Stag Hunt with Exogenous Network 
 Each participant is assigned to a group of four players, where each player 
is identified with a player ID but their identity is kept secret from each other. In 
part one of the experiment, each participant plays three different versions of a 
stag hunt game with other players in their group of four. The three different 
versions of the game correspond to a two, three, and four player version. We 
allow players to play each version of the game so that they gain familiarity with 
all three versions and have experience with playing the game with different 
numbers of players. This prevents us from needing to control for different part 
one experiences in later stages, such as when players are allowed to form links 
with each other.  
 Payoff tables for the three different versions of the stag hunt game are 
illustrated below. We use the same payoff structure as Corbae and Duffy (2008). 
The payoffs are given in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which are 
converted into pounds or dollars at the end of the experiment. Using ECU allows 
us to run the experiment in different countries with ease. Players are told to 
choose between X and Y without knowing the choice(s) of other players. In the 
tables, the other players’ choices are given by how many players choose each 
option. For example, in the 4-player game, 2X1Y means that two of the other 
players choose X and one chooses Y. 
 The payoff dominant equilibrium in each version of the game has all 
players choosing X, whereas the risk dominant equilibrium has each player 
choosing Y. This is a game of aggregate externalities, i.e. players only care about 
the total benefit they receive from the decisions of other players rather than who 
chooses what. In each version of the game, the participants are matched with 
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other players within their four-player group by the experimenter. These matches 
determine who plays the game with who and the subsequent payoffs from part 
one. Each player’s payoff and the decisions of all other players within their group 
of four are revealed to them before moving on to part two. Players can then use 
this information to decide who they will propose links to. One of the three versions 
of the game is randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. 
2-player Game 
  Other Player’s Choice 
  X Y 
Your 
Choice 
X 60 0 
Y 35 35 
 
3-player Game 
  Other Players’ Choices 
  2X 1X1Y 2Y 
Your 
Choice 
X 60 30 0 
Y 35 35 35 
 
4-player Game 
  Other Players’ Choices 
  3X 2X1Y 1X2Y 3Y 
Your 
Choice 
X 60 40 20 0 
Y 35 35 35 35 
 
 Part Two – Stag Hunt with Endogenous Network Formation 
 In part two of the experiment, players are given the opportunity to form 
links with other players within their group of four. They do this by completing a 
link proposal form where they tick the player ID(s) of any other players within their 
four-player group with whom they wish to form a link. A link can only be formed if 
two players mutually propose a link to each other. Forming a link means that the 
players who are linked will play another round of the stag hunt game with each 
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other. The number of links each player forms therefore determines which version 
of the game they play. Following on from Corbae and Duffy (2008), players who 
form no links receive an automatic payoff of 35 ECU. This is to prevent players 
from sending out extra link proposals solely as insurance that they will be linked. 
After the link formation stage, players are told the player IDs of any players they 
are linked with and asked to play one more round of the stag hunt game. 
 Part Three – Risk Aversion Elicitation 
 Part three of the experiment is a lottery choice task, designed to saliently 
elicit the subjects’ risk attitudes. Participants are asked to make ten decisions, 
where each decision involves a choice between two lotteries. One lottery is 
relatively riskier and the other relatively safer. The ten lottery choices are given 
in a table, and as you move down the table the expected value of the relatively 
riskier lottery increases, so that the risk attitude of a person can be measured by 
the point they switch from preferring the safer lottery to the riskier lottery. One of 
the ten choices is then randomly selected and played out to determine the payoffs 
from this part of the experiment. The probabilities and payoffs used in this task 
are based on Holt and Laury (2002). 
 Part Four – Follow-up Questionnaire 
 Part four is the final part of the experiment and involves a follow-up 
questionnaire. Subjects are asked a social risks question, questions about their 
family income and number of siblings, and questions designed to control for 
background risk. The social risks question is designed to test whether people 
from collectivist cultures are more risk averse for social risks than people from 
individualist cultures, as maintaining relationships is likely to be more important 
for collectivists. The question is framed as follows: 
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Imagine you have a good relationship with your roommate, and that your 
roommate is currently facing an important decision. You have a strong 
opinion about the decision your roommate should make, and need to 
decide whether or not to give your roommate advice. If you give advice 
that your roommate appreciates, this will greatly enhance your 
relationship. However, if your roommate dislikes your advice, this will 
seriously harm your relationship. If you give no advice, this will have no 
effect on your relationship. Will you give advice or remain silent? 
This question is based on an example of a social risks problem given by Weber 
et al (1998). Individualists are expected to take more risks with their interpersonal 
relationships as they probably do not rely as heavily on their social network for 
financial support as collectivists do. It is likely to be more important for an 
individualist to get their opinion across than to minimise the risk of harming a 
relationship. 
 We control for family income in case students from a particular culture are 
wealthier than students from other cultures, which could be driving any 
differences in risk attitudes. We also ask for the number of siblings to see how 
many people the family wealth is distributed amongst. 
 Background risk is where subjects are affected by risky situations outside 
the laboratory (Harrison et al, 2007), such as weather conditions, violence, and 
corruption (Harrison et al, 2009, p. 100). This is a large problem for cross-cultural 
research as students from a particular country may be feeling risk averse 
because of financial or environmental conditions in their home country, rather 
than their cultural values. To control for background risk, we ask students to rate 
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the current financial stability of their home country, as well as their current mood, 
on a scale from one to five. 
3.4 Results 
 3.4.1 Online Survey 
 There are four main research questions we can attempt to answer with the 
online survey. Firstly, do students from collectivist cultures form larger networks 
when they come to study at university? Secondly, how does network size affect 
attitudes to risk in the financial context? Thirdly, do students from collectivist 
cultures claim to be less willing to take risks with social approval? Fourthly, are 
the context-specific risk attitudes measures correlated with behaviour and are 
there any cultural differences? I will discuss the results for each of these 
questions below. 
 In the UK dataset, the cultural group each participant is allocated to 
depends on their nationality. In cases where a respondent lists more than one 
nationality, the first nationality they give is used to determine their cultural group. 
In NZ, cultural groups are based on ethnicity, rather than nationality. This is to 
distinguish between ethnic groups with the same nationality, i.e. Maori and 
European New Zealanders are two distinct ethnic groups who are both 
considered “New Zealanders”. Any responses with mixed Asian and European 
backgrounds are thrown out. Out of the 552 respondents who completed the 
online survey, 340 are British, 82 are East Asian, 53 are European, 48 are NZ 
European, and 29 belong to other cultures. The majority of respondents in the 
Other category are students who completed the survey in NZ but did not specify 
whether they are from a Maori or European background. 
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 Network Size 
 If network formation is driven by cultural values, we expect students from 
collectivist cultures to form larger networks when they come to study at university, 
when controlling for external conditions. Table 3.1 shows the average network 
sizes in each context by cultural group. These values correspond to the average 
number of network connections listed in response to the three questions: who 
would you ask to borrow money from? (Financial Network), who would you ask 
to borrow lecture notes from? (Academic Network), and who would you ask for 
advice when faced with an important decision? (Social Network). 
Table 3.1: Average Network Size by Nationality/Ethnicity 
  Average Network Size14 
  Overall 
n = 552 
British15 
n = 340 
Asian16 
n = 82 
European17 
n = 53 
NZ Euro 
n = 48 
Financial Network 4.93 
(0.13) 
5.14 
(0.16) 
5.66 
(0.33) 
4.60 
(0.40) 
3.60 
(0.42) 
Academic Network 4.71 
(0.12) 
5.07 
(0.15) 
4.65 
(0.32) 
4.26 
(0.36) 
3.77 
(0.36) 
Social Network 5.15 
(0.13) 
5.76 
(0.17) 
4.35 
(0.30) 
4.51 
(0.34) 
3.96 
(0.43) 
 
 We can see from Table 3.1 that the Asian students have a higher average 
network size for financial risks than any of the other cultures. Using a Mann-
Whitney U-test, the Asian network size variable is significantly different to the 
other cultures for financial risks (p = 0.011). NZ Europeans have an even smaller 
average financial network, which is also significantly different to the other cultures 
                                                          
14 Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
15 Includes other English-speaking individualist nationalities such as American, Canadian, 
Australian, and Irish. 
16 Includes Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian, Malaysian, Vietnamese, Indian, Hong Kong, and 
Singaporean. 
17 Includes German, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Lithuanian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Belgian, 
Polish, Czech Republic, Slovakian, Cypriot, Chechen, Swedish, and Russian. 
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(p < 0.001). While the average size of academic networks are fairly similar 
between the cultures, the British have a larger and statistically different social 
network size compared to the other cultures (p < 0.001). NZ Europeans have 
smaller networks sizes than the other cultures in all three contexts. As the online 
survey in NZ was conducted during a term break, network connections may have 
been less salient to the NZ participants. 
European cultures are a mixture of individualist and collectivist societies, 
and as such we do not have clear predictions about the size of Europeans’ social 
networks in different contexts. Categories containing other nationalities are 
omitted from this analysis due to low sample sizes or cultural ambiguity. For 
example, some students listed their ethnicity as “New Zealander”, which could 
include Maori or NZ European. As we cannot distinguish culture among these 
students, the results are not particularly insightful. 
A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions shows 
that Asians have a significantly different distribution of financial network size 
compared to the rest of the sample (p = 0.015). The British also have a different 
distribution to the rest of the sample but the result is less significant (p = 0.050), 
while the difference for NZ Europeans is highly significant (p < 0.001). 
 Table 3.2 shows some demographic characteristics of the online survey 
respondents. On average, Asian students are slightly older and in more advanced 
years of study than the British students. In addition, the sample of Asian students 
has a higher proportion of females than the British sample. Worth noting, is that 
females may form networks in a different way to males. For example, Lindenlaub 
and Prummer (2013) find that male high school students in the US form larger 
networks than their female counterparts. On the other hand, female students form 
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more clustered networks, where their friends tend to know each other (Lindenlaub 
and Prummer, 2013). In our survey, females form fewer links associated with 
financial risk-sharing, but have larger networks in the academic and social 
contexts. Testing for cultural and gender differences in the depth of networks, 
e.g. how much money could be borrowed from each friend, would be an 
interesting follow-up study to this work. For now, we control for the age and 
gender of participants when running regressions to see how network size 
influences risk attitude. 
Table 3.2: Average Demographic Characteristics 
 Average Demographics 
 British Asian European NZ Euro 
Age in Years 19.78 21.21 20.32 21.29 
Percent Female 55.59 71.60 58.49 47.92 
Percent Business Major 27.35 81.71 50.94 43.75 
Year of Study 1.66 2.01 1.75 2.83 
 
 The most striking demographic difference between British and Asian 
students is the proportion of students majoring in business or economics. The 
vast majority of Asian students in the sample, over 80%, major in business, 
whereas only 27% of British students take a business or economics major. A two-
sided two-sample Z-test of proportions shows that this is a highly significant 
difference (p < 0.001). This highlights the importance of controlling for 
demographic factors, as students who study business may have systematically 
different preferences to non-business majors, which could bias the results. For 
all variables, Europeans lie somewhere between the British students and the 
Asian students. NZ Europeans are in more advanced years of study on average, 
compared to the other cultures, and have a slightly lower percent female than the 
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British sample. Similarly to Europeans, they lie between the British and Asians in 
the percent who are taking a business major. 
To investigate whether any cultural differences in network size are driven 
by the high portion of business majors among Asian students, Table 3.3 looks at 
cultural differences in network size for business majors only. Analysis is restricted 
to the extreme cases of British students and Asian students, who have a very low 
and very high proportion of business majors, respectively. When looking at the 
results for British students who major in business compared to the overall British 
sample, there is little difference in the size of financial networks, but both the 
academic and social networks become smaller when restricting the sample to 
business majors. Even with these smaller values, the social network size of 
British business majors is still higher than the Asian business majors. Differences 
in the size of academic networks are still small when looking at only business 
majors. These results are in-line with the results discussed above for the entire 
sample. Asian business majors have similar network sizes to the overall Asian 
sample. 
Table 3.3: Average Network Size for Business Majors 
Average Network Size 
 British 
n = 93 
Asian 
n = 60 
Financial Network 5.19 
(0.32) 
6.02 
(0.36) 
Academic Network 4.48 
(0.26) 
4.90 
(0.37) 
Social Network 5.27 
(0.30) 
4.48 
(0.36) 
 
 
 
   
 73 
 
 Financial Risk Attitudes 
 As part of the online survey, we ask subjects to rate their willingness to 
take risks in different contexts, by giving a rating between 0 and 10 (higher 
numbers correspond to greater willingness to take risks). Although not a salient 
measure of risk attitudes, Dohmen et al (2011) find these measures to give an 
accurate prediction of related behaviour. For example, willingness to take risks in 
the health context is an accurate predictor of smoking behaviour. We ask subjects 
to rate their willingness to take risks in the context of financial investment, to see 
whether network size or culture affect attitudes to financial risk. On average, 
willingness to take risks with financial investment is higher for Asian students than 
British or NZ European students, with a mean of 5.4 for Asians, compared to 4.4 
for British and 4.9 for NZ Europeans. A Mann-Whitney U-test shows that Asians 
have a significantly different willingness to take financial risks than the other 
cultures (p < 0.001). However, to control for demographics of the sample, I use 
regressions to get a better idea of how culture and network size affect attitudes 
to financial risk. 
 We use an ordered probit regression to assess whether having a larger 
financial support network lowers risk aversion over financial outcomes. An 
ordered probit model accounts for the ordinal nature of the data, whereas ordinary 
least squares treats the data as though it has precise quantitative meaning 
(Greene, 2003, p. 736). For example, ordinary least squares treats the difference 
between a risk rating of five and six the same as the difference between a rating 
of nine and ten. However, the risk aversion measure used here is only a ranking, 
where the order of outcomes is important rather than precise values. Although an 
ordered probit model provides a more appropriate fit to the data, interpretation of 
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the coefficients is less straightforward. While sign and significance of coefficients 
from an ordered probit model are meaningful, the magnitude of coefficients does 
not have a direct interpretation. The magnitudes differ depending on values of 
the independent variables. 
 However, we can calculate expected values of the dependent variable 
(risk attitude) by plugging in values of the independent variables (such as the 
sample means) and comparing changes in the independent variable of interest. 
For example, we can compare the expected value of financial risk attitude when 
network size is one compared to a network size of five, while plugging in sample 
means for the rest of the independent variables. 
 Our regression equation is as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖
=  𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖  + 𝛽4𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
+  𝛽5(𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖  ×  𝑁𝑍 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑦𝑖) +  𝑢𝑖 
Risk attitude is measured as the respondent’s self-reported willingness to take 
risks in the financial context. Network size is the number of friends listed in the 
online survey, in three different contexts (financial, academic, and social). Age is 
the respondent’s age in years. Year of study and a dummy variable for business 
major were initially included, but dropped due to insignificance. Female is a 
dummy variable, equal to one if the respondent is female, and zero if they are 
male. I include three cultural dummy variables to look for differences in the 
cultures of interest: Asian, British, and NZ European. The omitted categories are 
Europeans and Other. I also include a dummy variable for Asian students who 
are studying in NZ, in case they have different preferences to Asian students 
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studying in the UK. I use robust standard errors to account for heterogeneity in 
the sample. 
 Results from the ordered probit regressions are presented in Table 3.4 
below. When looking at the entire sample of 552 students, we can see that the 
size of one’s financial network has a positive and significant (p = 0.020) effect on 
the willingness to takes risks in financial investment, as expected. Social network 
size is also significant at the 5% level of confidence, but has a negative effect on 
the willingness to take risks with money. It is unclear why a larger social network 
should have a negative effect on willingness to take risks. Perhaps the students 
with more friends are more concerned with their reputation and do not want to 
face the shame of asking to borrow money from others, incentivising them to be 
more careful with money.  Academic network size has no effect on risk attitudes 
in the financial context. Age and gender are also significant. Consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Dohmen et al, 2011), being female and older both reduce 
the willingness to take financial risks. 
The only significant cultural dummy variable is the Asian variable, which is 
significant at the 1% level of confidence (p < 0.001). As predicted, being Asian 
increases the willingness to take risks in the financial context, relative to the 
omitted categories of European and Other. A chi-squared test shows that the 
coefficient on the Asian dummy variable is significantly different to the coefficients 
on the British dummy variable (p < 0.001) and NZ European dummy variable (p 
= 0.039). There is no significant difference between the coefficients on the British 
and NZ European dummy variables (p = 0.220). 
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Table 3.4: Results from Ordered Probit Regression on Financial Risk Attitudes 
                                                          
18 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses, rounded to three decimal places. Significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of confidence is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively. In ordered 
probit models, the probability of the dependant variable taking on any particular value is given by 
the probability a latent variable lies between each cut point. 
Coefficients from Ordered Probit Model18 
Dependent Variable: Willingness to Take Financial Risks 
 
Entire Sample 
n = 552 
British Sample 
n = 340 
Asian Sample 
n = 82 
NZ Euro 
n = 48 
Financial Network Size 
    0.045** 
(0.019) 
0.036 
(0.022) 
    0.105** 
(0.051) 
0.004 
(0.106) 
Academic Network Size 
-0.000 
  (0.023) 
-0.001 
  (0.029) 
-0.092* 
(0.053) 
0.101 
(0.138) 
Social Network Size 
   -0.048** 
(0.020) 
-0.039 
(0.024) 
0.015 
(0.062) 
-0.046 
 (0.092) 
Age 
 -0.022* 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
  (0.018) 
  -0.083** 
(0.042) 
0.041 
(0.053) 
Female 
     -0.589*** 
(0.091) 
     -0.453*** 
0.110 
     -0.900*** 
(0.285) 
     -1.054*** 
(0.310) 
British 
 
0.042 
(0.134) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Asian 
 
      0.642*** 
(0.165) 
N/A N/A N/A 
NZ Euro 
0.244 
(0.190) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Asian * NZ Study 
-0.325 
(0.296) 
N/A 
-0.181 
 (0.349) 
N/A 
Cut 1 
-2.594 
(0.327) 
-2.329 
(0.416) 
-5.035 
(0.895) 
-1.223 
(1.338) 
Cut 2 
-2.072 
(0.326) 
-1.835 
(0.415) 
-4.232 
(0.876) 
-0.889 
(1.298) 
Cut 3 
-1.469 
(0.320) 
-1.126 
(0.402) 
-3.738 
(0.881) 
-0.458 
(1.248) 
Cut 4 
-1.081 
(0.317) 
-0.750 
(0.402) 
-3.165 
(0.878) 
-0.072 
(1.223) 
Cut 5 
-0.806 
(0.317) 
-0.454 
(0.401) 
-2.978 
(0.887) 
0.206 
(1.213) 
Cut 6 
-0.394 
(0.315) 
-0.049 
(0.400) 
-2.258 
(0.865) 
0.536 
(1.218) 
Cut 7 
0.131 
(0.313) 
0.424 
(0.398) 
-1.550 
(0.842) 
1.178 
(1.191) 
Cut 8 
0.783 
(0.316) 
1.038 
(0.403) 
-1.069 
(0.842) 
2.127 
(1.204) 
Cut 9 
1.472 
(0.332) 
1.650 
(0.415) 
-0.334 
(0.912) 
N/A 
Cut 10 
2.185 
(0.384) 
2.391 
(0.497) 
0.350 
(0.930) 
N/A 
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To see whether any of the effects are culture-specific, we stratify the 
sample into British, Asian, and NZ European responses. Here we can see that 
the effect of financial network size comes entirely through the Asian sample. This 
makes sense, as the collectivist Asians are more likely to consider their network 
when making risky decisions. On the other hand, the individualist British and NZ 
Europeans probably make risky decisions based on their own personality. The 
negative effect of age on financial risk taking also comes entirely through the 
Asian sample, whereas the gender effect holds for all three cultural groups. 
Interestingly, having a larger network in the academic context reduces the 
willingness to takes risks with money for the Asian sample. It is unclear why this 
should be the case.  
In addition to the stratifications, we run regressions that interact the cultural 
dummy variables with financial network size, age, and gender. This is to see 
whether the cultural effects differ with other characteristics. None of these 
interaction terms are significant. However, the results are available in Appendix 
Three for the Asian dummy variable interactions. We also check for an interaction 
between network size and gender, but this is also insignificant.   
Social Risk Attitudes 
 We now turn to see whether there are any cultural differences in the 
willingness to take risks with social approval. We can expect those from 
collectivist cultures to be wearier of harming relationships than those from 
individualist cultures. We ask respondents to rate their willingness to take risks 
with social approval on a scale from 0 to 10, with higher numbers indicating 
greater willingness to take risks. When looking at sample averages, the average 
willingness to takes risks with social approval among British students is 5.4, 
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whereas Asians have an average of 4.7. NZ Europeans are also more willing to 
take social risks than Asians, with an average willingness to take social risks of 
5.1. A Mann-Whitney U-test shows that Asians have a significantly different 
willingness to take social risks compared to the other cultures (p = 0.008). These 
results are indicative that students from collectivist cultures, such as most Asian 
countries, are indeed more risk averse for social risks than students from 
individualist cultures. 
 To account for demographic variables and any effects from network size, 
I run the same ordered probit regression as above, but with social risk attitudes 
as the dependent variable. Results from this regression are presented below in 
Table 3.5.  
All of the cultural dummy variables are significant in this regression, but all 
have a negative effect on social risk attitudes, compared to the omitted categories 
of European and Other. The effect of being Asian is particularly large and 
significant. Using a chi-squared test, the coefficient on the Asian dummy variable 
is significantly different to the British coefficient (p = 0.007) but not the NZ 
European coefficient (p = 0.191). Similarly to financial risk attitudes, being female 
has a significantly negative effect on social risk attitudes. However, the gender 
effect works entirely through the NZ European sample. Age is not significant in 
determining social risk attitudes, accept for Asians where age has a negative 
effect. The only network size variable to show significance is the financial network 
size (and the academic network size for NZ Europeans only), which increases 
the willingness to take social risks, especially for British and NZ Europeans. It is 
unclear why having a larger financial risk-sharing network increases the 
willingness to take social risks. 
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Table 3.5: Results from Ordered Probit Regression on Social Risk Attitudes 
                                                          
19 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses, rounded to three decimal places. Significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of confidence is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively. In ordered 
probit models, the probability of the dependant variable taking on any particular value is given by 
the probability a latent variable lies between each cut point. 
Coefficients from Ordered Probit Model19 
Dependent Variable: Willingness to Take Social Risks 
 
Entire Sample 
n = 552 
British Sample 
n = 340 
Asian Sample 
n = 82 
NZ Euro 
n = 48 
Financial Network Size 
  0.035* 
(0.018) 
       0.055*** 
(0.021) 
0.016 
(0.053) 
  0.154* 
(0.088) 
Academic Network Size 
-0.027 
  (0.021) 
-0.008 
  (0.025) 
-0.056 
(0.053) 
     -0.277*** 
(0.095) 
Social Network Size 
-0.008 
  (0.019) 
-0.027 
  (0.023) 
0.004 
(0.050) 
0.025 
(0.088) 
Age 
0.010 
(0.017) 
-0.001 
  (0.022) 
 -0.107* 
(0.056) 
0.084 
(0.053) 
Female 
   -0.178** 
(0.088) 
-0.141 
 (0.112) 
0.167 
(0.271) 
   -0.755** 
(0.329) 
British 
 
 -0.244* 
(0.145) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Asian 
 
     -0.631*** 
(0.184) 
N/A N/A N/A 
NZ Euro 
  -0.398** 
(0.171) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Asian * NZ Study 
0.315 
(0.345) 
N/A 
    0.732** 
(0.369) 
N/A 
Cut 1 
-2.194 
(0.415) 
-2.228 
(0.506) 
-3.792 
(1.117) 
-1.274 
(1.202) 
Cut 2 
-1.819 
(0.412) 
-1.845 
(0.499) 
-3.370 
(1.116) 
-0.932 
(1.193) 
Cut 3 
-1.328 
(0.411) 
-1.191 
(0.501) 
-3.088 
(1.108) 
-0.397 
(1.184) 
Cut 4 
-0.933 
(0.406) 
-0.820 
(0.492) 
-2.600 
(1.115) 
0.092 
(1.165) 
Cut 5 
-0.610 
(0.404) 
-0.417 
(0.492) 
-2.401 
(1.117) 
0.393 
(1.121) 
Cut 6 
-0.061 
(0.402) 
0.082 
(0.490) 
-1.725 
(1.106) 
1.247 
(1.113) 
Cut 7 
0.305 
(0.402) 
0.415 
(0.490) 
-1.421 
(1.106) 
1.856 
(1.119) 
Cut 8 
0.686 
(0.404) 
0.844 
(0.491) 
-1.136 
(1.093) 
2.523 
(1.131) 
Cut 9 
1.206 
(0.408) 
1.409 
(0.492) 
-0.652 
(1.057) 
3.521 
(1.330) 
Cut 10 
1.675 
(0.420) 
1.905 
(0.491) 
0.252 
(1.169) 
N/A 
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Context-Specific Risks 
 The average willingness to take risks in each context for each culture is 
presented below in Table 3.6. The average willingness to take risks in general is 
very close, with an average score of around 6 in all four cultures. Most people are 
very risk averse when driving, with averages of around 3 in each culture. Results 
for financial investment risks are discussed above, and show us that Asians tend 
to be more risk seeking with their money compared to British, Europeans, and 
NZ Europeans. All cultures are quite keen on taking risks with leisure and sport, 
although the Asians less so than the others. Asians are also less inclined to take 
risks with their careers, with an average willingness of 5.48 compared to over 6 
for British and Europeans, and 5.58 for NZ Europeans. There is quite a large 
cultural difference in the health context, with Asians scoring an average 
willingness to take risks of only 2.17, compared to 4.33 for the British and 4.65 
for NZ Europeans. This result may be due to Confucian values such as patience 
and self-control, that place less emphasis on immediate rewards than Westerners 
might. Therefore, Asians may be less inclined to engage in unhealthy behaviour 
such as over-eating. Risks with social approval are discussed above and show 
that Asians are less willing to take risks with their relationships than other 
cultures. 
 Following on from Dohmen et al (2011), we can check how well these 
context-specific risk measures predict actual behaviour using simple correlations. 
As the behavioural measures involve only “yes” or “no” outcomes, we use probit 
regressions to check the correlation between each behavioural measure and 
each context-specific risk attitude measure. The results from these regressions 
are presented below in Table 3.7. In-line with Dohmen et al’s (2011) results, all  
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Table 3.6: Average Willingness to Take Risks by Nationality/Ethnicity 
Average Willingness to Take Risks20 
 British 
n = 340 
Asian 
n = 82 
European 
n = 53 
NZ Euro 
n = 48 
General 6.10 
(0.10) 
5.88 
(0.19) 
6.02 
(0.24) 
6.04 
(0.25) 
Driving 3.37 
(0.14) 
2.66 
(0.31) 
2.89 
(0.33) 
3.83 
(0.28) 
Financial Investment 4.35 
(0.12) 
5.38 
(0.23) 
4.28 
(0.34) 
4.90 
(0.34) 
Leisure and Sport 6.89 
(0.11) 
5.63 
(0.25) 
6.60 
(0.30) 
6.13 
(0.31) 
Career 6.03 
(0.11) 
5.48 
(0.24) 
6.13 
(0.30) 
5.58 
(0.29) 
Health 4.33 
(0.15) 
2.17 
(0.26) 
3.94 
(0.39) 
4.65 
(0.34) 
Social Approval 5.41 
(0.12) 
4.67 
(0.28) 
5.45 
(0.36) 
5.10 
(0.28) 
 
Table 3.7: Correlations between Context-Specific Risk Measures and Self-
Reported Behaviour 
Probit Regression of Behavioural Outcomes on Risk Attitudes 21 
Dependant Variable: Behavioural Outcome 
Risk Attitudes Behavioural Outcomes 
 Smoking Traffic 
Offence 
Self-
Employed 
Stock 
Market 
Active 
Sports 
Public 
Sector 
General 0.172*** 
(0.046) 
0.167*** 
(0.053) 
 0.087*** 
(0.031) 
0.010*** 
(0.030) 
0.084*** 
(0.031) 
 0.004 
(0.030) 
Driving  0.011 
(0.029) 
0.087*** 
(0.032) 
 0.035 
(0.021) 
0.070*** 
(0.021) 
 0.051** 
(0.021) 
-0.040* 
(0.021) 
Financial Investment  0.041 
(0.032) 
 0.095** 
(0.039) 
 0.111*** 
(0.025) 
0.201*** 
(0.025) 
 0.054** 
(0.024) 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
Leisure and Sport 0.100*** 
(0.038) 
 0.007 
(0.039) 
 0.050* 
(0.027) 
 0.035 
(0.025) 
0.221*** 
(0.028) 
-0.048* 
(0.025) 
Career 0.131*** 
(0.041) 
 0.090** 
(0.044) 
 0.093*** 
(0.028) 
 0.049* 
(0.027) 
 0.054** 
(0.027) 
-0.012 
(0.027) 
Health 0.170*** 
(0.030) 
 0.046 
(0.030) 
-0.026 
(0.020) 
-0.000 
(0.020) 
 0.010 
(0.020) 
-0.004 
(0.020) 
Social Approval 0.112*** 
(0.033) 
 0.087** 
(0.037) 
 0.066*** 
(0.024) 
 0.036 
(0.023) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
 0.022 
(0.023) 
                                                          
20 Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
21 Standard errors are given in parentheses, rounded to three decimal places. Significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level of confidence is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
   
 82 
 
of the context-specific measures are strongly correlated with related behavioural 
outcomes, except for the question on public sector employment. For example, 
self-reported willingness to take risks in the financial investment context is a 
strong predictor of whether or not someone intends to invest in the stock market. 
Similarly, whether or not someone smokes is highly correlated with their 
willingness to take risks in the health context. As such, these context-specific 
measures of risk attitudes seem to give a realistic insight into behaviour.  
3.4.2 Network Formation in the Lab 
 In total, 188 students took part in the lab experiment, 120 in Exeter and 68 
in Canterbury. Of these, 74 students are British, 42 are Asian (21 of which are 
studying in NZ and 21 in the UK), 33 are NZ European, and the others are 
European or from other cultures (mostly New Zealanders who did not specify 
whether they are Maori or NZ European). We can now ask whether students from 
collectivist cultures are more inclined to form networks when given the opportunity 
to do so in the lab. 
 When looking at the descriptive statistics22, we can note differences in the 
extreme ends of the link proposals distribution, with no Asians proposing zero 
links in the UK data, compared to 18% of British students. At the other extreme, 
42% of Asians propose the maximum number of links (three), compared to only 
20% of British participants. The NZ data tells a different story, with 18% of Asians 
sending zero link proposals, compared to 15% of NZ Europeans. There is also 
                                                          
22 Responses from three sessions in the UK are removed from the analysis of link proposals due 
to a difference in the payoff structure. As almost all students were sending the maximum number 
of link proposals in the first three sessions, we decided to change the payoffs to make forming 
links less of a focal point. The payoff tables in all other sessions follow from Corbae and Duffy 
(2008). 
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little cultural variance in the proportions sending three link proposals, with 27% of 
Asians compared to 24% of NZ Europeans. 
The overall data from both countries is illustrated below in Figure 3.2, 
which shows the percentage of people from each culture sending each number 
of link proposals. Here, NZ Europeans stand out while Asians and British are 
fairly similar. Proportionately more NZ Europeans send one link proposal and less 
send two compared to Asians and British. Using a two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test of equality of distributions, Asians and British do not have 
significantly different distributions in the number of link proposals sent. However, 
NZ Europeans have a significantly different distribution compared to both the 
Asians and the British (p = 0.034 and p = 0.013, respectively). 
Figure 3.2: Link Proposals by Culture as a Percentage 
 
To control for demographic factors affecting behaviour in the number of 
link proposals, we run an ordered probit regression. The results from this 
regression are presented below in Table 3.8. Only two variables have a significant 
effect on the number of link proposals sent: the cultural dummy variables for 
Asians and NZ Europeans. Asians send significantly more link proposals and NZ 
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Europeans send significantly less, relative to the omitted categories of European 
and other. 
Table 3.8: Results from Ordered Probit Regression on Link Proposals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can also ask, how do link proposals relate to the size of one’s outside 
network? The network size variables are insignificant when adding them to the 
above regression on link proposals. However, financial network size has a 
                                                          
23 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses, rounded to three decimal places. Significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of confidence is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively. In ordered 
probit models, the probability of the dependant variable taking on any particular value is given by 
the probability a latent variable lies between each cut point. 
Coefficients from Ordered Probit Model23 
Dependent Variable: Number of Link Proposals 
Financial Network Size 
0.014 
(0.040) 
Academic Network Size 
0.021 
(0.044) 
Social Network Size 
-0.005 
(0.040) 
Age 
-0.027 
(0.024) 
Female 
-0.038 
(0.193) 
British 
 
-0.098 
(0.240) 
Asian 
 
     0.709** 
(0.339) 
NZ Euro 
    -0.659** 
(0.313) 
Asian * NZ Study 
-0.055 
 (0.662) 
Cut 1 
-1.731 
 (0.635) 
Cut 2 
-0.675 
 (0.621) 
Cut 3 
0.104 
 (0.619) 
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positive and significant effect on the number of proposals sent when the cultural 
dummy variables are removed from the regression. This means that the effect of 
financial network size is entirely captured by the cultural dummy variables, as 
Asians have a significantly larger financial network compared to the other 
cultures, while NZ Europeans have a significantly smaller network. 
Corbae and Duffy (2008) find a high degree of efficiency in their stag hunt 
experiment, with around 90% of players choosing payoff dominant strategies. In 
our experiment, 71% of players choose the payoff dominant outcome in the 2-
player game under the exogenous network, compared to 66% in the 3-player 
game, and 68% in the 4-player game. In total, 60% of players choose the payoff 
dominant outcome after link formation. The 40% of players “choosing” the risk 
dominant equilibrium includes players who did not form any links and were forced 
to accept the risk dominant payoff. As there is little cultural difference in the level 
of efficiency, I do not give a detailed analysis of efficiency here. 
3.4.3 Risk Attitudes in the Lab 
 Financial Risks 
Subjects are asked to make ten different lottery choices, and the point they 
switch from preferring the safer lottery to the risker lottery is taken as a measure 
of risk attitude (Holt and Laury, 2002). Subjects who switch later in the table are 
more risk averse than subjects who switch earlier. In my analysis, the measure 
of risk aversion is taken as the number of the row they switch at, such that higher 
numbers correspond to greater risk aversion. Nine inconsistent responses are 
dropped from the dataset. Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of subjects from each 
culture who choose each switch point in the lottery choice task. We can see that 
larger proportions of Asians and NZ Europeans switch to preferring the riskier 
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lottery later on the table (rows 9 or 10), compared to British students. There also 
appears to be a focal point, with the majority of subjects from all cultures choosing 
to switch at row 7 or 8. 
Figure 3.3: Percent of Subjects from each Culture Choosing each Switch Point 
 
 
Again, we use an ordered probit model to assess the effects of culture and 
network size on the salient measure of financial risk aversion24. From the 
regression, reported below in Table 3.9, we can see that age and gender 
significantly affect salient financial risk attitudes, in the usual way (e.g. Dohmen 
et al, 2011). Being older and female increases the level of risk aversion among 
subjects. Also significant, is the interaction of the two dummy variables, being 
Asian and studying in NZ. Being both Asian and studying in NZ reduces risk 
aversion, so that these subjects take more risks with money. None of the cultural  
                                                          
24 We also run this regression including family income, number of siblings, and an interaction term 
for these two variables, but drop all three variables due to insignificance. The family income 
variable is problematic as many students reported that they did not know their parents’ income 
and took a wild guess. 
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Table 3.9: Results from Ordered Probit Regression on Lottery Choice Task 
Switch Points 
 
                                                          
25 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses, rounded to three decimal places. Significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of confidence is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively. In ordered 
probit models, the probability of the dependant variable taking on any particular value is given by 
the probability a latent variable lies between each cut point. 
Coefficients from Ordered Probit Model25 
Dependent Variable: Lottery Choice Task Switch Point 
 
Entire Sample 
n = 188 
British Sample 
n = 74 
Asian Sample 
n = 42 
NZ Euro 
n = 33 
Financial Network Size 
-0.019 
 (0.047) 
-0.001 
(0.057) 
0.283* 
(0.162) 
-0.422* 
(0.245) 
Academic Network Size 
0.006 
(0.044) 
0.023 
(0.058) 
-0.070 
(0.113) 
0.259 
(0.198) 
Social Network Size 
-0.034 
 (0.040) 
-0.028 
(0.048) 
-0.230 
(0.140) 
-0.041 
(0.125) 
Age 
      0.064*** 
(0.020) 
    0.201** 
(0.097) 
0.045 
(0.093) 
0.080** 
(0.038) 
Female 
       0.624*** 
(0.193) 
0.235 
(0.243) 
2.070** 
(0.981) 
1.48** 
(0.585) 
British 
 
0.112 
(0.211) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Asian 
 
-0.220 
 (0.396) 
N/A N/A N/A 
NZ Euro 
-0.040 
 (0.302) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Asian * NZ Study 
    -1.31*** 
(0.358) 
N/A 
-2.019 
 (1.255) 
N/A 
Cut 1 
-0.858 
(0.588) 
2.000 
( 1.922) 
0.939 
(2.302) 
-0.070 
(1.056) 
Cut 2 
-0.465 
(0.586) 
2.193 
(1.943) 
1.404 
(2.095) 
0.652 
(1.018) 
Cut 3 
-0.133 
(0.568) 
2.454 
(1.894) 
2.027 
(2.252) 
1.140 
(1.063) 
Cut 4 
0.541 
(0.561) 
2.995 
(1.908) 
2.320 
(2.237) 
3.037 
(1.179) 
Cut 5 
0.925 
(0.560) 
3.402 
(1.895) 
3.154 
(2.257) 
3.775 
(1.250) 
Cut 6 
1.869 
(0.569) 
4.447 
(1.891) 
3.874 
(2.257) 
4.080 
(1.312) 
Cut 7 
2.511 
(0.564) 
5.176 
(1.914) 
4.773 
(2.339) 
N/A 
Cut 8 
2.974 
(0.580) 
5.576 
(1.992) 
N/A N/A 
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dummy variables are alone significant, but the coefficient on the Asian dummy 
variable has the expected sign, i.e. being Asian reduces risk aversion over 
financial outcomes. 
We observe some interesting results when stratifying the sample by 
culture for this regression. The effect of age works through the British and NZ 
European sample, but not the Asians, whereas the effect of gender works through 
the Asian and NZ European sample, but not the British. Also, when restricting the 
sample to Asians or NZ Europeans, the coefficient on financial network size 
becomes significant. Strangely, financial network size has a positive effect on risk 
aversion for the Asians. This is in contrast to our result obtained from the online 
survey, where having a larger financial risk-sharing network increases the 
willingness to take risks for the Asian sample.  
The main problem with using Holt and Laury’s lottery choice task is that 
we lack variation in the data. Most people in the experiment switch at around row 
7 or 8, which is somewhat of a focal point. Because subjects are given exact 
probabilities and payoffs they are able to make decisions fairly systematically. 
We observe a lot more variation in the self-reported willingness to take risks 
measures from the online survey. The survey measures may be more related to 
personal preferences as there is no need to try and calculate a “right” answer. 
 Social Risk Problem 
 Participants are given a hypothetical social risk problem as part of the 
follow-up questionnaire. The problem involves a choice of whether or not to give 
advice to a roommate who is currently facing a major personal decision. Giving 
advice involves a social risk as the advice may turn out to be bad or the roommate 
may believe you are being pushy, which would harm the relationship. On the 
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other hand, if the roommate appreciates the advice, the relationship is improved. 
Remaining silent avoids the risk as it has no effect on the relationship. 
Participants can choose either to give advice or remain silent. Overall, 88% of 
British and 82% of NZ European participants indicate they would give advice, 
compared to only 54% of Asian participants. Using a two-sided two-sample Z-test 
of proportions, both the British and NZ European results are statistically different 
to the Asian results (p < 0.001 for both). 
As there are only two outcomes in the social risks question, a standard 
probit regression can be used to analyse the results. A dummy dependent 
variable is created to indicate whether the subject would take the risk (1) or 
remain silent (0). Results from the probit regression on the social risks question 
are presented below in Table 3.10. As the cultural dummy variables are the most 
interesting here, I do not stratify the regression by culture. 
We can see here that being Asian or older significantly reduces the 
tendency to take social risks in the roommate problem. The large effect of age is 
surprising considering the small variety of ages in the sample. However, when 
removing those older than 25 the effect of age becomes insignificant (p = 0.143). 
The effect of culture backs up my hypothesis that Asians are less willing to take 
risks with their interpersonal relationships. Without maintaining good 
relationships, collectivists do not have access to the benefits of belonging to a 
close-knit social network, such as receiving financial support in times of need. 
Although this result supports the idea that Asians are more risk averse for 
social risks, only one hypothetical problem is considered. More social risks 
questions in different contexts need to be added as a robustness check to the 
above result. Alternative explanations also need to be considered. Perhaps the 
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Asians prefer to remain silent due to other cultural values, such as being polite, 
rather than wanting to maintain the risk-sharing network. Similarly, individualists 
may be concerned with other aspects of their culture, such as a greater emphasis 
on opinion sharing to show their individual values, rather than risks to 
relationships. In addition, we cannot be sure whether the participants even 
interpreted the problem as a risky situation. Perhaps they imagined a good friend 
whom they felt they could be honest with without risk of harming the relationship. 
Table 3.10: Results from Probit Regression on Social Risk Question 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
26 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses, rounded to three decimal places. Significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of confidence is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Coefficients from Probit Model26 
Dependent Variable: Social Risk Attitude 
Constant 
       4.411*** 
(1.054) 
Financial Network Size 
0.022 
 (0.051) 
Academic Network Size 
-0.033 
(0.069) 
Social Network Size 
-0.034 
(0.064) 
Age 
     -0.129*** 
(0.037) 
Female 
0.066 
(0.285) 
British 
 
-0.555 
(0.455) 
Asian 
 
     -2.010*** 
(0.534) 
NZ Euro 
-0.423 
 (0.540) 
Asian * NZ Study 
1.019 
(0.636) 
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3.5 Discussion 
 This paper provides some indicative results that students from collectivist 
cultures do form larger networks at university, and do consider their networks 
more when making risky decisions. These results may show a lower bound on 
the effects of social networks on risk attitudes, as only networks within the 
university are considered. However, there are several important problems that 
need to be addressed with this research. Four of the key problems, which are 
common to cross-cultural research, are sample bias, background risk, 
interpretation bias, and heterogeneity within cultures with respect to values. 
 3.5.1 Sample Bias  
 The aim of this study is to provide some insights on how culture affects 
risk attitudes through social networks. However, it is important to note that any 
conclusions reached here only apply to a particular sample of students. The 
results are not representative of any cultural population, such as Asians in 
general. Asians who study abroad could be more or less risk seeking than the 
average population. Perhaps international students are particularly risk seeking 
as they are prepared to move countries to study, which is somewhat risky as 
students do not know how much they will like a place before they arrive.  
On the other hand, students who are living in a foreign country may feel 
and act more risk averse as they are without the support of their close friends and 
family. Similarly, international students may conform to the local culture when 
studying abroad and act less collectivist as they perceive less collectivism in 
society (Zou et al, 2009). Extending this study to representative samples would 
be an interesting exercise for the future, to get an idea of how culture affects risk 
attitudes at the macro-level. 
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 3.5.2 Background Risk 
 Comparing samples of students from different countries is subject to the 
problem of background risk (Harrison et al, 2007). The risk attitudes measured in 
this study could be influenced by different risky conditions that the students face 
in their daily lives. Perhaps some of the students come from a country that is 
experiencing harsher economic downturn than other countries. The students from 
the University of Canterbury were facing on-going earthquakes at the time the 
online survey and experiment were run. Could this have affected their risk 
attitudes? If so then comparison with students studying at Exeter will be biased. 
We try to control for background risk by asking subjects to rate their current mood 
and financial stability in their home country when completing the experiment’s 
follow-up questionnaire. Neither of these variables turn out to be significant in 
regressions on risk attitudes. However, the problem of background still needs to 
be considered in our results. 
 One possible way to alleviate the problem of background risk is to compare 
cultures who are born and raised in the same environment, subject to the same 
background risks. For example, the Maori and European cultures in New Zealand 
represent two distinct cultural groups that are integrated and share the same 
environment. While the Maori culture is very collectivist, the NZ European culture 
is similar in individualism to the UK. While a few responses from Maori students 
were gathered in this study, more data needs to be collected to make a 
comparison between Maoris and NZ Europeans. 
 3.5.3 Interpretation Bias 
 Any experiment or survey is subject to interpretation differences between 
cultures. Interpretation bias is where people from a particular culture interpret the 
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experimental situation in a systematically different way to people from another 
culture. This may happen because cultural values dictate what the focus of the 
situation should be. For example, Morris and Peng (1994) use a computer 
simulation of a group of fish swimming, with some fish appearing in the 
foreground and others in the background. They find that Chinese participants 
tend to focus on the entire group of fish, while American participants focus on just 
one individual fish in the foreground. Therefore, Asians tend to consider 
background and context more in making decisions. How do Asian students 
interpret questions about their social networks and risk attitudes, or sending link 
proposals in the lab? Will this differ from the British/NZ European interpretation? 
The lab experiment with endogenous network formation seems quite abstract and 
difficult to interpret in terms of individualist and collectivist values.  
 3.5.4 Heterogeneity Within Cultures 
 One limitation with this research is heterogeneity within cultures with 
respect to values, such as collectivism and individualism (Bond and Smith, 1996, 
p. 125). While overall, East Asia can be characterised as a collectivist culture, 
and the United Kingdom can be characterised as an individualist culture, how 
individuals within these cultures take on the values of individualism and 
collectivism can differ widely. Students who attend economic experiments may 
be particularly individualist or collectivist individuals, regardless of their country 
of origin. How closely each individual identifies with being individualist or 
collectivist will determine whether or not these values are manifested in their 
behaviour. 
Jetten et al (2002) look at how the strength of identification with national 
identity can affect behaviour among North Americans and Indonesians. In North 
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America, those who identify strongly with their national identity are more 
individualistic, while in Indonesia those who identify strongly are less individualist. 
These results reflect the national identities of North America being very 
individualist and Indonesia being very collectivist. Future experiments regarding 
cultural differences at the individual level should contain a measure of how 
strongly each individual identifies with their culture. 
3.6 Conclusions 
 The main research questions of this study are whether students from 
collectivist cultures form larger networks when they come to study at university, 
and whether network size affects risk attitudes. We find that on average, students 
from collectivist Asian countries do form larger networks in the financial risk-
sharing context, but not in the academic or social contexts. Having a larger 
financial risk-sharing network does increase the willingness to take risks with 
money, but only for Asian students. Risk attitudes for individualists are likely to 
be driven more by personality than relationships with others. 
 A couple of secondary research questions are whether collectivists are 
more risk averse for social risks, and are there any other cultural differences in 
context-specific risk attitudes? We find that Asian students are significantly less 
likely to take risks with their social relationships than British or NZ European 
students. This makes sense as Asian students are more likely to receive financial 
support from their social network and thus have a greater incentive to maintain 
relationships to ensure the support. Individualists are less likely to receive support 
to begin with and thus have less need to maintain relationships. In addition to 
social risks, Asians are also less inclined to take risks with their health compared 
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to the other cultures. This may be due to other cultural values such as self-control 
and not over-indulging. 
 The results of this project may be useful for policymakers, especially in 
countries that have a mixture of individualist and collectivist citizens. For example, 
policies that encourage risk-sharing networks to promote entrepreneurial 
activities may have a stronger impact on collectivists than individualists. These 
results are particularly relevant for developing countries which may lack formal 
insurance markets and also often tend to be collectivist in nature. 
 While the cushion hypothesis is likely to hold for university students, we 
need to ask how the effect may change with age. University students tend to be 
in a young age group, who have not yet accumulated their own wealth, which 
means they need to rely on financial support from older family members. But what 
effect does belonging to a collectivist culture have on the risk attitudes of older 
generations? The older generations are likely to make net transfers to the 
younger generations, as they have accumulated more wealth. Will the older 
generations therefore be more risk averse as they are responsible for supporting 
the young? Collectivism may have an opposite effect on risk attitudes as age 
increases. Does this mean the effect of risk-sharing networks cancels out when 
averaged over a representative sample? All of these questions are promising 
avenues for future research. 
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Chapter Four: Cultural Norms and Identity in Coordination Games 
4.1 Introduction 
 Coordination is important for many economic decisions, such as firms 
deciding on output and pricing decisions without knowing the decisions of their 
competitors, or Governments setting trade policy without knowing the strategies 
of other countries. People from different backgrounds may use different heuristics 
when trying to coordinate with others. Knowing how culture affects the ability to 
coordinate will be useful for those engaging in trade or competition with people 
from other countries. 
 People from the same culture are likely to share similar norms and perhaps 
find it easier to predict the behaviour of their opponent, thus improving 
coordination. On the other hand, when playing against someone from a different 
culture, the players may be unfamiliar with each other’s norms and need to rely 
on cultural stereotypes to try and predict the opponent’s behaviour. We expect 
players to experience more ambiguity when playing against someone from a 
different culture and therefore choose safer strategies in coordination games. 
 We run two types of coordination games – a stag hunt and a bargaining 
game. While we do not find Asian students to discriminate very much between a 
British or Asian opponent, the British students tend to act very differently against 
an Asian opponent compared to a British opponent. In a stag hunt game, the 
British students tend to play the safer strategy more often against an Asian 
opponent, while in a bargaining game they demand more of the pie. The British 
seem to be basing their behaviour on a cultural stereotype that Asians are 
cautious. However, our results show that this stereotype is misleading. 
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4.2 Background Literature  
 Although cultural differences in coordination games have not yet been 
studied extensively, some related literature has demonstrated the importance of 
social norms (e.g. Singh, 2009) and group identity (e.g. Benjamin et al, 2010; 
Chen and Chen, 2011; Chen et al, 2010) for coordination game outcomes. As 
culture is one aspect of identity, we can expect a group identity to be stronger 
when players are from the same cultural background. Chen and Chen (2011) 
show that a salient group identity increases coordination on Pareto superior 
outcomes in the minimum effort coordination game. As Chen and Chen impose 
only minimal group identities in the lab27, we can expect natural group identities 
such as culture to have an even stronger effect. Similarly, social norms are culture 
specific, and norms of sharing and cooperation within a community are likely to 
increase efficiency in coordination games such as the stag hunt (Singh, 2009). 
Finally, expectations and beliefs are also important in coordination game 
decisions. When playing against someone from another culture, people may find 
it harder to predict their opponent’s behaviour and need to rely on stereotypes 
when forming their beliefs. 
 4.2.1 Social Norms  
 Singh (2009) considers how norms of trust within a society will affect 
behaviour in the stag hunt game. Typical payoffs for a two-player stag hunt game 
are illustrated below in Figure 4.1. The story goes as follows. Players must 
choose whether to hunt a stag or a hare when out hunting. Capturing a stag is 
more valuable than a hare but requires the help of both players. Therefore, if a 
                                                          
27 Minimal groups are where subjects are randomly allocated to groups and given an arbitrary 
label such as the “blue” or “yellow” group. 
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player hunts a stag without the assistance of the other player, he will receive a 
payoff of zero. Capturing a hare is easier and guarantees a small but sure payoff. 
We assume that players are separated and cannot communicate while on the 
hunt, thus coordination is important for reaching an equilibrium. 
Figure 4.1: Stag Hunt Game 
  Player 2 
 Stag Hare 
Player 1 Stag 2, 2 0, 1 
Hare 1, 0 1, 1 
 
There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game. The payoff 
dominant equilibrium is where all players help in hunting a stag and obtain 
maximum payoffs. However, there is also a risk dominant equilibrium, where each 
player guarantees him or herself a sure payoff from hunting a hare. There is also 
a mixed strategy equilibrium, where each player hunts stag or hare with a certain 
payoff-dependent probability. According to Singh (2009), people from societies 
with a norm of high trust are more likely to coordinate on the payoff dominant 
outcome, whereas people from societies with a norm of low trust will be driven 
towards the risk dominant equilibrium. This is because in a low trust society, 
people expect that the other player will be untrusting and prefer to guarantee 
themself a hare. Therefore, their best response is to also hunt hare to avoid 
ending up with nothing. 
Using data from the World Values Survey, Singh (2009, p. 24) concludes 
that 64% of countries are characterised by low trust. In particular, countries with 
the lowest level of trust include African countries such as Uganda and Tanzania, 
whereas Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and Sweden have the highest 
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levels of trust (Singh, 2009, p. 18). Trust is particularly important in societies that 
lack formal contracts and enforcement mechanisms. In such societies, trust 
provides an incentive to engage in business deals as people can expect to be 
fairly compensated for their actions. 
Singh develops a theory of how people base their expectations of others’ 
behaviour on a sample of past interactions. A society will then converge towards 
either a low or high trust norm, which respectively correspond to the risk dominant 
and payoff dominant equilibria in the stag hunt game. We can think of the mixed 
strategy equilibrium as a society with a norm of medium trust. However, the 
medium trust society is highly unstable. As people update their expectations of 
others’ behaviour after each interaction, a few successive positive or negative 
interactions could push the society towards either the high or low trust equilibrium. 
In such a society, monitoring and enforcement could be used to prevent 
convergence to the low trust equilibrium. 
Singh’s theory of how trust norms affect coordination in the stag hunt has 
not yet been empirically tested. We can expect people from collectivist cultures, 
such as China and India, to have norms of working together and sharing in the 
community, which may increase coordination on the payoff dominant outcome. 
 4.2.2 Group Identity 
 Identity was introduced into economic models by Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000), who theoretically show that people like to behave in a way that reinforces 
their identity. Extending this idea, Chen and Chen (2011) experimentally find that 
a common group identity28 increases coordination on the payoff dominant 
                                                          
28 Using randomly assigned minimal groups, which are labelled according to colour. 
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equilibrium in a minimum effort game (Huyck et al, 1990), but only when the group 
identity is made salient. They make the group identity salient by allowing subjects 
to communicate in their groups when trying to solve a task where they have to 
match paintings to the respective artists. If subjects help each other in the 
communication stage, the authors suggest they will be more likely to reciprocate 
when playing the minimum effort coordination game. Chen and Chen (2011) 
model this behaviour as an increase in the subjects’ group-contingent other-
regarding parameter αig when the group identity is made salient. The other-
regarding parameter is a weight ∈ [-1, 1] which measures how much a player 
cares about the payoff of their group members relative to their own payoff, as can 
be seen in the utility function below. 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 𝛼𝑖
𝑔?̅?−𝑖 + (1 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑔)𝜋𝑖(𝑥) 
 Worth nothing, is that an increase in efficiency may also be driven by a 
shift in beliefs about the underlying probability distribution of the other players’ 
actions, rather than an increase in altruism. Perhaps some subjects in Chen and 
Chen’s (2011) study decided to go for the payoff dominant outcome because they 
believed the other players were more likely to do the same after the 
communication stage. Therefore, as well as a potential increase in the other-
regarding parameter, the beliefs about probabilities regarding the other players’ 
behaviour is another factor that needs to be considered in explaining Chen and 
Chen’s (2011) results. 
 The Pareto optimal equilibrium of the minimum effort game is for all players 
to contribute maximum effort, as payoffs are given by the equation below, where 
c < 1. However, it is only in a player’s best interest to give the maximum effort if 
every other player also gives the maximum effort. A player should never give 
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more effort than the minimum chosen by any other player, as this effort would be 
wasted. Neither should they give less than the minimum as this would lower the 
payoff. This game is thus a coordination game, with Pareto-ranked Nash 
equilibria that have all players choosing the same effort level. 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛} − 𝑐[𝛼𝑖
𝑔?̅?−𝑖  + (1 −  𝛼𝑖
𝑔)𝑥𝑖] 
 Chen et al (2010) investigate the impact of salient ethnic identities on 
coordination and cooperation. They find that Asians are more responsive to 
ethnic priming than Caucasians, and show more in-group favouritism and out-
group discrimination. They use the participants’ surnames to convey ethnic 
identity of the other players in each game, but they combine the surname with 
the participant’s year of study and student ID to avoid experimenter demand 
effects29. Chuah et al (2007) also find more in-group favouritism and out-group 
discrimination by Malaysian Chinese than UK subjects when playing the 
ultimatum game. This suggests that people from collectivist cultures may 
distinguish more between in-groups and out-groups than people from individualist 
cultures.  
 Similarly, Benjamin et al (2010) investigate the effects of making ethnic 
identity salient on both financial risk attitudes and patience. They find no effect of 
priming30 on risk aversion for Asian Americans, whites, or blacks. Priming 
ethnicity could have a dual effect on risk aversion for Asians. They could be more 
risk seeking when thinking about their collectivist values and knowing they have 
a social network who can bail them out financially. On the other hand, they could 
                                                          
29 Experimenter demand effects (i.e. subjects giving results that they believe will be helpful for the 
experimenter, rather than making the choice they want) have been shown to be of particular 
concern in Asian cultures (Brislin and Lonner, 1973, p. 70). 
30 Using a questionnaire developed by Shih et al (1999). 
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become more risk averse when thinking about the stereotype of Asians being 
cautious. Therefore, the overall effect of priming on risk attitudes may be 
negligible. 
 However, Benjamin et al (2010) do find an effect of priming on patience 
among Asian Americans, who become more patient when their race is primed. 
This may be due to Confucian values, which emphasize perseverance and are 
still prominent in several Asian countries. Interestingly, Benjamin et al (2010) find 
minimal evidence of experimenter demand effects, with a follow-up questionnaire 
showing 90% of participants claimed they were not thinking about what the 
experimenter wanted them to choose when making their decision. Of the 
remaining 10% of participants, no one guessed the experiment was about race 
(Benjamin et al, 2010, p. 18). 
 4.2.3 Expectations and Stereotypes 
 In addition, coordination games may be used to identify social norms. In 
Krupka and Weber (2013), subjects are asked to rate the social appropriateness 
of possible decisions in two variants of a dictator game. One variant is the 
standard dictator game, where the dictator is given an endowment of $10 and 
asked how much they want to transfer to the recipient. The other variant is a 
“bully” dictator game, where both subjects are endowed with $5, and the dictator 
is asked how much they want to give to or take from the other person. In both 
variants, the dictator can transfer amounts in increments of $1. Subjects earn 
extra money for each appropriateness rating that matches the modal response of 
all of the subjects’ ratings. Therefore, subjects have an incentive to try and 
coordinate on the appropriateness rating that they believe other people will 
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choose. The most popular ratings may identify a social norm, or at least people’s 
perceptions of the social norm. 
 However, expectations of other peoples’ behaviour may rely on 
stereotypes, which do not necessarily represent the social norm31. For example, 
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) find that men of Eastern Jewish origin (Asian or 
African) in Israel are discriminated against in a trust game because they have an 
ethnic stereotype of being untrustworthy. However, the stereotype was found to 
be unjustified in the trust game as Eastern Jewish participants did not send back 
significantly lower amounts than men of European or American Jewish origin. 
They also find men of Eastern Jewish origin to be allocated more money in an 
ultimatum game because they have a stereotype of reacting harshly to 
unfairness. Again, this stereotype was unfounded in actual rejection rates. 
 Similarly, Hsee and Weber (1999) find predictions of risk aversion in 
Chinese and American subjects to be in contrast to actual behaviour. Subjects 
apparently rely on a misleading cultural stereotype that Americans are more risk 
seeking than Chinese, probably because Americans are portrayed as risk 
seeking in movies. In fact, the results show the opposite – Chinese are more risk 
seeking than Americans in financial lottery choice tasks when asked to choose 
between a certain outcome and a gamble. However, the predictions of subjects 
in Hsee and Weber’s (1999) experiment are not made salient by paying subjects 
for correct predictions. 
 Participants in Hsee and Weber’s (1999) study apparently rely even more 
on the misleading stereotype when trying to predict behaviour of those from a 
                                                          
31 Stereotypes are often correlated with social norms, as people gain utility from belonging to a 
group and thus often prefer to conform to group stereotypes in order to reinforce their group 
membership (Geisinger, 2004; Shih et al, 1999). 
   
 104 
 
different culture. The Chinese participants expected Americans to be even more 
risk seeking than the American participants expected of each other. Similarly, the 
American participants expected the Chinese to be even more cautious than the 
Chinese expected of other Chinese. When trying to predict behaviour of people 
in other countries, participants have less scope to base their prediction on people 
they know, and thus rely more on stereotypes. This suggests that people will likely 
face more ambiguity when interacting with those from another culture. 
 4.2.4 Ambiguity and Coordination Games 
 Ambiguity refers to a situation where the relevant probabilities are 
unknown and cannot be estimated to a reasonable degree. Eichberger et al 
(2008) show that the identity of the opponent matters for ambiguity, with subjects 
experiencing more ambiguity when playing strategic games against a granny 
than a game theorist. Most students reported that the game theorist’s behaviour 
was easier to guess than the granny and that they would prefer to play against 
the game theorist. As such, the students chose more ambiguity-averse strategies 
against the granny than the game theorist.  As people are less familiar with the 
social norms of other cultures, perhaps they will experience more ambiguity when 
playing strategic games and therefore choose safer strategies. 
 A high degree of ambiguity can hinder coordination on the payoff dominant 
outcome in many coordination games. Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) consider a 
bargaining game where players can make claims on a total payoff, say 4, but if 
the claims exceed 4, everyone receives 0. As the players are not allowed to 
communicate, the game can be interpreted as a coordination game. Any outcome 
that exhausts the available surplus is a Nash equilibrium. However, with sufficient 
ambiguity, subjects will prefer to claim lower amounts, leading to inefficient 
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outcomes. The two-player version of this bargaining game where players can 
claim 1, 2, or 3 is illustrated below in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2: Bargaining Coordination Game 
  Player 2 
  3 2 1 
 3 0 , 0 0 , 0 3, 1 
Player 1 2 0 , 0 2, 2 2, 1 
 1 1, 3 1, 2 1, 1 
 
As people are likely to experience a higher degree of ambiguity when 
playing against someone from another culture, we can expect such games to 
result in inefficient equilibria. However, social norms may also govern behaviour. 
For example, people from societies where fairness or equality is highly valued 
may select the efficient equilibrium of (2, 2) as a focal point. Similarly, those from 
trusting cultures may find it easier to coordinate on an efficient outcome, as in the 
stag hunt game discussed above. In contrast, those from low trust cultures may 
be driven towards inefficient outcomes such as (1, 1). To allow ambiguity and 
social norms to have maximum effect, we need to remove any obvious focal 
points when testing this game experimentally. 
 The bargaining game discussed above differs from the stag hunt in that 
the bargaining game is a situation of strategic substitutes, whereas the stag hunt 
is a game with strategic complements. Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) show that 
the implications of ambiguity differ depending on whether a game has strategic 
substitutes or strategic complements. Strategic substitutes are where an increase 
in the opponent’s action will decrease the marginal benefit of one’s own action. 
For example, in the bargaining game above, a larger claim of the opponent 
decreases the marginal benefit of one’s own claim. Strategic complements are 
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the opposite: an increase in the opponent’s action makes one’s own action more 
beneficial, as in the stag hunt game. If the opponent switches from hunting hare 
to hunting stag, this increases the benefit of putting in the extra effort to hunt stag. 
 Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) show that an increase in ambiguity will have 
opposite effects in games with strategic complements and substitutes, but this 
depends on whether there are positive or negative externalities. In the bargaining 
game we have negative aggregate externalities, because an increase in demand 
of the opponent lowers payoffs. Under negative externalities, in a game with 
strategic substitutes (e.g. the bargaining game), an increase in ambiguity will 
lower equilibrium actions. However, the opposite result holds under positive 
externalities. With strategic complements, an increase in ambiguity will increase 
equilibrium actions under negative externalities, but decrease equilibrium actions 
under positive externalities. The stag hunt game has positive externalities, i.e. a 
higher action by the opponent is beneficial, which means that ambiguity should 
lower equilibrium actions in the game, leading to the inefficient equilibrium where 
all players hunt hare. Therefore, an increase in ambiguity, perhaps by playing 
someone from a different culture, has undesirable implications for both the stag 
hunt and bargaining coordination games. 
 4.2.5 Previous Experimental Results 
 le Roux and Kelsey (2014) compare the level of ambiguity when playing 
against a local or a foreign opponent in coordination games with multiple 
equilibria. Their subject pool consists of students at the University of Exeter in the 
UK and St. Stephen’s College in New Delhi, India. They firstly run the experiment 
in India and then match the students in Exeter with both another Exeter student 
and a foreign opponent from the Indian sample. Students in the Exeter 
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experiment are explicitly told that they are playing against students in India and 
are given some background information on the Indian students, e.g. that they are 
studying at a prestigious institution. 
 le Roux and Kelsey (2014) find no difference in the level of ambiguity when 
playing a local or foreign opponent. They offer the following reasons for this. 
Firstly, part of the experiment uses a within-subjects design where players face 
both a local and foreign opponent. Subjects may have simply wanted to appear 
consistent in their choices against different opponents. In addition, some students 
were worried about appearing racist if they change their behaviour towards the 
foreign opponents. We can get around this first point by using a between-subjects 
design so that students are faced with either an opponent from their own culture 
or a different culture, but not both. 
 However, le Roux and Kelsey (2014) also point out that subjects may have 
found it easy to conceptualise the foreign students and thought they were the 
same as any other students due to increasing globalisation. As universities in the 
UK have become very international, students are used to mingling with people 
from many different cultures and probably see more similarities than differences 
with their fellow students. This point is difficult to control for and can only be dealt 
with by extending the sample to non-students who perhaps have less interaction 
with others from abroad. Such an extension is a promising avenue for future work. 
4.3 Experimental Design 
 We want to test whether players from the same cultural background will 
coordinate better when playing strategic games, such as a stag hunt and a 
bargaining game. As the probabilities of the opponent’s decision are unknown in 
these games, the decision environment is one of ambiguity rather than risk. 
   
 108 
 
Players should experience more ambiguity when playing against someone from 
a different culture as they are less familiar with the social norms of that culture. 
As such, we predict that players from different cultures will prefer safer strategies 
and therefore choose less efficient outcomes in coordination games. 
We run a between-subjects design where players face either someone 
from their own culture or a different culture, but not both. This is to remove the 
confound of subjects wanting to appear consistent against different opponents, 
as noted by le Roux and Kelsey (2014). All subjects play both a one-shot stag 
hunt game and a one-shot bargaining game. The reason we choose one-shot 
games is to make the decisions highly salient for the participants. Repeated 
versions of the games would only be interesting if we revealed the opponent’s 
choice after each round to allow for learning. However, we did not want to reveal 
payoffs until the end of the experiment to avoid wealth effects. Therefore, both 
the stag hunt and bargaining game only contain one round each in this 
experiment. 
 We recruit East Asian and British students to the Finance and Economics 
Experimental Laboratory (FEELE) at the University of Exeter in November 2012 
and March 2013. The main reasons for choosing East Asians and British are that 
the two cultures have very different social norms and that they have obvious 
differences in physical appearance. To avoid experimenter demand effects, we 
use physical appearance to subtly show the cultural identity of the subjects. We 
recruit subjects based on surnames, with a mixture of East Asian and English 
surnames invited to sessions32. 
                                                          
32 We verify that all of the participants with East Asian surnames are East Asian by checking their 
responses to a follow-up questionnaire, and do the same for participants with English surnames. 
A small number of participants with English surnames come from other individualistic English-
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In the November 2012 sessions, all subjects play both a stag hunt and 
bargaining game, while in the March 2013 sessions the two games are played in 
separate sessions by different subjects. This is to avoid subjects using the two 
games played together to hedge risk, which may confound our results. Across 
both sessions, we have a total of 64 Asian observations and 60 British 
observations for the stag hunt. For the bargaining game we have a total of 64 
Asian observations and 64 British observations. 
We run four different treatments: one with all Asian participants, one with 
all British participants, one with a mixture of Asians and British where the 
opponent is from the other culture, and one control treatment with a mixture of 
Asians and British and random opponent matching. The purpose of the control 
treatment is to use as a benchmark to compare the other treatments to. 
 To indicate to the subjects who they are matched with, they are told that 
they will be randomly matched with another player who is seated on the other 
side of the room. Therefore, in the Asian-only and British-only treatments, the 
subjects are matched with someone from their own culture. In the different-culture 
treatments, Asians are seated on one side of the room and British on the other 
so that subjects are matched with someone from a different culture33. In the 
control treatment, seating is randomised. Given the large number of Asian 
students studying at the university, we do not believe that having only Asian 
students on one side of the room will feel unusual for the subjects. However, we 
test for experimenter demand effects by asking subjects what they thought the 
                                                          
speaking countries such as Australia and the United States. All of the participants with East Asian 
surnames are in fact from East Asian backgrounds. For brevity, East Asians will henceforth be 
referred to as Asians. 
33 We run two sessions here to swap which side of the room the Asians and British are seated 
on, in case this has any effect on their behaviour. There are no significant differences in behaviour 
between these sessions. 
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experiment was about in a follow-up questionnaire, in the spirit of Benjamin et al 
(2010). 
 The experiment consists of four stages which are each explained in detail 
below: priming, stag hunt game, bargaining game, and follow-up questionnaire. 
All of the stages are run on computer terminals using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Full instructions for the experiment are available in Appendix Four. Participants 
are given each set of instructions separately for each stage of the experiment. 
 4.3.1 Priming 
 Players are primed before taking part in the games, in order to make their 
cultural identities salient. We use a questionnaire to subtly get participants 
thinking about their own culture (Shih et al, 1999). This type of priming avoids 
inducing any particular stereotype which may affect behaviour. For example, 
showing American subjects the Statue of Liberty may induce a feeling of freedom. 
Inducing stereotypes is dangerous as stereotypes can sometimes be misleading 
(Hsee and Weber, 1999). Instead, by completing a questionnaire, subjects think 
about the people they know and social norms of their culture rather than 
stereotypes. The questions we use in the priming stage are intended to get 
participants thinking of their friends and family back home, and are as follows: 
What year of study are you in at Exeter? 
How many full years have you lived in the UK? 
How often do you talk to people from your home country here in Exeter? 
Do you live with your family during term time? 
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If you answered "no" above, how many trips do you make to visit your 
family each year? 
 4.3.2 Stag Hunt Game 
 The first coordination game faced by the subjects is a simple 2-player stag 
hunt game, illustrated below in Figure 4.3. Players have two strategies to choose 
from, which we label as “1” and “2”. We try to keep the labels neutral, rather than 
calling the strategies “hunt hare” or “hunt stag”. This is because the descriptive 
labels may be interpreted in a very different way by people from different cultures. 
The payoffs in Figure 4.3 are given in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which 
are converted into pounds after the experiment at an exchange rate of 1 ECU = 
£0.10. 
Figure 4.3: Stag Hunt Game 
  Other Player’s Choice 
  2 1 
Your 
Choice 
2 60, 60 0, 40 
1 40, 0 40, 40 
 
 4.3.3 Bargaining Game 
 The bargaining game involves a surplus of 40 ECU to be shared between 
each pair of subjects. However, each participant must decide how much of the 
40 ECU to demand for themselves before knowing the decision of their opponent. 
If the total demands exceed 40, both players receive zero. If the total demands 
are less than or equal to 40, each player receives the amount they demanded. 
However, participants have only four options in the amount they demand, and 
there is no obvious focal point. This means that social norms become important 
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in trying to determine what the opponent will choose. The game is illustrated 
below in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4: Bargaining Game 
  Other Player’s Choice 
  30 25 15 10 
 30 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 30, 10 
Your Choice 
25 0, 0 0, 0 25, 15 25, 10 
15 0, 0 15, 25 15, 15 15, 10 
 10 10, 30 10, 25 10, 15 10, 10 
 
4.3.4 Follow-up Questionnaire 
 Once the bargaining game is complete, the participants are shown the 
decisions of their opponents in each game and their total payoff from the 
experiment. After payoffs are revealed, the experiment is concluded with a 
demographic questionnaire, to control for other factors that could be driving 
behaviour. The questionnaire includes a few questions about cultural background 
to verify where the participants were born and raised. We also ask subjects for 
their predictions about their opponent’s behaviour when playing each game. This 
is to see whether there is a difference in expectations when playing someone 
from another culture. The entire set of questions in the follow-up questionnaire 
can be found in Appendix Four. 
4.4 Results 
 4.4.1 Stag Hunt Game 
 Surprisingly, in the November 2012 experiments, the participants choose 
stag more frequently when the other player is from a different culture, as can be 
seen below in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. However, the differences between treatments  
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Figure 4.5: Proportion of British and Asian students choosing stag or hare when 
faced with an opponent from the same culture 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Proportion of British and Asian students choosing stag or hare when 
faced with an opponent from a different culture 
 
 
not statistically significant (p = 0.472 for Asians and p = 0.272 for British)34. 
Results from the mixed culture treatment, with random opponent matching, lie in 
between the other two treatments. Also of interest, expectations of the other 
                                                          
34 Throughout this chapter, we use a Mann-Whitney U-test to determine whether the samples are 
statistically different. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
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player choosing stag increase dramatically when both cultures are in the room 
(50% of people expecting the other to choose stag compared to 80% of people). 
These results hold for both cultures with no apparent cultural difference in 
behaviour. 
We can speculate as to why we obtained these results. Firstly, perhaps 
having cultural diversity inspired them to take a risk. This is in contrast to some 
previous literature, which suggests that risk-taking should be lower among a 
culturally diverse group (Watson and Kumar, 1992). However, in Watson and 
Kumar’s paper the decision making was done in groups rather than privately. 
Also, the culturally homogeneous groups consisted of white Americans, who may 
come from very different backgrounds with their own sub-cultures. In addition, the 
white Americans may have been behaving according to their stereotype of being 
risk takers (Hsee and Weber, 1999) simply to reinforce their group membership 
(Geisinger, 2004; Shih et al, 1999). 
Another reason for our results could be that the participants thought for 
longer when faced with an opponent from another culture. In contrast, when faced 
by someone from their own culture, the thinking may have been more automatic 
and they went for the option that first came to mind. However, it is unclear which 
option should be the first to come to mind. Also, we checked the response times 
from the z-Tree output and there are no significant differences in average 
response times between the mixed and same culture treatments. 
Finally, the participants may have simply been too scared to rip someone 
off from another culture as they were unsure of the other player’s reaction. 
However, given that players were anonymously matched and there were no 
opportunities for retribution, this does not seem a likely reason. Interestingly, the 
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players coordinated quite well, with both cultures more willing to hunt stag when 
playing someone from another culture. This led to overall higher payoffs than in 
the same culture treatments. 
One potential confound with the November 2012 experiments is that more 
Asians are studying business or economics compared to the British. All of the 
Asians are taking a business or economics major, expect for one Asian student 
who is studying law. This compares with only 16 of the 40 British students, who 
are majoring in business or economics (40%). Therefore, we may be picking up 
more of a subject-major difference than a cultural difference. 
 On average, business majors are more likely to choose the safe option in 
the stag hunt game, but demand more of the pie in the bargaining game. 
However, in the case of the bargaining game, the difference is entirely driven by 
the Asian business majors, with British business majors demanding slightly less 
than the non-business majors. The high numbers of Asian business majors 
compared to the British is one reason we decide to run another round of 
experiments in March 2013. 
Another reason we choose to run another round of experiments is that 
some subjects appear to use the two games to hedge risk. For example, one 
subject mentioned in their follow-up questionnaire that “I'd taken a risk in Game 
One so in Game Two I played it more safe.” On average, those who choose the 
payoff dominant option in the stag hunt do demand less of the pie in the 
bargaining game. There also appears to be a cultural difference in hedging risk 
with British switching from risky to safe strategies more than Asians. Perhaps 
there is a cultural difference in the interpretation of the games, with British treating 
the two games as one large game and the Asians considering the two games in 
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isolation. To investigate further, we run another round of experiments where the 
two games are played separately. 
 The results from the March 2013 stag hunt experiments are reported below 
in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. Here we not only see a difference between the same 
culture and mixed culture treatments, but we find a striking cultural difference in 
behaviour. When the British students are faced with an Asian opponent, they are 
less likely to go for the payoff dominant outcome than when faced with a British 
opponent (p = 0.079 using a Mann-Whitney U-test). However, the Asian students 
are no less likely to choose the payoff dominant outcome when faced with a 
British opponent compared to an Asian opponent. In fact, the proportion of Asians 
choosing each option is exactly the same in each treatment. 
We also check the expectations data from our follow-up questionnaire. 
While the Asian students do not discriminate between the same culture and 
mixed culture treatments, the British students are less likely to expect Asian 
students to choose the payoff dominant outcome compared to other British. This 
result is in contrast to the November 2012 experiments, where expectations of 
the other player choosing stag went up dramatically with both cultures in the 
room. 
The only obvious difference to the participants between the November and 
March experiments would have been that the March experiments were booked in 
for a shorter length of time. Perhaps the students were more careful of their 
choices in the March experiments as they figured they would have fewer 
opportunities to earn money during the experiment. 
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Figure 4.7: Proportion of British and Asian students choosing stag or hare when 
faced with an opponent from the same culture 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Proportion of British and Asian students choosing stag or hare when 
faced with an opponent from a different culture 
 
  
We also need to consider other demographic variables that could be 
driving the results. Firstly, more British business school students were invited to 
the March sessions to balance the high number of Asian business school 
students. Therefore the British students in March may have acted differently to 
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the British students in November simply because they are business students. On 
the other hand, the Asian students, who are almost all business majors, behave 
similarly across sessions. The March results are possibly more reliable due to the 
similar numbers of business majors across cultures. 
Secondly, we invited a similar number of males and females of each 
culture to each session to try and minimise gender effects. Our results show that 
males are more likely to go for the safe option in the stag hunt but demand more 
of the pie in the bargaining game. However, the gender differences do not appear 
to interact with culture and are therefore not a major confound to our results. 
4.4.2 Bargaining Game 
 In the November 2012 experiments, we find a contrasting result between 
the stag hunt and bargaining game. The results are presented below in Figures 
4.9 and 4.10. While in the stag hunt players are more likely to take a risk when 
both cultures are in the room, in the bargaining game players tend to be more 
cautious when faced with an opponent from a different culture. This result is in-
line with our hypothesis that people experience more ambiguity when interacting 
with someone from another culture and as such should choose safer strategies. 
In the different-culture treatments, both groups demand less of the pie than in the 
same-culture treatments, but the results are not significant (p = 0.427 for Asians 
and p = 0.456 for British). Again, the results from the mixed culture treatment 
represent an intermediate case, between the other two treatments. 
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Figure 4.9: Proportion of British and Asian students choosing each bargaining 
game option when faced with an opponent from the same culture 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Proportion of British and Asian students choosing each bargaining 
game option when faced with an opponent from a different culture 
 
  
Similarly to the stag hunt results from March 2013, we also obtain a cultural 
difference in the bargaining game. The results are presented below in Figures 
4.11 and 4.12. Asians demand slightly less of the pie when faced with a British  
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Figure 4.11: Proportion of British and Asian students choosing each bargaining 
game option when faced with an opponent from the same culture 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Proportion of British and Asian students choosing each bargaining 
game option when faced with an opponent from a different culture 
 
 
opponent compared to the all-Asian treatment, although this difference is not 
significant (p = 0.389). On the other hand, British demand more when faced with 
an Asian opponent compared to the all-British treatment, which is a significant 
result (p = 0.010). This is in contrast to the November 2012 results, where both 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Asians
British
Same Culture - March 2013
30
25
15
10
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Asians
British
Different Culture - March 2013
30
25
15
10
   
 121 
 
cultures demand less of the pie when faced with a foreign opponent. The British 
also contrast the theoretical prediction that people will choose safer options when 
faced with an opponent from a different culture. However, the coordination works 
well, with the British demanding more and Asians demanding less when faced 
with an opponent from a different culture. 
The cultural difference in the March bargaining game could be driven by 
social norms. Perhaps the Asian students feel the need to be more polite towards 
the British students than the other Asian students, as they consider themselves 
guests in the UK. The British students may expect Asians to be polite towards 
them, based on their personal experiences, and therefore expect to be able to 
claim more of the pie. Indeed, according to our expectations data from the follow-
up questionnaire, the British students expect Asian students to claim less of the 
pie than other British students. 
4.4.3 Differences between Games and Treatments 
 Why, then, do the Asians discriminate based on the identity of the 
opponent in the bargaining game but not the stag hunt? The stag hunt game is 
more straightforward and has an obvious focal point of both going for the payoff 
dominant outcome. Perhaps the Asians thought this choice was obvious 
regardless of the opponent, whereas the bargaining game requires more thought. 
However, we cannot glean any evidence of longer response time in the 
bargaining game compared to the stag hunt in our z-Tree output. 
 In March 2013, the British appear to be more careful in the stag hunt but 
more risk taking in the bargaining game, when faced with a foreign opponent. 
While this behaviour may seem odd, we can make sense of this by thinking about 
stereotypes. The British may expect Asians to choose the safer options in both 
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games, which would mean that the British should also play it safe in the stag hunt 
but take a risk in the bargaining game. When looking at the expectations data, 
Asian participants do not show much difference between treatments. However, 
the British expect the Asians to demand much less of the pie than other British. 
The British also expect Asians to be more likely to choose the safe option in the 
stag hunt compared to other British. 
 According to the follow-up questionnaires, a few people in the March 
experiments had an inkling that the experiment was about ethnicity. For example, 
when asked for aspects of the opponent’s identity they considered in making their 
decision, one participant commented “Their gender, their race/ethnicity, their 
nationality.” Although only a few people (four in total) guessed that the experiment 
was about ethnicity, others may have subconsciously picked up on cultural 
stereotypes. This is especially true given our priming questionnaire at the 
beginning of the experiment. While the questionnaire was intended to induce 
social norms, rather than stereotypes, there is a possibility that the questionnaire 
heightened students’ susceptibility to stereotypes. A good robustness check for 
this result would be to run sessions where a different aspect of identity is primed 
and then match people with an opponent of the corresponding identity. For 
example, people may expect females to be more cautious and finance majors to 
be more risk seeking due to the stereotypes. 
 The most likely explanation for the March 2013 results seems to be that 
the British students expected the Asians to behave cautiously in both games. In 
other words, British students expected that Asian students would take the safe 
option in the stag hunt and demand less of the pie in the bargaining game. Is this 
stereotype true? To investigate this, we restrict ourselves to the same culture 
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treatments, where the decisions are less complicated by trying to figure out the 
cultural norms of the opponents. 
 When looking at the same culture treatments, Asians are more likely to 
hunt stag than British and also demand more of the pie in the bargaining game. 
This means that a stereotype of Asians being cautious is not only misleading, but 
has real effects on behaviour. Even the Asian students appear to be affected by 
their stereotype in the bargaining game, where they demand less of the pie 
against British students than in the same culture treatment. Asian students may 
lower their demands against the British students because they expect the British 
students to demand more, based on the stereotype that Asians are cautious. 
These results are in-line with Hsee and Weber's (1999) study that finds Chinese 
to be more risk seeking than Americans, even though both groups predicted the 
opposite. 
 We can now consider whether cultural norms or the opponent’s identity 
had the greatest influence on behaviour. As we observe a difference in behaviour 
between British and Asians in many of the same culture treatments, we can 
speculate that cultural norms play a part in the decision making process. 
However, the difference in behaviour between the same culture and different 
culture treatments shows that identity also comes into play. Chuah et al (2007) 
also find cultural differences both when interacting within national groups and with 
those from another group, when looking at ultimatum game responses of 
Malaysian Chinese and UK subjects. This suggests that both cultural norms and 
the opponent’s identity play a part in interactive decision making. 
We can also consider whether playing someone from a different culture 
improves or hinders efficiency. Across all sessions and games, the payments are 
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higher in the same culture treatments than the different culture treatments. 
However, for the bargaining game we notice fairly good coordination between 
Asians and British in the different culture treatments in March 2013. British 
increase their demands when facing an Asian opponent compared to another 
British opponent, while Asians lower their demands against the British. The 
players seem to be using cultural stereotypes to predict each other’s behaviour 
and choose their action accordingly. Interestingly, players perform better by 
behaving according to the stereotype, even if the stereotype is untrue. 
On the other hand, coordination is hindered in the different culture 
treatments for the March stag hunt game. While Asians tend to go for the payoff 
dominant choice, British get the wrong impression by believing Asians will be 
cautious and choose the certain outcome. Therefore, British tend to choose the 
certain outcome, based on a misleading stereotype, when they could do better 
by choosing the payoff dominant outcome. Therefore, stereotypes may 
sometimes be a useful guide to behaviour when there is little else to base 
decisions on, but can also harm efficiency if the opponents do not behave 
according to their stereotypes. 
 Although the March 2013 experiments are conceptually different to the 
November 2012 experiments, we add the two datasets together to see whether 
we can glean any general conclusions about British or Asian behaviour. When 
looking at the overall sample, the results are roughly in-line with the March 2013 
experiments. The British students are more likely to go for the safe option in the 
stag hunt but demand more in the bargaining game when faced with an Asian 
opponent compared to another British opponent. For the Asian students we see 
the opposite – they are more likely to go for the payoff dominant outcome in the 
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stag hunt while demanding less in the bargaining game against a British opponent 
compared to another Asian. We do need to keep in mind however that the overall 
results may be biased by the high proportion of Asian business majors compared 
to British business majors in the November 2012 set of experiments. 
 We also check the overall expectations data. For the stag hunt, results are 
in-line with the November 2012 experiments, with both cultures more likely to 
expect the opponent to choose stag in the mixed culture treatments. In the 
bargaining game, the overall results support the March 2013 results for the British 
but not the Asians. Overall, British expect Asians to demand less of the pie than 
other British, while Asians expect the British to demand less than other Asians. 
This second result implies that people from both groups should demand more 
against an opponent from the other culture. We observe this behaviour for the 
British but not the Asians. 
4.5 Discussion 
 While we have considered expectations of the opponent’s behaviour 
based on their identity, we have yet to mention how social preferences may differ 
by culture. Perhaps the players care more about each other’s payoffs when they 
are from the same culture. Chen and Chen (2011) consider an other-regarding 
parameter that increases when players share a common group identity. While 
Chen and Chen (2011) find an improvement in coordination when players share 
a group identity, it is unclear whether this is because they care more about each 
other’s payoff, or because they believe the other player is more likely to choose 
the payoff dominant outcome when they come from the same group. Reciprocity 
is likely to feature in Chen and Chen’s (2011) experiment as the participants 
helped each other in a task before taking part in the game. Therefore, 
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expectations of reciprocity may have improved the coordination, rather than 
altruistic feelings towards those from the same group. 
 Separating beliefs from social preferences is also difficult in our 
experiment. However, when reading through responses to our follow-up 
questionnaire, the players appear to be trying to maximise their own payoff, with 
little regard for the other player. For example, many players mention something 
along the lines of “I wanted to guarantee a payment regardless of the other 
player”, when asked “how did you decide what option to choose?” 
Worth noting, is that motivations for behaviour are likely to be different in 
the stag hunt than the bargaining game. The stag hunt is a game of cooperation 
while the bargaining game is one of competition. In the stag hunt, the option that 
maximises the player’s payoff also maximises the opponent’s payoff. Therefore, 
decisions are more likely to be driven by expectations of the other’s behaviour 
than social preferences. In contrast, the bargaining game introduces a conflict 
between the player’s payoff and the opponent’s payoff. Here social preferences 
are more likely to play a role, as the player must decide how much they care 
about their own payoff relative to the opponent’s payoff. 
 Cultural differences in the way in-groups and out-groups are formed and 
defined may also impact the level of altruism players feel towards each other. 
Forming a group takes longer in collectivist cultures as bonding is necessary, 
whereas individualists have many superficial interactions and perhaps in-groups 
are formed more readily (Triandis, 1989). This means that students from 
collectivist cultures, such as many Asian countries, may perceive all others as 
out-groups as their in-groups only include close friends and family and are not 
extended to nationality. For this reason, the students from collectivist cultures 
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could be less susceptible to group identity effects. This is a research question for 
the future, along with experiments to isolate the effects of altruism versus 
expectations of the opponent’s behaviour. 
 Another possibility is that participants did not consider the cultural identity 
of their opponent in decision making and treated the opponent simply as “another 
student”. In Eichberger et al’s (2008) experiment, the subjects are given 
descriptions of the granny and game theorist, which make them more believable 
and easier to imagine. Perhaps having students of a different culture on the other 
side of the room was not enough to distinguish a cultural identity. However, le 
Roux and Kelsey (2014) give their subjects background information about the 
Indian students but still find no difference in the level of ambiguity against a 
foreign or home opponent. Eichberger et al (2008) find that other students are 
also a source of ambiguity, with other students being perceived as more 
ambiguous than the game theorist and just as ambiguous as the granny. An 
interesting idea for future research would be to combine the cultural identity of 
the opponent with further information, such as “the opponent is studying game 
theory” to see how the two components of identity interact. 
 As part of the follow-up questionnaire we ask participants whether they 
considered the identity of their opponent when making their decision. Asians are 
slightly more likely to answer this question with “yes” but there appears to be 
some misunderstanding about what the question was asking. For example, when 
asked what aspects of the opponent’s identity they considered, several students 
talk about mutual benefit or what choice they thought the opponent would take. 
According to our questionnaire responses, identity is actually considered more in 
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the same-culture treatments than the different-culture treatments. However, very 
few students mention culture as an aspect of identity they considered.  
 We also need to consider whether our priming questionnaire had a 
differential impact on British students compared to Asian students. The 
questionnaire probably felt quite normal for international students, with questions 
about how long you have lived in the UK and how often you speak to people from 
your home country. However, this questionnaire may have felt quite strange, or 
had little or no impact, for the British students. In addition, the questionnaire may 
have primed aspects of identity other than culture, such as a sense of family. 
Priming a sense of family could change the mood of Asian students in a different 
way to British students. For example, Asian students may feel sad when family is 
primed as they are probably very far away from their families, while British 
students are a lot closer. 
 These concerns highlight a key problem with our data, sample bias. The 
sample bias comes from comparing the behaviour of home students with 
international students, who may be inherently different in personality. Our results 
may be driven by differences between home and international students, rather 
than cultural differences. There are several ways to get around the problem of 
sample bias. Firstly, we could run the same experiment in an Asian country such 
as China, where the roles are reserved and compare the results to the British 
experiment. Secondly, we could run the experiment between two countries, 
where the British home students face Chinese home students. 
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However, one problem with these two methods is that the players would 
face different levels of background risk35 in each country, making the samples not 
entirely comparable. A preferred method may be to run the experiment between 
two cultures that are native to a particular country, thus facing the same level of 
background risk. For example, the Aboriginal Australians or Maori of New 
Zealand have distinct cultural identities but share their environment with 
Europeans. Running experiments in these cultures will be the next step in 
understanding cultural differences under uncertainty. 
4.6 Conclusions 
 We expected that players would experience more ambiguity when faced 
with an opponent from a different culture and therefore choose safer options in 
coordination games. This is because players should find it harder to predict each 
other’s behaviour when they do not share similar social norms. We find 
contrasting results between two rounds of experiments run in November 2012 
and March 2013. The March 2013 experiments are possibly more reliable as we 
have similar numbers of business school students in each cultural group, thus 
removing the confound of more Asian business school majors than British. 
 In November, cultural diversity appeared to improve coordination on the 
payoff dominant stag hunt outcome. However, in March the British students 
tended to go for the safe, risk dominant, outcome against the Asians, even though 
most Asians still tried to achieve the payoff dominant outcome. In the November 
bargaining games, students from both cultures lowered their demands of the pie 
when matched with someone from a different culture. On the other hand, in March 
                                                          
35 Background risk is where subjects are affected by risky situations outside the laboratory 
(Harrison et al, 2007), such as weather conditions, violence, and corruption (Harrison et al, 2009, 
p. 100). 
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the British students increased their demands against the Asians while Asians 
lowered their demands against the British. One likely reason for this is a cultural 
stereotype of Asians being cautious. Based on our results, this stereotype was 
proven to be misleading. 
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Chapter Five: Culture, Conformity, and Risk Attitudes 
Social influence can be powerful in a society where everyone claims to be 
independent and autonomous. – Jetton, Postmes, and McAuliffe (2002, p. 204) 
5.1 Introduction  
 How people behave depends not only on individual preferences, but is 
often shaped by the attitudes of those we interact with. As people gain utility from 
belonging to a peer group, we sometimes take on the norms and characteristics 
of the groups we belong to, in order to increase our attachment to those groups 
(Geisinger, 2004). How the attitudes of one’s peers shapes individual behaviour 
is known as “peer effects”. As group attachment is stronger in collectivist cultures, 
it is conceivable that peer effects are stronger in collectivist cultures than 
individualist cultures. In collectivist cultures, conformity brings positive feelings of 
harmony and connectedness, whereas in individualist cultures people enjoy the 
feelings of freedom and independence from being unique (Kim and Markus, 
1999). My main focus for this chapter is to see whether people from collectivist 
cultures are more conformist in risk attitudes than people from individualist 
cultures. 
 In Chapter Three of this thesis, I find that Asian students form larger 
financial risk-sharing networks at university compared to British students. I also 
find that the number of network connections affects the risk attitudes of Asian 
students but not British students. This makes sense, as those from collectivist 
cultures probably consider their networks more in decision making than those 
from individualist cultures. However, I now want to test if collectivists are 
influenced more by the attitudes of their peers compared to individualists. Peer 
effects in risk attitudes have been documented among a sample of MBA students 
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(Ahern et al, 2013), where after one year on the programme, individual risk 
attitudes converged to the average risk attitudes of the group. Similarly to Ahern 
et al (2013), I also want to test for peer effects in risk attitudes, but this time testing 
for any cultural differences. I choose East Asian students to represent a 
collectivist culture and British students to represent an individualist culture. These 
choices are consistent with Hofstede’s (1980) measures of individualism and 
collectivism in each country. 
 I run an experiment with lottery choice tasks, where I present some 
participants with the majority choices from previous sessions. While the 
distribution of choices among Asian students is unaffected by the presence of 
peer choices, the British students tend to choose against the majority of their 
peers. This makes sense, as people from individualist cultures gain utility from 
being different to others. The results from this research will be useful for policy-
makers, who want an idea of how different cultural groups react to the decisions 
of their peers. Messages about the behaviour of others are increasingly being 
used by Government to influence behaviour (Wenzel, 2002). Knowing whether 
people from different cultural groups will prefer to conform or to go against the 
majority will help the Government to know which types of information will be 
useful to make public, and to whom. 
5.2 Background Literature 
 5.2.1 Peer Effects in Risk Attitudes 
Ahern et al (2013) study peer effects in risk attitudes and trust among a 
sample of MBA students at the University of Michigan. They measure pre-
determined risk attitudes using a Holt and Laury (2002) lottery choice task, and 
they measure trust attitudes using questions from the World Values Survey. They 
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then re-elicit risk and trust attitudes after one year on the MBA programme to test 
for any convergence. Ahern et al (2013) decide to focus on attitudes rather than 
outcomes in order to fill a gap in the literature and better understand whether 
peers influence underlying attitudes as well as outcomes (Ahern et al, 2013, p. 
1). Observing outcomes only, such as betting decisions among a group of friends 
at the horse races, does not tell us why we might see convergence. People may 
conform for social reasons or conform automatically without putting much thought 
into their decision, rather than a change in risk attitudes. 
The reason Ahern et al (2013) use pre-determined attitudes is to avoid 
simultaneity between the influences of peers on attitudes and attitudes on peers. 
As individuals may influence the attitudes of their peers, as well as being 
influenced by their peers, looking at how the individual’s attitudes change shows 
a causal relationship of the peer attitudes on the individual’s attitudes. In addition, 
people may select peers with similar attitudes to themselves, leading to observed 
peer similarity that is not necessarily driven by peer influence. Ahern et al (2013) 
overcome this problem by using random assignment of peer groups in their 
experiment. Finally, they include a survey to verify that the peers have meaningful 
social relationships. 
After one year on the MBA programme, Ahern et al (2013) find that risk 
attitudes of individuals do converge to the average risk attitudes of the group. In 
particular, a one standard deviation increase in average risk aversion of a 
randomly assigned peer group increases an individual’s risk aversion by 0.2 
standard deviations. On the other hand, no effects are found for the influence of 
peer attitudes on individual trust attitudes, suggesting that trust may be a more 
stable attitude, related to factors other than risk taking. This finding supports 
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recent evidence that trust is not just a special case of risk taking (Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser, 2009). I expect Ahern et al’s (2013) finding of positive peer effects 
in risk attitudes would be stronger among people of collectivist cultures.  
Delfino et al (2013) also look at conformity in attitudes under risk and 
uncertainty. Participants are given an investment choice task, where they choose 
how many tokens to invest in a risky or uncertain prospect. The risky prospect is 
represented by known probabilities of loss and the uncertain prospect is 
represented by unknown probabilities. They use a within-subjects design where 
participants first make a series of investment choices, with varying probabilities 
of loss. Next, the participants repeat the series of choices, but are given some 
information about the choices of an earlier group of subjects. The information 
about past choices is given as either a group average or one individual’s choice. 
Delfino et al (2013) find evidence of conformity in choices, which is 
stronger when the decision-makers are more cautious, when they are given a 
group average rather than an individual’s choice, and when they are under time 
pressure. Interestingly, the authors find stronger conformity for risky prospects 
than for uncertain prospects. They initially expected this to be the other way 
around, as with less information to base their decisions on people may be more 
likely to copy others. However, the result could be because under uncertainty the 
participants may have thought the others were just choosing randomly, whereas 
for known probabilities the choices are a better indication of preferences. People 
are probably more likely to conform when they believe others’ choices reflect their 
true preferences, rather than a random choice. 
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5.2.2 Peer Effects and Culture 
Although peer effects in risk attitudes are yet to be explored cross-
culturally, there are several studies in the field of social psychology that document 
cultural differences in conformity in other areas. For example, Bond and Smith 
(1996) conduct a meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s (1952, 1956) line 
judgement task to investigate cultural and temporal differences in conformity. 
In Asch’s line judgement task, subjects are presented with a group of three 
lines of varying lengths and asked to select the line that is equal in length to a 
standard line, as shown below in Figure 5.1. The task is designed such that the 
answer is fairly obvious. Subjects are in groups of seven to ten people and each 
individual is required to announce his or her choice to the group. However, in 
each group, all but one of the subjects is previously instructed by the 
experimenter to choose the wrong line and announce this to the group. Therefore, 
one subject is faced with information from the group that contradicts their private 
observation. The idea is to see whether this individual conforms by choosing the 
same line as the majority of their group. 
Bond and Smith (1996) compare data collected for the line judgement task 
in 17 countries. Using three different measures of individualism and collectivism 
(Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994; Trompenaars, 1993), they find a positive and 
significant relationship between collectivism and conformity. In addition, when 
looking at the U.S. data, they find that conformity has declined since the 1950s. 
The authors also point out that the identity of the peers matters for conformity, 
with studies showing higher levels of conformity among friends than strangers 
(Bond and Smith, 1996, p. 112). This raises the question over whether 
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collectivists will only conform more than individualists when dealing with members 
of their in-groups. 
Figure 5.1: Asch’s Line Judgement Task (1952, 1956) 
 
More recently, Kim and Markus (1999) investigate conformity preferences 
among East Asian and European Americans, by asking subjects to choose 
between items that represent either conformity or uniqueness. In their first set of 
studies, subjects choose from sets of abstract shapes where the majority of 
shapes look the same but there are a minority of shapes that look different. 
Overall, more European Americans than Chinese Americans choose the shapes 
that are in the minority, indicating a preference for uniqueness. They also 
replicate this study in Korea and once again find the European Americans to 
select the minority shapes more often than the Koreans. 
In order to see whether this cultural difference in preference is also 
manifested through choice, Kim and Markus (1999) run another study where 
subjects are asked to choose a pen from a group of five pens, that are coloured 
either green or orange. As there are five pens, the majority of pens are the same 
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colour, while the minority of pens are the other colour. Overall, most Americans 
(74%) choose the less common colour while most East Asians go for the majority 
colour (76%). One reason Kim and Markus (1999) choose to present their 
subjects with trivial choice tasks is to remove social pressure from their 
experiments. This is to show that the tendency to conform can be a preference, 
which is based on cultural values rather than a response to group pressure (Kim 
and Markus, 1999, p. 787). 
5.2.3 Motivations for Conformity 
Similarly to Kim and Markus (1999), I am interested in conformity as a 
cultural value. To isolate this value, we need to remove other peer influence 
forces that drive risk taking behaviour. For example, Gamba and Manzoni (2014) 
show that the simple act of comparing oneself to others can prompt risk seeking 
behaviour. In addition, interacting with others from the same cultural group may 
bring about stereotypes, which can affect behaviour but sometimes be misleading 
(Shih et al, 1999). Therefore, I focus on simple individual choice tasks in this 
chapter, where each participant’s decisions are kept private. 
This is especially important when looking at cultural differences, as the 
varying drivers of behaviour could affect people from different cultures in different 
ways. For example, the tendency to become more risk seeking when making 
decisions in a group could work in a culturally-specific way (Kim and Park, 2010). 
Collectivists may focus on a norm of interdependent relationships that leads to a 
diffusion of responsibility. On the other hand, individualists may be more focused 
on individual goals such as showing-off to other group members. By focusing on 
one aspect of peer influence, such as the preference of being similar to other 
people, we can gain a better understanding of how culture affects conformity. 
   
 138 
 
In addition, I control for the beliefs of players by giving everyone the same 
precise information regarding probabilities. In environments of uncertainty, 
players may copy each other simply because they believe others have made a 
good choice. Without knowing the probabilities involved, players have little else 
to base their decisions on. How people’s beliefs are shaped by others may also 
differ culturally, leading to a confounding situation where cultural differences 
could be driven by different beliefs as well as different preferences. To isolate 
conformity due to preferences, the only benefit players should receive from 
conforming is to know they have behaved similarly to others, rather than any 
informational or social gains. This motivation should be stronger in cultures that 
value conformity. 
5.2.4 Applications 
Focusing on conformity as a cultural value may also be useful for public 
policy. Although the Government cannot control peer influence due to social 
pressure or comparison, they can attempt to influence behaviour through 
messages about social norms. For example, in a field trial with the Australian Tax 
Office, Wenzel (2002) finds that people tend to overestimate a negative attitude 
towards tax compliance in others, and believe that tax evasion is more 
widespread than it actually is. When sharing this information with taxpayers, 
Wenzel finds an increase in compliance relative to a control group. This effect 
works through changing the perceived social norm, which people prefer to 
conform to. Knowing how different cultural groups are affected by such messages 
will help the Government to target policy in areas that would be most effective. 
 Another area cultural differences in conformity can be applied is herding 
in financial markets. Herding is where people choose to invest in a stock because 
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they have observed others investing in the stock (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 
2000). Park and Sgroi (2009) distinguish between rational and irrational herding. 
Rational herding is where people use information gained from observing others’ 
actions in order to make better decisions. Irrational herding represents a decision 
to follow others even though no useful information is gained from observing the 
others’ actions. Park and Sgroi (2009) also point out the existence of contrarian 
behaviour, which is where people go against the majority action e.g. investing in 
a stock that others are avoiding. Similarly to herding, contrarianism can be either 
rational, i.e. using valuable information, or irrational, i.e. doing something different 
for the sake of it. 
Herding can lead to irregularities in the stock market, such as over-priced 
stocks and bubbles that eventually burst. Looking at cultural differences in 
conformity raises the question of whether certain cultures are more susceptible 
to herding. If cultural values are indeed an important driver of conformity, the 
tendency to herd may be even stronger among collectivist cultures. However, the 
goal of participating in the stock market is to make money, and financial concerns 
may outweigh any cultural inclinations. 
5.3 Experimental Design 
 5.3.1 Hypotheses 
 My main hypothesis to be tested is that students from collectivist cultures 
will be more susceptible to peer effects than students from individualist cultures. 
Previous research shows that Asian students are more risk seeking with money 
than American students (Hsee and Weber, 1999). One key reason for this 
appears to be the ability to rely on social networks for support in collectivist 
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cultures, known as the “cushion hypothesis” (Hsee and Weber, 1999). Therefore, 
I have three hypotheses for this research: 
Hypothesis One: Students from collectivist Asian cultures will be more financially 
risk seeking than students from individualist cultures. Therefore, when measuring 
a preference for risk, a sample of Asian students will have a higher mean 
preference than students from an individualist culture such as Britain. 
Hypothesis Two: When presented with the decisions of their peers, the 
distribution of choices among collectivist Asian students will become more 
clustered than the students from individualist cultures, with less extreme choices. 
This means that choices will converge to the mean as people prefer to make 
similar choices to their peers. 
Hypothesis Three: When presented with the decisions of their peers, Asian 
students will be more likely to conform to the majority than students from 
individualist cultures. Students from individualist cultures may not be affected at 
all by the decisions of others, or they may be affected by choosing differently to 
their peers to express their individuality. 
 5.3.2 Experiment 
 I run a 2 X 2 between-subjects design, where I compare individualist and 
collectivist cultures in treatments with or without peer effects. Although a within-
subjects design is more economical, subjects would need to complete two 
different risk attitude elicitations, i.e. before and after peer effects are induced. 
This would be subject to possible consistency bias, as the players may choose 
the same options in the second task simply to appear consistent with the first 
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task, thereby ignoring the peer effects. I choose a between-subjects design to 
avoid this bias. 
 To represent an individualist culture, I invite students of British or Irish 
nationality. For students of collectivist culture, I invite students from China or other 
East Asian countries such as Taiwan and Vietnam. I avoid inviting Japanese 
students, as in Japan collectivism is focused on the work group rather than the 
family (Bond and Smith, 1996, p. 126). This experiment was run at the Finance 
and Economics Experimental Laboratory (FEELE) at the University of Exeter in 
March 2014. I run four sessions, with 20 participants in each. However, one 
session only contains 19 participants due to no-shows. 
 I run separate sessions for British and Asian students. Each cultural group 
has both a control session without peer effects and a treatment session with peer 
effects. In the treatment sessions, peer effects are induced by revealing the 
results from the respective culture’s control session. For example, Asian students 
in the treatment session are given the results of Asian students in the control 
session, and vice versa for the British students. One advantage of running 
separate sessions is that social norms of individualism and collectivism may be 
enhanced in each cultural group. However, the main reason I run separate 
sessions is to induce peer effects in a culturally specific way. 
This is because I expect the Asian and British students to choose different 
options in the control sessions, with Asian students going for more risk seeking 
options. I want to present the students in the treatment sessions with a culturally 
specific social norm, which they can then decide whether or not to conform to. 
Also, as identity of the peers is likely to be important (Bond and Smith, 1996, p. 
112), I want each group in the treatment sessions to imagine a session being run 
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previously with similar participants to themselves. Running sessions with all-
Asian or all-British students is an effective way to induce this image. However, to 
avoid experimenter demand effects36, the students are not explicitly told that the 
previous sessions contained participants of the same culture. 
 Participants complete a lottery choice task in the experiment, very similar 
to Hsee and Weber’s (1999) hypothetical task. I choose this task because Hsee 
and Weber find very promising cultural differences but do not pay subjects 
according to their decisions. Therefore, I thought this task would be interesting to 
run saliently. The exact lottery choices subjects make are shown below in Table 
5.1. Each question appears in order on a computer screen, which is programmed 
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The reason I choose to present the questions 
in order is to prevent confusion and inconsistent responses. Hsee and Weber 
(1999) vary the order of their questions and find no significant order effects (Hsee 
and Weber, 1999, p. 169). 
Table 5.1: Lottery Choice Task 
Question Safe Option Risky Option 
1 Receive £4 ECU for sure Flip a coin; Receive £20 if heads or £0 if tails 
2 Receive £6 ECU for sure Flip a coin; Receive £20 if heads or £0 if tails 
3 Receive £8 ECU for sure Flip a coin; Receive £20 if heads or £0 if tails 
4 Receive £10 ECU for sure Flip a coin; Receive £20 if heads or £0 if tails 
5 Receive £12 ECU for sure Flip a coin; Receive £20 if heads or £0 if tails 
6 Receive £14 ECU for sure Flip a coin; Receive £20 if heads or £0 if tails 
 
 After the lottery choice task, each participant is asked to roll a die to 
determine which question we will pay them for. If they have chosen the coin flip 
                                                          
36 Brislin and Lonner (1973, p. 70) note the possibility of cultural differences in experimenter 
demand effects, with “courtesy bias” being particularly prevalent in Eastern cultures, where 
participants like to please the experimenter. 
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for the selected question, they then flip a coin to determine their payoff. In 
addition, everyone receives a £5 show-up fee to avoid people leaving with 
nothing. The payment method is explained to participants at the beginning of the 
experiment. I decide to pay each participant for only one decision, in order to 
avoid wealth effects and participants hedging risk between the questions. 
Subjects earn £14.89 on average for this experiment, with a maximum of £25 and 
a minimum of £5. 
 The only difference between the control sessions and the treatment 
sessions is that in the treatment sessions, participants are presented with a 
sentence for each question detailing the results from the corresponding control 
session. This sentence is a true statement based on actual results. For example, 
for the first question, participants in the Asian treatment session are given the 
following sentence: 
Yesterday we ran the same experiment and 30% of participants chose £4 
for sure while 70% of participants chose the coin flip. 
I then compare the numbers of Asian and British students choosing in-line with 
the majority, expecting Asian students to be more likely to follow the majority than 
the British. Instructions for this experiment are given below in Appendix Five. 
 5.3.3 Follow-up Questionnaire 
 Once payoffs are determined, the subjects complete a follow-up 
questionnaire, also programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). This 
questionnaire contains a survey measure of risk attitudes in different contexts 
(Dohmen et al, 2011), as well as demographic questions and a hypothetical social 
risks problem. One key reason I include an additional measure of risk attitude in 
   
 144 
 
the follow-up questionnaire is to allow us to control for subjects’ underlying risk 
attitudes when comparing lottery choices between treatments. Perhaps the 
subjects in one treatment happen to be very risk averse with money and their 
choices are driven more by their attitudes than peer effects. Including an 
additional measure of risk attitude allows us to observe differences between 
treatments that are not accounted for by differences in risk attitude. 
 The risk attitude questions in my follow-up questionnaire come from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel. These questions involve an 11-point Likert scale 
rating of the willingness to take risks in different contexts. Specifically, questions 
are asked about taking risks in the following contexts: while driving, with financial 
investment, when engaging in leisure and sport, with your career, with your 
health, and with social approval37. The questions have been validated 
experimentally and shown to be good predictors of behaviour in each context 
(Dohmen et al, 2011). 
 I also present subjects with a hypothetical social risks problem, inspired by 
Weber et al (1998). In Chapter Three of this thesis, British students showed a 
greater tendency to take social risks than Asian students, which could be due to 
a greater need to maintain good relationships in collectivist cultures. In order to 
test for peer effects in social risks as well as financial risks, I give the percentage 
of people choosing each option from the control sessions to those in the treatment 
sessions. As with financial risks, I expect Asian students to be more susceptible 
to peer effects in social risks than British students. The social risks problem is 
framed as follows: 
                                                          
37 I add the question about social approval to capture cultural differences in attitudes toward social 
risks. 
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Imagine you have a good relationship with your roommate, and that your 
roommate is currently facing an important decision. You have a strong 
opinion about the decision your roommate should make, and need to 
decide whether or not to give your roommate advice. If you give advice 
that your roommate appreciates, this will greatly enhance your 
relationship. However, if your roommate dislikes your advice, this will 
seriously harm your relationship. If you give no advice, this will have no 
effect on your relationship. Will you give advice or remain silent? 
 Finally, subjects in the treatment sessions are presented with an extra 
question in their follow-up questionnaire. The subjects are asked whether or not 
they considered the previous results and if so how did this affect their decision. I 
expect more Asian students to be influenced by their peers than British students, 
and to be more likely to choose in-line with the majority. The questions from the 
follow-up questionnaire are presented below in Appendix Five. 
5.4 Results 
 5.4.1 Lottery Choices 
 Similarly to Hsee and Weber (1999), I calculate a risk preference index to 
compare the risk preferences of those taking part in the experiment. The risk 
preference index represents the number of risky choices taken out of the six 
options. Therefore, the risk preference index has a minimum of zero and 
maximum of six, with higher numbers representing more risky choices. Twelve 
students give inconsistent responses, where they switch from preferring a safe 
option to a risky option when the value of the safe option is higher than the safe 
option they chose previously. However, the number of risky choices still gives us 
some useful information regarding risk preference, even if inconsistent. Also, as 
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risk preference tends to be malleable (Beauchamp et al, 2012), rather than a 
stable underlying characteristic, inconsistent responses are a reflection of real life 
decision making. Therefore, I decide to keep the inconsistent responses for the 
analysis. As a robustness check, I repeat the analysis with the inconsistent 
responses removed and find that the conclusions of this chapter remain 
unchanged. 
 Table 5.2 below shows the average risk preference index by nationality. In 
the control sessions, Asians choose more risky options than British students on 
average, but the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.73638). However, 
in the treatment sessions, British choose more risky options than Asian students 
on average. This difference is not statistically significant either (p = 0.454). 
Interestingly, the British students in the treatment group are more risk seeking 
than the British students in the control group (p = 0.138), which may be related 
to the peer effects treatment, or other demographic factors. Later on we will check 
for any cultural differences when controlling for underlying risk attitudes as well 
as other demographic factors. 
Table 5.2: Average Risk Preference Index39 
 British Asian 
Control 1.55 
(1.00) 
1.80 
(1.44) 
Treatment 2.05 
(1.19) 
1.79 
(1.13) 
 
 As can be gleaned from the summary statistics above, there is little 
difference in the distribution of risky choices between treatments for the Asian 
                                                          
38 Throughout this chapter, we use a Mann-Whitney U-test to determine whether the samples are 
statistically different. 
39 Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
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students. However, the British students take significantly more risky choices in 
the treatment condition than in the control condition. We now look at the lottery 
choices in more detail to see whether there are any cultural or treatment 
differences. Table 5.3 below shows the proportion of students choosing each 
option for each question in the control condition. These proportions are then 
presented to students in the respective culture’s treatment conditions. None of 
these differences in proportions between cultures are significant for any of these 
questions40. 
Table 5.3: Choices in the Control Conditions 
Question Options British Students Asian Students 
1 Safe: Receive £4 ECU for sure 
Risky: Flip a coin; Receive £20 
if heads or £0 if tails 
Safe: 15% 
Risky: 85% 
Safe: 30% 
Risky: 70% 
2 Safe: Receive £6 ECU for sure 
Risky: Flip a coin; Receive £20 
if heads or £0 if tails 
Safe: 65% 
Risky: 35% 
Safe: 45% 
Risky: 55% 
3 Safe: Receive £8 ECU for sure 
Risky: Flip a coin; Receive £20 
if heads or £0 if tails 
Safe: 65% 
Risky: 35% 
Safe: 70% 
Risky: 30% 
4 Safe: Receive £10 ECU for sure 
Risky: Flip a coin; Receive £20 
if heads or £0 if tails 
Safe: 100% 
Risky: 0% 
Safe: 90% 
Risky: 10% 
5 Safe: Receive £12 ECU for sure 
Risky: Flip a coin; Receive £20 
if heads or £0 if tails 
Safe: 100% 
Risky: 0% 
Safe: 90% 
Risky: 10% 
6 Safe: Receive £14 ECU for sure 
Risky: Flip a coin; Receive £20 
if heads or £0 if tails 
Safe: 100% 
Risky: 0% 
Safe: 95% 
Risky: 5% 
  
There is also little cultural difference in risk preferences in the treatment 
conditions. However, perhaps the more interesting differences are those within-  
                                                          
40 Using a two-sided two-sample Z-test for difference in proportions. 
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Figure 5.2: Proportion of Asian Students Choosing the Safe Option for Each 
Question 
 
Figure 5.3: Proportion of British Students Choosing the Safe Option for Each 
Question 
 
 
cultures between treatments. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 above show how the 
distribution of choices compares between treatments, for Asian and British 
students respectively. Although the distribution of choices for Asian students is 
roughly the same between treatments, the British tend to make riskier choices in 
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the treatment condition. However, rather than displaying herding behaviour, the 
British students are moving away from the majority choices towards the minority 
choices, which is an example of contrarian behaviour. This makes sense as those 
from individualistic cultures like Britain are likely to place value on being different 
from other people. Although mean risk preference is higher for British in the 
treatment group, a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of 
distributions shows no significant difference in distributions between the 
treatment and control sessions (p = 0.452). We now need to control for 
demographics and underlying risk attitudes to see whether there are factors other 
than contrarianism that are driving behaviour. 
5.4.2 Survey Questions 
 When looking at cultural differences in context-specific risks, we can see 
from Table 5.4 below that Asians are less willing to take risks than British in every 
category. This contrasts my Hypothesis One, that Asians will be more willing to 
take financial risks than British, but the difference is not quite significant (p = 
0.103). As expected, the Asian students are also less willing to take social risks 
than the British, but again this difference is not quite significant (p = 0.135). We 
will use these measures of risk attitude to control for differences in risk preference 
when testing for peer effects in social and financial risks. 
While most of the other categories show similar results for both cultures, 
there is a noticeable difference in the willingness to take risks with health. The 
British students indicate an average willingness to take health risks of 4.13 out of 
10, which compares to only 2.64 for the Asian students. This difference is 
statistically significant (p = 0.011) and can possibly be explained by Confucian 
values such as patience and self-control among the Asian students. Students 
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who believe in these values would be less likely to over-indulge in unhealthy food 
or alcohol than students who believe in living for the moment.  
Table 5.4: Average Willingness to Take Risks on a Scale from 0–1041 
 British Asian 
General 5.58 
(1.99) 
5.44 
(2.25) 
Driving 3.00 
(1.75) 
2.41 
(2.44) 
Financial Investment 5.58 
(2.09) 
4.74 
(1.96) 
Leisure and Sport 7.10 
(2.04) 
6.46 
(1.89) 
Career 5.58 
(2.18) 
5.00 
(2.22) 
Health 4.13 
(2.65) 
2.64 
(2.61) 
Social Approval 5.73 
(2.16) 
5.00 
(2.03) 
 
Table 5.5 below shows the average willingness to take financial risks by 
treatment and nationality. When looking at the willingness to take financial risks, 
we can find no significant difference between treatments for the British students 
(p = 0.427). This means that the tendency for British students to make riskier 
decisions in the treatment condition is unlikely to be explained by differences in 
risk attitudes alone. As for the Asian students, those in the control condition 
indicate a greater willingness to take financial risks than those in the treatment 
session, but the difference is not significant (p = 0.181). However, the Asians 
show little difference between treatments in their lottery choices. Perhaps those 
Asians in the treatment condition were inspired to make riskier choices based on 
their peers’ choices in the control condition. We now consider these results in-
light of demographic variables. 
                                                          
41 Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
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Table 5.5: Average Willingness to Take Financial Risks on a Scale from 0–1042 
 British Asian 
Control 5.40 
(2.06) 
5.25 
(1.52) 
Treatment 5.75 
(2.15) 
4.21 
(2.25) 
 
Gender is an important factor that can affect risk attitudes, with males 
tending to take greater financial risks than females. In-line with previous results 
(e.g. Dohmen et al, 2011), males rate their willingness to take financial risks 
significantly higher than females in these experiments (p = 0.005). Males also 
have a higher risk preference index in the lottery choice task, but this difference 
is not significant (p = 0.672). As similar proportions of males and females attend 
the British session, the difference between treatments is unlikely to be driven by 
gender. On the other hand, the Asian treatment session contains a higher 
proportion of females than the control session. The higher proportion of females 
in the Asian treatment session could be one reason they have a lesser willingness 
to take financial risks than the control session. 
Age can also be important for determining risk attitudes (Dohmen et al, 
2011). However, as the students attending these experiments tend to be of similar 
age, I do not expect to find a significant effect of age on risk attitudes. In-line with 
this prediction, age is insignificant in the estimation of both risk preference index 
and the survey measure of willingness to take financial risks. With a greater 
dispersion of ages in the sample, we may obtain some more interesting results 
on how age interacts with culture, conformity, and risk attitudes. 
                                                          
42 Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
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As subject major may also affect risk attitudes, I endeavoured to invite 
similar proportions of students from each subject area to each session. However, 
as most of the Asian students registered for economic experiments are studying 
business, this is not such an easy task. To avoid any bias, I invite a high 
proportion of British business school students in attempt to match the proportion 
of Asian business school students. Overall, the proportions are fairly similar, with 
85% of Asian students studying a business major, compared to 78% of British 
students studying business. There are no significant differences in either risk 
preference index or the survey measure of financial risk attitude between 
business and non-business majors. 
I include all of these demographic factors, along with the measure of 
underlying financial risk attitude, in an ordered probit43 regression on the risk 
preference index. In addition, I include a binary variable, Peer Effects, equal to 
one if the participant took part in the treatment session and zero if they took part 
in the control session. Gender and subject major are also represented as binary 
variables, with Female equal to one if female, and Business Major equal to one if 
studying business. Age is a continuous variable measured in years and Financial 
Risk measures the willingness to take financial risks on a scale from 0 – 10. I use 
robust standard errors to account for heterogeneity in the sample. I run this 
regression both overall and for each cultural group separately44. Results are 
presented below in Table 5.6.  
                                                          
43 An ordered probit model accounts for the ordinal nature of the data by focusing on the ranking 
of outcomes rather than precise quantitative values (Greene, 2003, p. 736). 
44 In the overall regression, I also included a binary variable for cultural group, as well as an 
interaction term between treatment and culture. However, neither of these variables were 
significant and were subsequently dropped from the analysis. Results from these regressions are 
available in Appendix Six. 
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Table 5.6: Coefficients from Ordered Probit Regression on Risk Preference 
Index45 
 
 
As the magnitude of coefficients cannot be directly interpreted in ordered 
probit models, I focus on the sign and significance of results. In both the overall 
and Asian sample regressions, financial risk attitude has a significant and positive 
effect on the lottery choices. This makes sense, as a greater willingness to take 
financial risks should result in riskier lottery choices. The only significant 
demographic variable is age and this is only significant for the Asian group, where 
age has a positive effect on the risk preference index. Interestingly, the treatment 
binary variable is only significant for the British students, where they make 
significantly more risky choices on average in the treatment session than the 
                                                          
45 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of 
confidence is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively. In ordered probit models, the probability 
of the dependant variable taking on any particular value is given by the probability a latent variable 
lies between each cut point. 
 
Entire 
Sample 
British 
Sample 
Asian 
Sample 
Female 
0.100 
(0.244) 
-0.128 
 (0.349) 
0.465 
(0.458) 
Age 
0.033 
(0.068) 
-0.222 
 (0.165) 
    0.250** 
(0.122) 
Business Major 
-0.350 
 (0.331) 
-0.483 
 (0.368) 
-0.472 
 (0.581) 
Financial Risk 
    0.151** 
(0.069) 
0.150 
(0.102) 
  0.244* 
(0.128) 
Peer Effects 
0.361 
(0.259) 
  0.650* 
(0.370) 
0.008 
(0.422) 
Cut 1 
0.366 
(1.403) 
-4.686 
  (3.021) 
5.389 
(2.827) 
Cut 2 
1.140 
(1.395) 
-3.842 
 (3.007) 
6.185 
(2.836) 
Cut 3 
1.897 
(1.392) 
-3.055 
 (2.961) 
6.979 
(2.886) 
Cut 4 
3.475 
(1.421) 
-1.368 
 (2.916) 
8.606 
(2.990) 
Cut 5 
3.772 
(1.413) 
N/A N/A 
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control session. This shows that the British students are affected by the peer 
effects treatment, even when controlling for their underlying risk attitudes and 
demographics. 
Although the British appear to be engaging in contrarian behaviour, they 
certainly do not admit to this in their follow-up questionnaires. Only two British 
students in the treatment session admit they considered the previous results, 
compared to seven Asian students. When asked how the previous results 
affected their decisions, the two British students make the following comments: 
“I took the previous decisions into account on question 3 and gave a 
different answer because of this.” 
“Usually followed the pattern” 
However, of the two British students who considered the previous results, three 
of their decisions go against the majority, out of twelve choices in total. This 
compares to only two out of forty-two decisions going against the majority among 
the Asian students who considered the previous results. The Asian students 
make the following comments, when asked how the previous results affected their 
decisions: 
“how much money I can get maximum” 
“knowing others responses is important to make my decision” 
“When I made a decision, I would consider that how others were thinking, 
and then I made some decisions based on the results others made. But 
overall, the results didn’t have much effect.” 
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“for the question 3, I was thinking to take the risk. but I changed my mind 
when I saw the general choices from other people was not taking risk. then 
I changed my mind.” 
“when the proportion of people who chose yes is high, I decided to choose 
yes as well” 
“I will be less willing to take risk if most people do not take the risk.” 
“To double check if my decision was approved by the majority after I have 
made my own decision.” 
These questionnaire results are as expected, since imitating others has 
positive connotations such as harmony in collectivist cultures but negative 
connotations such as lack of free-will in individualist cultures. To avoid these 
negative emotions, the British students are unlikely to admit being influenced by 
other people, even if they were influenced by going against the majority. 
Paradoxically, as noted by Jetten et al (2002), individualists are conformist in their 
non-conformity. 
5.4.3 Social Risks 
As part of the follow-up questionnaire, I present subjects with a 
hypothetical social risks problem, where they must decide whether or not to give 
advice to a roommate. Results by treatment and nationality are given below in 
Table 5.7. In both treatments, more British than Asian students indicate they 
would give advice to the roommate, which is the riskier option in this scenario. 
However, the cultural differences are small compared to the differences between 
treatments, with more students going for the safer option when given information 
about the choices of their peers. Interestingly, the students display contrarian 
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behaviour, by going against the majority choices from the previous sessions. 
However, none of these differences in proportions are statistically significant46.  
Table 5.7: Proportion of Students Choosing to Give Advice 
 British Asian 
Control 80% 75% 
Treatment 70% 63% 
 
Similarly to financial risks, we can use our measure of willingness to take 
social risks from the follow-up questionnaire to control for underlying social risk 
attitude in the face of peer effects. As shown in Table 5.8 below, there is no 
difference in the average willingness to take social risks between treatments for 
Asian students, with an average willingness of 5 out of 10 in each treatment. In 
contrast, the British students indicate a greater willingness to take social risks in 
the treatment condition than in the control condition, with an average of 6.10 in 
the treatment condition, compared to 5.35 in the control. However, this difference 
is not statistically significant (p = 0.224). 
Table 5.8: Average Willingness to Take Social Risks on a Scale from 0–1047 
 British Asian 
Control 5.35 
(2.01) 
5.00 
(2.08) 
Treatment 6.10 
(2.29) 
5.00 
(2.03) 
 
Although insignificant, the differences between treatments support the 
notion that British are engaging in contrarian behaviour. Firstly, the minority 
choice becomes more popular when the students are told it is the minority choice. 
                                                          
46 Using a two-sided two-sample Z-test for difference in proportions. 
47 Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
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Secondly, the students choose the safe option more readily in the treatment 
condition, even though they indicate a greater willingness to take social risks than 
those in the control. The students are choosing against the majority, even though 
their preferences indicate they should prefer the riskier option even more than 
those in the control session.  
 I use a probit regression to see whether there are any significant treatment 
effects when controlling for demographics and underlying social risk attitude. My 
dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the person indicates they 
would give advice in the roommate problem, and zero if they choose to remain 
silent. I include the same demographic variables as the regression on risk 
preference index, but this time include a measure of the underling social risk 
attitude. The variable Social Risk indicates how subjects rate their willingness to 
take social risks on a scale from 0 – 10. Results from the regression are presented 
below in Table 5.9. 
The only significant variable in the below regression is the binary variable 
for whether or not the subject is studying a business major. As the coefficient is 
negative, those studying business are less likely to take the social risk by giving 
advice. This effect works entirely through the British sample, with collinearity in 
the British sample regression but insignificance in the Asian sample regression. 
As there is no difference in underlying social risk attitudes between business and 
non-business majors, this result could be driven by how business majors interpret 
the question, rather than underling attitudes. Perhaps they see the scenario as a 
strategic interaction rather than a risky situation per se. Although the summary 
statistics indicate a possible contrarian treatment effect on the British students, 
there are no significant treatment effects in the regression. More research with 
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higher sample sizes is necessary to obtain a clearer result about cultural 
differences in peer effects in social risks. 
Table 5.9: Coefficients from Probit Regression on Roommate Problem48 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Discussion 
 5.5.1 Overview 
 For financial risks, these experiments show that British students make 
riskier choices when given information about the majority choices of their peers. 
In this case, the British show contrarian behaviour rather than herding, as they 
tend to go against the majority choices. However, the Asian students show 
neither contrarianism nor herding. According to Hypothesis Two, I expected the 
Asian students to imitate the majority choices and have a more clustered 
distribution of choices in the treatment session compared to the control session. 
However, there are no significant differences in the distribution of choices 
                                                          
48 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of 
confidence is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively. In ordered probit models, the probability 
of the dependant variable taking on any particular value is given by the probability a latent variable 
lies between each cut point. 
 
Entire 
Sample 
British 
Sample 
Asian 
Sample 
Female 
-0.235 
 (0.324) 
0.188 
(0.480) 
-0.294 
 (0.566) 
Age 
-0.005 
 (0.093) 
0.021 
(0.195) 
0.118 
(0.174) 
Business Major 
 -1.004* 
(0.544) 
Omitted 
-0.650 
 (0.760) 
Social Risk 
0.024 
(0.078) 
-0.084 
 (0.126) 
0.161 
(0.118) 
Peer Effects 
-0.186 
 (0.331) 
0.058 
(0.491) 
-0.421 
 (0.464) 
Constant 
1.684 
(1.961) 
0.425 
(3.780) 
-1.787 
 (3.785) 
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between treatments for Asian students, even when accounting for demographic 
factors and underlying risk attitudes. Nonetheless, when looking at conformity as 
a scale, the British students are less conformist than the Asian students, which is 
in-line with Hypothesis Three. Also, although the Asian students did not choose 
very differently between the two treatments, their comments in the follow-up 
questionnaire support the notion of strong peer influence in collectivist cultures. 
 5.5.2 Cultural Norms 
Contrarian behaviour is expected in individualist cultures such as Britain, 
especially when an experimenter is obviously trying to influence the participants 
by blatantly showing the previous results. The students may have felt as though 
the experimenter was trying to coerce them into choosing in-line with the majority, 
and therefore chose against the majority in order to restore their free-will. This 
explanation is consistent with Brehm’s theory of psychological reactance (1966). 
Psychological reactance is a negative emotional state brought about by people 
perceiving their freedom as being limited through obligation or coercion. People 
feeling this way are likely to behave in such a way as to restore their freedom, 
perhaps by choosing against the majority in these experiments. 
One implication of contrarian behaviour is that people from individualistic 
cultures may be resistant to policies that try to influence people by social norms. 
Some people may even react negatively, by doing the opposite of what the policy 
intends. For example, a message that “most people enjoy alcohol responsibly” 
may encourage individualists to stand out from the crowd by breaking the norm. 
Policymakers need to be aware of how policies can affect people from different 
cultural groups in different, and perhaps unintended, ways. 
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While the British behave according to their cultural norms, the Asian 
students do not show evidence of conformity in these experiments. One reason 
for this could be that the Asians had similar preferences to begin with, which limits 
the scope to become more conformist in-light of new information. Many Asians 
mentioned in their follow-up questionnaire that the decisions of others confirmed 
their original choices. An experiment that contrasts peer preferences with 
individual preferences may be better placed to elicit conformity preferences 
among Asians, such as Asch’s line judgement task (1952, 1956). 
Another reason for the result could be that the students in the previous 
session were not considered part of an in-group. In collectivist cultures, in-group 
formation is a long process that requires bonding (Triandis, 1989). As the 
students in the treatment session did not even see the students in the control 
session, it is likely they were treated as strangers. Indeed, Williams and Sogon 
(1984) document higher conformity by Japanese students when they are dealing 
with familiar people than with strangers. Perhaps if this experiment was run 
amongst a group of friends or classmates, we would see greater conformity 
among the Asian students. 
5.5.3 Methodological Issues 
In order to better understand the results, we need to look at various 
methodological issues that could be driving the behaviour and apparent cultural 
differences. Firstly, the fact that the experiment was presented in English may 
introduce some bias. Keysar et al (2012) show that using a foreign language, as 
opposed to native language, reduces biases in decision making. This is likely 
because people are less emotionally and cognitively attached when thinking in a 
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foreign language, and therefore make decisions more systematically and less 
intuitively. 
One bias that raises a particular concern for these experiments is the 
certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Allias, 1953). The certainty effect 
is where people have a bias towards certain outcomes, when they would prefer 
a riskier option when probabilities are scaled by a fixed constant. As the 
experiments in this chapter involve choices between certain outcomes or a 
lottery, the participants may be subject to the certainty effect. In addition, the 
Asian students may be less subject to the certainty effect than the British 
students, as the instructions are in English. As part of the follow-up questionnaire, 
I ask participants for their native and second languages. Only 3 out of the 19 
Asian participants list English as their native language, compared to all of the 
British students. As certainty bias encourages choosing the sure outcome, the 
Asian students may have made riskier choices in these experiments than if the 
instructions were in their native language. However, my instructions are very 
short and choices between simple lotteries seem unlikely to be interpreted very 
differently between cultures. 
When considering certainty bias, the questions arises as to whether 
people felt a bias towards a certain outcome in the roommate problem. The 
question is framed such that one option has a certain outcome, “If you give no 
advice, this will have no effect on your relationship”, and the other option has a 
risky element, depending on whether or not the roommate appreciates the advice. 
Although giving no advice may be seen as a certain outcome, this scenario is 
less straightforward than the lottery choices. For example, subjects may imagine 
a scenario where the roommate makes a bad decision and they regret not giving 
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them advice, which could have avoided the bad outcome. Therefore, even the 
supposed certain outcome may not be interpreted as certain by the subjects. 
 As well as a possible cultural difference in certainty bias in the decision 
making task, we need to consider other possible flaws with the task itself. 
Similarly to the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery choice task, which was used in 
Chapter Three of this thesis, the lottery choice task by Hsee and Weber (1999) 
does not produce a large amount of variety in the data. Most people switch from 
preferring the risky option to the safe option at around question two in the Hsee 
and Weber (1999) task. As most people are risk averse, hardly anyone chooses 
the coin flip when the safe option is more than about £6. I used this task as Hsee 
and Weber (1999) found some promising cultural differences when running this 
task hypothetically. However, perhaps including more intermediary choices 
between the questions people tend to switch on would provide us with a richer 
dataset. There is also some evidence that lottery choice tasks do not accurately 
predict risk taking in real life situations and that context-specific questionnaire 
measures may provide more predictive power (Dohmen et al, 2011). 
 As mentioned in Chapter Three of this thesis, the strength of identification 
with national cultures can vary widely among individuals. The students who 
attended these experiments may hold particularly individualist or collectivist 
values, regardless of their nationality. We can only attribute the results to culture 
if we understand the cultural values held by participants. Jetten et al (2002) use 
a questionnaire to measure strength of identification with national culture, as well 
as endorsement of individualist or collectivist values. Measures such as these 
should be included in future cross-cultural work. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 In these experiments, I expected that students from collectivist Asian 
cultures would be more conformist than students from individualist cultures such 
as Britain. However, rather than the Asian students imitating their peers more 
than British students, the difference is evidenced by British students being 
contrarian and choosing against their peers. This makes sense, as those from 
individualist cultures tend to value uniqueness. The British students do not openly 
admit being influenced by others, which also makes sense as peer influence is 
seen negatively as a constraint on personal freedom in individualist cultures. 
While the British students try to restore their freedom by choosing against the 
majority, they are paradoxically still being influenced by others, even though the 
influence pushes them in the other direction to what the majority are doing. On 
the other hand, the Asian students seem happy to admit that they are influenced 
by the behaviour of others, as evidenced by their responses to the follow-up 
questionnaire. 
 My two secondary hypotheses fail to gain support from these experiments. 
Asian students do not choose riskier options than the British students in the lottery 
choice task, and neither do they indicate a greater willingness to take risks with 
money in their follow-up questionnaire. This contrasts previous evidence that 
students from collectivist cultures are more financially risk seeking than those 
from individualist cultures (Hsee and Weber, 1999). In addition, my hypothesis 
that the distribution of choices among Asian students will converge to the mean 
in the presence of peer effects, is not confirmed by this experiment. More studies 
with larger sample sizes and a greater variety of choice options are needed to 
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ascertain whether Asian students are more likely to conform to their peers than 
British students. 
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Chapter Six: Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis I have explored differences in decision making between 
students from collectivist Asian cultures and students from individualist Western 
cultures. My main findings include larger financial risk-sharing networks among 
the Asian students, the tendency to reply on stereotypes when interacting with 
someone from another culture, and a tendency towards contrarian behaviour 
amongst the British. These results reinforce the idea that culture affects 
behaviour and should be considered in economic models. The challenge now is 
to further refine cross-cultural experiments to isolate competing explanations for 
results. We can then move on to study more representative samples to gain an 
understanding of how culture affects behaviour at the macro level. 
Although I only deal with student samples in this thesis, which are not 
representative of entire cultures, we can still learn something interesting about 
the particular groups studied. Asian students studying in the UK or New Zealand 
are a large group of people who have significant impacts on the economies of 
their host countries. Knowing how behaviour differs between home students and 
Asian international students will be useful for university planners. For example, a 
marketing campaign to encourage social interactions between home and 
international students may benefit from an understanding of how cultural 
stereotypes affect interactions. Similarly, encouraging students to study hard 
using peer effects may be more effective for Asian international students than 
home students. Governments and financial services firms may also be interested 
in differences in risk attitudes and risk-sharing networks between the two groups, 
when designing financial support products for students, such as insurance 
policies and emergency support schemes. 
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 Asian students who are studying abroad are likely to be more 
individualistic than the average person in their home country (Zou et al, 2009). 
Therefore, my results in Chapters Three and Five may show a lower bound on 
the population differences between individualist and collectivist cultures. 
Interestingly, we find contrasting results on the social risks problem between the 
two chapters, with the majority of Asian students showing aversion to taking the 
risk in Chapter Three, but the majority opting to take the risk in Chapter Five. We 
also find slightly contrasting results in the context-specific risk attitude measures, 
with Asians in Chapter Five being less willing to take risks with money than the 
British. However, Asians are less willing to take social and health risks, which is 
consistent with the findings in Chapter Three. 
 In the future, I hope to avoid the sample bias of comparing home and 
international students, by studying cultural differences between groups within the 
same country. This also alleviates the problem of background risk which could 
differ by home country (Harrison et al, 2007). In particular, I am interested in 
comparing behaviour of NZ Europeans and Maori, which are two integrated 
groups with unique cultural identities. I would also like to use a greater variety of 
risk attitude measures, especially to measure social risks. Work by Weber et al 
(2002) to develop a scenario based, context-specific, risk attitudes questionnaire 
looks particularly promising. I avoided scenario based measures of risk attitudes 
in this thesis due to possible interpretation differences between cultures (Weber 
and Hsee, 1999). However, interpretation differences are likely to be minor when 
comparing two cultures who speak the same language and are from the same 
country, such as Maori49 and NZ Europeans. 
                                                          
49 Modern day Maori speak English fluently. 
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 Finally, we need to consider the relevance of studying cultural differences 
in the future. As we move towards a more globalised world, cultural differences 
are likely to decline over time. For example, many families in New Zealand now 
consist of both Maoris and NZ Europeans, and the term New Zealander is 
increasingly being used to describe ethnicity, as discovered in Chapter Three of 
this thesis. Now that cultural differences are being documented, we can track 
changes over time to see whether the differences decline and even eventually 
disappear. Although cultures have developed separately for thousands of years, 
the bringing together of cultures through travel and technology suggests we may 
now be heading in the other direction, with increasing similarities and declining 
differences. 
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Appendix One: Online Survey Questions (UK version) 
1. Imagine you need £100 today for a deposit on your next accommodation, but cannot 
afford this until the end of the month. If you do not pay today you will lose the 
accommodation. You have no savings and cannot receive the money from your family. 
Please give the full names of any people at the University of Exeter who you could ask 
to borrow this money from. You can list any number of people. 
2. Imagine you need to study for an exam but have lost your lecture notes. Please give 
the full names of any classmates who you could ask to borrow the notes from. 
3. Please list any friends you could ask for advice when you need to make an important 
decision, such as which job offer to accept. 
4. Please answer the following questions (Yes/No): Do you smoke? Have you ever been 
charged with a traffic offence? Do you plan to become self-employed? Do you (or will 
you) invest in the stock market? Do you play any active sports? Do you plan to work in 
the public sector? 
5. How willing are you to take risks in general, with 0 being not at all willing to take risks, 
and 10 being very willing to take risks? 
6. Please estimate your willingness to take risks with regard to the following areas, with 
0 being not at all willing to take risks, and 10 being very willing to take risks: Driving, 
Financial Investment, Leisure and Sport, Career, Health, Social Approval. 
7. Please enter the following demographic information: Full name, Age (in years), 
Gender, Academic Major, Year of study, Nationality, Nationality(ies) of your parents, List 
the national cultures that were influential in your upbringing, Native language. 
8. Will you be willing to participate in paid future experiments in relation to this survey? 
If you answer "yes" please leave your email address so we can contact you. 
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Appendix Two: Experiment Instructions (UK version) 
You are about to take part in an experiment. Your payoff from this experiment will 
depend on the decisions you make during the experiment. Therefore it is important that 
you carefully read and understand these instructions. The instructions will be read 
aloud. After the instructions are read aloud, you will be given a further 5 minutes to read 
the instructions again to clarify your understanding. Please do not communicate with 
the other participants at any stage during the experiment. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand and the experimenter will assist you. 
Your earnings from the experiment will be in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Each 
ECU is worth £0.05. After the experiment, your earnings will be converted into pounds, 
and you will be paid anonymously in cash before you leave the room. You will also 
receive a £5 show-up fee, in addition to any money earned during the experiment. 
Each of you is assigned to a group of 4 players. You will remain in the same group of 4 
players throughout the experiment. Each group member is identified with a player ID, 
but you will not be given the names of any other players. Your name will not be revealed 
to anyone except the experimenters. 
The experiment consists of four parts. In the first part, you will play three different 
versions of a game with the other players in your group of 4. Instructions for the 
subsequent parts will be given after the first part is complete. 
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Part One 
In the first game that you will play, you will be linked with 1 other player within your 
group of 4. You will therefore play the 2-player game described below. The game 
consists of a choice between X and Y. Your payoff depends on both your own choice and 
the choice of the player you are linked with. 
The payoff table for this game is illustrated below. The numbers in the table correspond 
to your payoffs in ECU, for every possible combination of choices by you and the other 
player. One of the three versions of the game will be randomly selected to determine 
your payoff from part one. 
In the 2-player game, if both you and the other player choose X, you each receive a 
payoff of 60 ECU. If both players choose Y, you each receive a payoff of 35. If one player 
chooses X while the other chooses Y, the player choosing X receives 0 while the player 
choosing Y receives 35. You will not know the choice of the other player until after you 
have made a decision. 
2-player Game 
  Other Player’s Choice 
  X Y 
Your 
Choice 
X 60 0 
Y 35 35 
 
You will then play a 3-player and 4-player version of the game. In the 3-player version 
you will play the game with 2 other players within your group of 4, and in the 4-player 
version you will play the game with 3 other players. The experimenters will randomly 
match you to other players. 
The payoff tables for these games are illustrated below. 
For the 3-player and 4-player games, the other players’ choices are given by how many 
players choose each option. For example, in the 4-player game, 2X1Y means that 2 of 
the other players choose X and 1 player chooses Y. In this case, if you choose X you will 
receive 40 and if you choose Y you will receive 35. You will not know the choices of the 
other players until after you have made a decision. 
3-player Game 
  Other Players’ Choices 
  2X 1X1Y 2Y 
Your 
Choice 
X 60 30 0 
Y 35 35 35 
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4-player Game 
  Other Players’ Choices 
  3X 2X1Y 1X2Y 3Y 
Your 
Choice 
X 60 40 20 0 
Y 35 35 35 35 
 
Please record your decision of X or Y for each version of the game on your decision sheet 
when asked to do so. The responses will then be collected and the results compiled. 
Your decision sheet showing the decisions of all 4 players in your group and your payoff 
from each version of the game will then be returned. Please raise your hand if you have 
a question at any stage during the experiment. 
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Part Two 
You will now have the opportunity to form links with other players within your 4-player 
group. If you form any links, you will play the same game as you played in part one with 
the player(s) you are linked with. You can propose a link to any other player. If a player 
you propose a link to also proposes a link to you, a link is formed. However, if a player 
you propose a link to does not propose a link to you, then no link is formed. You can 
propose and form as many links as you wish within your 4-player group, including zero. 
If you form no links, you will receive an automatic payoff of 35 ECU, without playing the 
game. Each link you propose will cost you 5 ECU. 
If you form any links, you will play another round of the game you played in part one. 
The number of links you form will determine which version of the game you play. For 
example, if you form two links, you will play the 3-player version of the game with the 
two players you formed links with. The number of links you form and the player IDs of 
those you form links with will be revealed to you before you play the game. Please note, 
the players you are linked with may have a different number of links to you, and 
therefore may face a different payoff table to you. The payoff tables for this game are 
the same as in part one, and are illustrated again below. 
 
2-player Game 
  Other Player’s Choice 
  X Y 
Your 
Choice 
X 60 0 
Y 35 35 
 
3-player Game 
  Other Players’ Choices 
  2X 1X1Y 2Y 
Your 
Choice 
X 60 30 0 
Y 35 35 35 
 
4-player Game 
  Other Players’ Choices 
  3X 2X1Y 1X2Y 3Y 
Your 
Choice 
X 60 40 20 0 
Y 35 35 35 35 
 
Please tick the player ID(s) of any players you wish to form links with on your link 
proposal sheet. You do not need to tick your own player ID. These sheets will be 
collected and a decision sheet will be returned to you showing the player IDs of any 
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players you have formed links with. If you form no links, you will still be given a decision 
sheet but do not need to make a decision.  
When you receive your decision sheet for part two, please record your decision of X or 
Y. The responses will then be collected and the results compiled. Your decision sheet 
showing the decisions of all 4 players in your group and your payoff from part two will 
then be returned. Please raise your hand if you have a question at any stage during the 
experiment. 
  
   
 174 
 
Part Three Your Player ID: XX 
Please choose between each of the following lottery options, by selecting either lottery 
A or lottery B in each row. One of the rows will be randomly selected and played out to 
determine your payoff from this part of the experiment. Therefore, it is important that 
you consider each decision carefully. 
As an example, imagine that the second row in the table is randomly selected for payoff. 
If you chose lottery A in the second row, you will receive 20.00 ECU with 20% probability 
and 16.00 ECU with 80% probability. If you chose lottery B in the second row, you will 
receive 38.50 ECU with 20% probability and 1.00 ECU with 80% probability. 
You can choose lottery A or lottery B as many times as you wish in the following table, 
but must make a decision for each of the 10 rows. 
Lottery A Lottery B Your 
Choice 
(A or B) 
10% chance of 20.00 ECU 
90% chance of 16.00 ECU 
10% chance of 38.50 ECU 
90% chance of 1.00 ECU 
 
20% chance of 20.00 ECU 
80% chance of 16.00 ECU 
20% chance of 38.50 ECU 
80% chance of 1.00 ECU 
 
30% chance of 20.00 ECU 
70% chance of 16.00 ECU 
30% chance of 38.50 ECU 
70% chance of 1.00 ECU 
 
40% chance of 20.00 ECU 
60% chance of 16.00 ECU 
40% chance of 38.50 ECU 
60% chance of 1.00 ECU 
 
50% chance of 20.00 ECU 
50% chance of 16.00 ECU 
50% chance of 38.50 ECU 
50% chance of 1.00 ECU 
 
60% chance of 20.00 ECU 
40% chance of 16.00 ECU 
60% chance of 38.50 ECU 
40% chance of 1.00 ECU 
 
70% chance of 20.00 ECU 
30% chance of 16.00 ECU 
70% chance of 38.50 ECU 
30% chance of 1.00 ECU 
 
80% chance of 20.00 ECU 
20% chance of 16.00 ECU 
80% chance of 38.50 ECU 
20% chance of 1.00 ECU 
 
90% chance of 20.00 ECU 
10% chance of 16.00 ECU 
90% chance of 38.50 ECU 
10% chance of 1.00 ECU 
 
100% chance of 20.00 ECU 
0% chance of 16.00 ECU 
100% chance of 38.50 ECU 
0% chance of 1.00 ECU 
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Part Four Your Player ID: XX 
Please complete the following questions. 
1. Imagine you have a good relationship with your roommate, and that your roommate 
is currently facing an important decision. You have a strong opinion about the decision 
your roommate should make, and need to decide whether or not to give your roommate 
advice. If you give advice that your roommate appreciates, this will greatly enhance your 
relationship. However, if your roommate dislikes your advice, this will seriously harm 
your relationship. If you give no advice, this will have no effect on your relationship. Will 
you give advice or remain silent? Please circle your choice below. 
 
Remain silent Give advice 
 
2. What is the approximate yearly before-tax income of your parents/guardians in 
pounds? 
            
3. How many siblings do you have? 
            
 
4. Please rate your current mood on the following scale by circling a number, with 1 
being entirely pessimistic and 5 being entirely optimistic: 
Pessimistic Neutral Optimistic 
1     2   3   4  5 
 
5.  Please rate the current financial stability in your home country, with 1 being 
extremely volatile and 5 being very stable: 
Volatile Neutral Stable 
1     2   3   4  5 
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Appendix Three: Regression with Cultural Dummy Variable Interactions 
 
  
                                                          
50 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses, rounded to three decimal places. Significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of confidence is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively. In ordered 
probit models, the probability of the dependant variable taking on any particular value is given by 
the probability a latent variable lies between each cut point. 
Coefficients from Ordered Probit Model50 
Dependent Variable: Willingness to Take Financial Risks 
Financial Network Size 
    0.040** 
(0.020) 
Academic Network Size 
-0.000 
  (0.023) 
Social Network Size 
   -0.048** 
(0.020) 
Age 
 -0.018 
(0.013) 
Female 
     -0.561*** 
(0.097) 
British 
0.054 
(0.135) 
Asian 
      1.901** 
(0.900) 
NZ Euro 
0.246 
(0.191) 
Asian * NZ Study 
-0.122 
(0.324) 
Asian * Financial Network Size 
0.042 
(0.037) 
Asian * Age 
-0.064 
(0.044) 
Asian * Gender 
-0.235 
(0.255) 
Cut 1 
-2.504 
(0.347) 
Cut 2 
-1.980 
(0.347) 
Cut 3 
-1.377 
(0.339) 
Cut 4 
-0.989 
(0.337) 
Cut 5 
-0.714 
(0.337) 
Cut 6 
-0.300 
(0.336) 
Cut 7 
0.227 
(0.333) 
Cut 8 
0.881 
(0.336) 
Cut 9 
1.578 
(0.349) 
Cut 10 
2.301 
(0.397) 
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Appendix Four: Experiment Instructions 
Instructions 
You are about to take part in an experiment. Your payoff from this experiment will 
depend on the decisions you make during the experiment. Therefore it is important that 
you carefully read and understand these instructions. 
Please do not communicate with the other participants at any stage during the 
experiment. If you have a question, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
assist you. 
Your earnings from the experiment will be in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Each 
ECU is worth £0.10. After the experiment, your earnings will be converted into pounds, 
and you will be paid anonymously in cash before you leave the room. You will also 
receive a £5 show-up fee, in addition to any money earned during the experiment. 
The experiment will start with a questionnaire which will shortly appear on the 
computer screen. Please complete the questions and then click the “OK” button at the 
bottom of the screen. 
After everyone has completed the questionnaire, instructions will be handed out for the 
next stage of the experiment. 
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Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions and click the "OK" button when complete. 
What year of study are you in at Exeter? 
How many full years have you lived in the UK? 
How often do you talk to people from your home country here in Exeter? 
Do you live with your family during term time? 
If you answered "no" above, how many trips do you make to visit your family each 
year? 
- OK Button -  
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In the next stage of the experiment, you will play the game described below. You will be 
randomly matched with another player who is sitting on the other side of the room to 
you.  
Game One 
Game One consists of a choice between 1 and 2. Your payoff depends on both your own 
choice and the choice of the player you are matched with, who is sitting on the other 
side of the room. 
The payoff table for this game is illustrated below. The numbers in the table correspond 
to your payoffs in ECU, for every possible combination of choices by you and the other 
player. The first number in each cell is your payoff and the second number is the other 
player’s payoff. 
If both you and the other player choose 2, you each receive a payoff of 60 ECU. If both 
players choose 1, you each receive a payoff of 40. If one player chooses 2 while the other 
chooses 1, the player choosing 2 receives 0 while the player choosing 1 receives 40. 
Please input your choice of 1 or 2 into the computer when asked to do so. You will not 
know the choice of the other player until after you have made a decision. 
If you have a question, please raise your hand and the experimenter will assist you. 
 
  Other Player’s Choice 
  2 1 
Your 
Choice 
2 60, 60 0, 40 
1 40, 0 40, 40 
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In the next stage of the experiment, you will play the game described below. You will be 
randomly matched with another player who is sitting on the other side of the room to 
you. The person you are matched with in Game Two will not necessarily be the same 
person you were matched with in Game One. 
Game Two 
In Game Two, you and another player are allocated 40 ECU to share between you. You 
need to decide how much of the 40 ECU you will demand for yourself and the other 
player will do the same. If the total demands from you and the other player exceed 40 
ECU, you will both receive 0. If the total demands are less than or equal to 40, each of 
you will receive the amount you demanded. 
The payoff table for this game is illustrated below. The numbers in the table correspond 
to your payoffs in ECU, for every possible combination of choices by you and the other 
player. The first number in each cell is your payoff and the second number is the other 
player’s payoff. 
As an example, if you choose 25 and the other player chooses 15, the total demands are 
40. In this case, you will receive 25 and the other player will receive 15. However if you 
choose 25 and the other player also chooses 25, the total demands are 50. In this case, 
you will both receive 0. 
As another example, if you choose 10 and the other player chooses 15, the total 
demands are 25, which is less than 40. In this case, you will receive 10 and the other 
player will receive 15. 
Please input your choice of 10, 15, 25, or 30 into the computer when asked to do so. You 
will not know the choice of the other player until after you have made a decision. 
If you have a question, please raise your hand and the experimenter will assist you. 
  Other Player’s Choice 
  30 25 15 10 
 30 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 30, 10 
Your Choice 
25 0, 0 0, 0 25, 15 25, 10 
15 0, 0 15, 25 15, 15 15, 10 
 10 10, 30 10, 25 10, 15 10, 10 
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Follow-up Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions and click the "OK" button when complete. 
In Game One, how did you decide what option to choose? 
In Game Two, how did you decide what option to choose? 
In Game One, what did you think the other player would choose? 
In Game Two, what did you think the other player would choose? 
Did you consider the identity of the other player when making your decisions? 
If you answered "yes" above, what aspects of the other player's identity did you 
consider? 
What do you think this experiment was about? (Optional) 
- OK Button -  
Please answer the following questions and click the "OK" button when complete. 
Age (in years): 
Gender: 
Subject major: 
Nationality: 
Nationality(ies) of your parents: 
Country of birth: 
Native language: 
Second languages: 
- OK Button -  
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Appendix Five: Experiment Instructions 
Instructions 
You are about to take part in an experiment. Your payoff from this experiment will 
depend on the decisions you make during the experiment. Therefore it is important that 
you carefully read and understand these instructions. 
Your earnings from the experiment will be in pounds and you will be paid anonymously 
in cash before you leave the room. You will also receive a £5 show-up fee, in addition to 
any money earned during the experiment. 
During the experiment you will be asked to make a series of decisions. At the end of the 
experiment, one of the decisions you make will be randomly selected to determine your 
payoff. This will be done by a dice roll, as you will make six decisions in total. 
Some of the choices will involve a lottery where you have a 50% chance of each payoff. 
In these cases, we will flip a coin to determine your payoff. 
The experiment will begin shortly. Please raise your hand if you have a question at any 
stage. 
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Follow-up Questionnaire 
Imagine you have a good relationship with your roommate, and that your roommate is 
currently facing an important decision. You have a strong opinion about the decision 
your roommate should make, and need to decide whether or not to give your roommate 
advice. If you give advice that your roommate appreciates, this will greatly enhance your 
relationship. However, if your roommate dislikes your advice, this will seriously harm 
your relationship. If you give no advice, this will have no effect on your relationship. Will 
you give advice or remain silent? 
In Peer Effects Treatments: Yesterday we ran the same questionnaire, and XX% of 
participants chose to give advice while XX% of participants chose to remain silent. 
- OK Button -  
How willing are you to take risks in general, with 0 being not at all willing to take risks, 
and 10 being very willing to take risks? 
- OK Button -  
How willing are you to take risks when driving, with 0 being not at all willing to take risks, 
and 10 being very willing to take risks? 
- OK Button -  
How willing are you to take risks with financial investment, with 0 being not at all willing 
to take risks, and 10 being very willing to take risks? 
- OK Button -  
How willing are you to take risks when engaging in leisure or sport, with 0 being not at 
all willing to take risks, and 10 being very willing to take risks? 
- OK Button -  
How willing are you to take risks with your career, with 0 being not at all willing to take 
risks, and 10 being very willing to take risks? 
- OK Button -  
How willing are you to take risks with your health, with 0 being not at all willing to take 
risks, and 10 being very willing to take risks? 
- OK Button -  
How willing are you to take risks with social approval, with 0 being not at all willing to 
take risks, and 10 being very willing to take risks? 
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- OK Button -  
In Peer Effects Treatments: During the experiment, we gave you information on the 
results from yesterday's session. Did you consider these results when making your 
decisions? 
If you answered "yes" above, please tell us how the previous results affected your 
decisions? 
What do you think this experiment was about? (Optional) 
- OK Button -  
Please answer the following questions: 
Age (in years): 
Gender: M/F 
Subject major: 
Nationality: 
Nationality(ies) of your parents/guardians: 
Country of birth: 
Native language: 
Second languages: 
- OK Button -  
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Appendix Six: Regression with Binary Variable for Culture 
and Interaction Term 
 
  
                                                          
51 Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of 
confidence is indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively. In ordered probit models, the probability 
of the dependant variable taking on any particular value is given by the probability a latent variable 
lies between each cut point. 
Coefficients from Ordered Probit 
Regression on Risk Preference Index51 
Female 
0.112 
(0.265) 
Age 
0.046 
(0.088) 
Business Major 
-0.407 
 (0.343) 
Risk Attitude 
    0.143** 
(0.068) 
Peer Effects 
0.588 
(0.358) 
Asian 
0.213 
(0.341) 
Asian * Peer Effects 
-0.452 
 (0.545) 
Cut 1 
0.660 
(1.773) 
Cut 2 
1.433 
(1.764) 
Cut 3 
2.192 
(1.761) 
Cut 4 
3.795 
(1.796) 
Cut 5 4.104 
(1.816) 
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